Kurdish parties have become kingmakers in Baghdad , and they know
it. As no federal government can work without them, they are pulling
every available political lever to expand the territory and resources
they control, trying to build the foundation of an independent Kurdish
state. But even more than territory, they need security. If everyone
acts quickly and wisely, that understanding could help resolve one
of the Iraq war’s thorniest issues.
No one was more surprised than the Kurds themselves by the speed with
which former peshmerga guerrillas moved into senior positions in the
new Iraqi government: the president, deputy prime minister, foreign
minister, deputy army chief of staff and many less visible but pivotal
spots, especially in the security and intelligence services.
With the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a party Iran created, the
Kurds are working steadily to hollow out the central government so
it won’t be able to attack the Kurdish population ever again,
and to maximize prospects for an independent Kurdistan.
They are also pressing for control of Kirkuk, whose oilfields contain
13 percent of Iraq’s proven reserves. But this two-edged approach
risks freeing other centrifugal forces that could shred the fragile
country altogether.
What the Kurds really need -- and they should admit it publicly --
is long-term security within recognized boundaries.
Once US forces leave, the Kurds’ enemies in Turkey, Syria and
Iran, as well as Baghdad, could easily use local proxies to make life
hell in and around Kirkuk. The July 29 suicide bombings, which killed
61 people in Kirkuk and Baghdad, underscore the volatility of that
region. But with US forces still present and friendly, the Kurds have
an uncommon opportunity to make deals that will be both beneficial
and durable.
Time and again the Kurds have seesawed on whether to accommodate and
fight for minority rights in Baghdad politics, or to rebel, secede
and retreat beyond the Hamrin mountain chain, the northern ridge they
consider their border.
The 1958 revolution, the 1968 coup, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war and the
1990 invasion of Kuwait all led to negotiations on the fate of Kirkuk.
But the talks repeatedly collapsed into chaos and vicious attacks
that killed thousands of Kurds. A bloody Kurdish internal split made
things worse in the 1990s.
The Kurds claim a continuous presence in Kirkuk and see it as vital
to the economic leverage they need to resist central government pressure
and, eventually, to support a statehood bid. Their alliance with US
forces, aided by Turkey’s 2003 refusal to grant transit rights,
let the Kurds solidify their control of the area, smoothed some of
their internal differences and led to a constitution that, in effect,
gives them veto power over much legislation.
But despite their political strength in Baghdad, the Kurds’
minority status in Iraq prevents them from forcing implementation
of other laws they like, such as Article 140 of the constitution,
which lays out a path for formal control in Kirkuk. Arabs in the region
have not been removed (a process referred to as “normalization”);
many displaced Kurds have not returned because of continuing insecurity;
nor has there been a census or a referendum, all of which was supposed
to happen by December 2007. The Baghdad government has excelled in
dithering, and Kirkuk is now in limbo, profoundly backward, unhappy
and divided.
Much parliamentary wrangling centers on federalism as it relates to
the division of power: How much power should regions really have vis-à-vis
the federal government? Should new regions be allowed? If so, how
and how many? Who has the right to manage the country’s oilfields?
How will revenues be shared? Turkey, Syria and Iran observe and pull
their allies’ strings in Baghdad to block any tilt toward Kurdish
preferences.
The result is a central government that is steadily unsteady, which
the major players seem to prefer to any firm resolution, at least
for the time being.
Some Kurdish maps show a Kurdistan that reaches through Syria and
Turkey to the Mediterranean, but no Iraqi Kurdish politicians believe
that is realistic. By acknowledging that their real need is for long-term
security, and that they are unlikely to gain exclusive control over
Kirkuk, they could instead win the right to develop oil and gas fields
within the Kurdistan region under federal legislation that would allow
them to draw international investment and to use export routes through
Turkey.
They could also secure a regional boundary that Iraq and neighboring
states might accept with guarantees of inviolability. In turn, they
should agree to deal with the endemic corruption and indifference
to social needs that is undermining their own local authority.
The Kurds must choose between endless strife and a compromise that
could buy them peace for a generation or more. Their dream of independence,
if not fully realized, at least would not die.
The window of opportunity for compromise agreements is open, but it
is closing fast. Once a new US administration begins withdrawing its
forces, whether by “aspirational” target dates or a final
deadline, the opportunity will have passed. The time for the Kurds
to negotiate a real future for themselves is right now.
---
Joost Hiltermann is deputy program director for the Middle East and
North Africa at the International Crisis Group. This article was prepared
with assistance from the Carnegie Corporation.
Bob
Woodward’s four books chronicling the wars of President
George W. Bush are sensitive barometers of conventional wisdom in Washington.
Whereas the first volume, published in 2002 at the height of the self-righteous
nationalism gripping the capital after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
hailed Bush’s self-confidence in acting to protect the homeland,
the 2008 installment depicts the same man as cocksure and incurious.
This much is not news. More educational are Woodward’s hints
about the worldviews that will outlast this unpopular administration,
embedded in the organs of the national security state. Full
Story>>
The Egyptian
regime has once again succeeded in stifling freedom of speech, this
time not in Egypt, but in the US. Earlier this month, an Egyptian court
convicted a prominent Egyptian-American activist for his outspoken
criticism of the regime’s poor human
rights record in American public fora. The court accused Saad Eddin
Ibrahim, of "tarnishing Egypt's image" abroad. The conviction
referred primarily to writings he published in the foreign press; most
notably among them an August 2007 op-ed in the Washington Post in which
he criticized Egypt's human rights record and questioned the reasons
behind US aid to Egypt. Full
Story>>
Militant
Islam is under global scrutiny for clues to conditions that foster
its rise, and to strategies for reversing that growth. But the key
is not in Islamic doctrine, US foreign policy or formal ties to various
nations, as many analysts have asserted. It lies at the community
level, with clan and local leaders. Full
Story>>
Kurdish
parties have become kingmakers in Baghdad , and they know it. As
no federal government can work without them, they are pulling every
available political lever to expand the territory and resources they
control, trying to build the foundation of an independent Kurdish state.
But even more than territory, they need security. If everyone acts
quickly and wisely, that understanding could help resolve one of the
Iraq war’s thorniest issues. Full
Story>>
The
debate over the war in Iraq follows a yellowing script: The minute
someone suggests that the US move to withdraw its troops, war supporters
cry “Havoc!”
True to form, when no less a figure than Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki stated he wants a timeline for a US pullout, John McCain
summoned the specter of dire consequences. “I’ve always
said we’ll come home with honor and with victory and not through
a set timetable,” McCain said. In his major foreign policy speech
on July 15, Barack Obama affirmed his support for a withdrawal timetable,
adding that the US must “get out as carefully as we were careless
getting in.” Obama’s position is the correct one, but he,
like many other war critics, has done too little to counter the refrain
that withdrawal is simply
“cutting and running,” a recipe for disaster. Full
Story>>
At
the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) earlier this month, presidential candidates
John McCain and Barack Obama competed over who would become the “candidate
for Israel.” The match came to a draw when both candidates
pledged undying and unconditional support for Israel. While their
support for “Israel right or wrong” was unquestionable,
at the end of all the commotion, the most pertinent question for
Americans and the world remained unasked and unanswered: Who is
the candidate for peace? Full
Story>>
