Turkey's
Operation Return to Life
Murat Paker
(Murat Paker,
physician and clinical psychologist, has written on human rights
and the psychology of torture survivors in Turkey.)
December 29,
2000
During
the week of December 19-26, 2000, 10,000 Turkish soldiers violently
occupied 48 prisons to end two months of hunger strikes and "death
fasts" by hundreds of political prisoners. The hunger strikers
are protesting the state's plan to transfer its prisoners from large
wards to US-style "F-type" cells holding one to three
occupants. Operation "Return to Life" -- which left at
least 31 prisoners and two soldiers dead -- lasted a few hours in
most prisons, and up to three days at one prison. Eight prisoners
are reportedly "disappeared," and at least 426 prisoners
have been wounded. 1,005 prisoners have been transferred to F-type
cells.
The armed operation
ostensibly aimed to "rescue" members of illegal, radical
left organizations from "forced" starvation at the hands
of their leaders. But the official number of prisoners conducting
death fasts has reportedly increased to 353 since the operation,
up from 282. Unofficial reports say that up to 2,000 prisoners are
starving themselves, with the active support of 10,000 others. Human
rights groups suspect security forces of burning prisoners with
firebombs during the operation. According to the Human Rights Foundation
of Turkey, some bodies were buried without being identified, and
other deceased prisoners' families and lawyers were not admitted
to the autopsies. As many prisoners are in critical condition with
burns and other injuries, and others are continuing death fasts,
the death toll from Operation Return to Life will likely increase.
The government is now looking for ways to "forcibly treat"
the hunger strikers, in clear violation of international medical
ethics, which prohibit medical interventions without the patient's
consent.
Operation Return
to Life reflects Turkey's deeper political crisis as the country
bids for membership in the European Union (EU) and attempts a cautious
democratic transition. Efforts at democratization run up against
the legacy of the military junta that ruled Turkey from 1980-83,
crushed the left and increased oppression in the Kurdish southeast
-- provoking the conflict with the PKK that has claimed around 35,000
lives. The constitution adopted during this period -- which remains
intact to this day -- established the "supervisory" role
of the military over the political system, lending an authoritarian
bent to all subsequent civilian governments. Recently, all indications
suggest that the military and hardline nationalists have decided
to overtly resist, and if possible to reverse, the process of democratization
in Turkey.
TURKEY'S
PRISON REGIME
Prisons in
Turkey have been widely criticized for failing to meet international
standards of proper infrastructure, and implementing extrajudicial
punishment of prisoners. Since the military coup of 1980, political
prisoners have protested poor conditions through numerous hunger
strikes, death fasts and riots. From 1980-95, 460 prisoners died
from torture, armed operations, lack of medical care or death fasts.
27 prisoners have died from death fasts since 1980, 12 in 1996 alone.
The government has confronted the demands for better conditions
with armed operations in several prisons, resulting in 27 more prisoner
deaths in the last five years. The security forces' use of excessive
force during these operations is well-documented by human rights
groups, but the responsible parties have not been charged with their
crimes.
The declared
rationale behind the government's decision to replace the ward-based
prison system with F-type cells was to end the collective ward life
of leftist political organizations, which had reportedly become
uncontrollable. F-type prisons, modeled after the US prison system,
have little or no shared social space, and would likely dissolve
the social networks that political prisoners in Turkey have traditionally
relied upon to make prison life bearable. Human rights groups, left-wing
parties, the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), the Union of Turkish
Bars (TBB) and the Association of Engineers and Architects (TMMOB)
have spoken strongly against the harsh design of F-type prisons.
A joint report of the TTB, TBB and TMMOB concluded that F-type prisons
are geared to break prisoners psychologically through isolation.
Political prisoners themselves warned of increased prison guard
brutality in isolated cells without witnesses. The hunger strike
began to protest the government's decision to build the new jails
anyway, on the pretext of implementing the prison "reform"
that all observers agree is urgently needed in Turkey.
The hunger
strikers, all members or supporters of radical left organizations,
demanded either abolition of F-type prisons or their redesign under
the supervision of TTB, TBB and TMMOB. They called for prosecution
of perpetrators of previous prison massacres and medical care for
ailing prisoners who had survived previous armed operations and
death fasts. After a month, the hunger strike became a death fast.
On the strike's fifty-fifth day, the Ministry of Justice finally
announced postponement of the F-type transfer pending an agreement
with the strikers, but would not sign a document mandating the professional
organizations' approval of redesigned prisons. Based on their previous
experiences, the prisoners did not trust the Ministry without a
written agreement. Refusing to negotiate further, the government
launched Operation Return to Life few days later. The Minister of
Interior Affairs admitted that the operation had been planned a
year in advance, and right after the operation, hundreds of prisoners
-- including several conducting death fasts -- were transferred
to completed F-type prisons. Lawyers who visited F-type prisons
in Sincan and Edirne recently said that death-fasting inmates had
been left to die in their cells, some exposed to torture. Prison
heating systems did not work, they said, reporting meetings with
shivering prisoners wearing sheets. They estimated the operation's
real death toll at well over 40.
DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION IN DANGER
Operation Return
to Life occurs in the context of increased hopes for a democratic
transition in Turkey. The conflict and tension in the Kurdish region
has decreased considerably, after captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
ordered the organization to withdraw its armed forces outside Turkish
borders, and convinced the PKK to change its strategy to legal,
political struggle. Ocalan's death sentence, currently under review
at the European Court of Human Rights, is unlikely to be carried
out. In 1999, the EU officially approved Turkey's candidacy for
membership, a piece of news enthusiastically received in Turkey.
In October
2000, the EU publicized its requirements from Turkey to start the
official membership process. In response, Turkey was supposed to
prepare its own national program taking the EU demands into account.
Although the requirements of EU membership were well-known from
the beginning, and despite the popularity of EU membership as an
idea, the mere discussion of concrete steps to fulfill the requirements
shifted powerful sectors of the state from a cooperative position
to a defensive, paranoid and isolationist position. Among the requirements
deemed objectionable are: abrogation of the military's supervisory
role over the political system, native-language media and education
for all Turkish citizens, including Kurds, and the commencement
of constructive negotiations with Greece and Cyprus over those countries'
long-standing disputes with Turkey.
The military,
and the ultra-nationalist party MHP in the coalition government,
decry the EU requirements as an attack on Turkish national unity
and even an alliance with the PKK. Most of the other major political
parties and the Turkish media express similar views, though less
intensely. Previously allied sectors of the state have come into
open conflict. For the first time in history, the military and the
National Intelligence Agency publicly disagreed -- over the use
of the Kurdish language in the media. But since the mainstream political
parties lack the political will for an open confrontation with the
military and ultra-right, and since superficial changes in Turkey's
political system will not be enough to qualify Turkey for EU membership,
the EU negotiations are at a standstill.
COMPETING
SELF-IMAGES
Several other
recent events point to hardline resistance to democratization. In
November 2000, several thousand police held illegal demonstrations
to protest the killings of two officers and to demand that the government
include officers convicted of applying torture in the amnesty bill
that came into effect this week, releasing 20,000 non-striking prisoners.
Businessmen called upon the military to intervene in Turkey's "sudden"
economic crisis. Shortly thereafter, the government signed an additional
agreement with the IMF, bringing all key economic policies in line
with the neoliberal demands. Turkish troops have once again crossed
the Iraqi border to pursue PKK forces that have been observing a
unilateral ceasefire for over a year. Operation Return to Life was
not confined to prisons; hundreds of civilians demonstrating against
the prison invasions were detained daily, and harassment of human
rights organizations and legal socialist parties increased.
For decades,
two founding principles have shaped the Turkish state's imagination
of itself, and penetrated large sectors of Turkish society to varying
degrees. On the one hand, Turkey regards itself as part of the "civilized"
Western world, and Westernization is an everlasting "ego-ideal."
On the other hand, Turkey feels surrounded by external enemies and
filled with internal enemies who aim to destabilize the country.
The concrete demands of EU membership make it seem impossible to
reconcile the "ego-ideal" and the nationalist defense
mechanism. Turkey will either redefine its ego-ideal and become
a democratic country -- in or out of the EU -- or reinforce its
paranoid defense, producing more violence and instability. Operation
Return to Life is alarming evidence of the strength of the paranoid
position.
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