Beyond the
Bibi Bill
Israel's Electoral System and the Intifada
Jeff Halper
December 19,
2000
(Jeff Halper,
professor of anthropology at Ben Gurion University, is coordinator
of the Israeli Coalition Against House Demolitions.)
December 18
the Knesset partially amended Israel's electoral law -- the so-called
"Bibi bill" -- allowing Binyamin Netanyahu to run against
Ehud Barak for prime minister. The law had stipulated that when
a government resigns, as Barak's did December 9, elections are held
for the prime ministership only, and that only Knesset members may
present their candidacy. By the amendment, Netanyahu, who resigned
from the Knesset after his 1999 defeat, could have run. But Netanyahu
has withdrawn because the Knesset did not dissolve itself, which
would have led to general elections. The Shas Party, which supported
Netanyahu in the prime minister's race, refused to back this further
amendment. So Netanyahu bowed out, and Ariel Sharon becomes Barak's
challenger in the planned February 6 elections by default.
Barak is behind
in the polls because his transparent attempt to impose Israel's
terms upon the Palestinians at Camp David set off a rebellion in
the Occupied Territories, and because the uprising has produced
great, if exaggerated, concern among the Israeli public regarding
their personal security. The elections are nominally over who will
be tougher with the Palestinians as their uprising approaches its
third month. But the government crisis that precipitated the early
elections is only tangentially related to the intifada and the "peace
process." The underlying causes of the crisis have more to
do with a technical change in the electoral law that preceded the
1996 election. At that time, as part of a broader reform of the
electoral system that never took place, the election of the prime
minister was separated from that of the Knesset. Before 1996, the
leader of the political party that received the most votes was tapped
to head the government. Under the new system, Israelis vote directly
for their candidate for prime minister, in addition to the party
of their choice for the Knesset.
INCOMPLETE
ELECTORAL REFORM
Israel has
always had a singular system of elections. The parties of the 1920s-1960s
-- left, right, religious -- offered the Jewish public limited but
clearly defined choices, political "homes" that offered
members jobs, housing, health care, education and social activities,
including youth movements and sport clubs, all reflecting clear
ideological differences. It made sense to vote for a party rather
than an individual representative. To this day, the entire country
is one voting district, with parties allocated seats in the 120-member
Knesset according to the percentage of the vote they garner. A party
needs a majority of at least 61 in the Knesset to form a government.
Since no party in Israeli history has come close to achieving a
majority on its own, the party that wins the most votes can only
form a government by building a coalition of four to six parties
with a more or less coherent political agenda. In this system, small
parties that make the difference between 58 or 61 carry a lot of
leverage in coalition bargaining.
Over the years,
Israeli society has grown and diversified, with its Palestinian
population taking an active role in civil society and politics,
despite systematic discrimination. New generations have emerged
with entirely different sets of interests and concerns. Ideology
has declined, except among the very religious and among the settlers.
Israeli Jews no longer regard political parties as complete "homes,"
though parties maintain a presence outside the political arena far
beyond that of US parties. The electoral system has not evolved
along with society.
In 1996, no
longer having to vote for one of the big parties to ensure one's
choice of prime minister, the public shattered the system, voting
in greater numbers for small single-issue or single-constituency
parties. Netanyahu fell in large part because he could not handle
his fractious partners in the resulting coalition. The same happened
with Barak: his Labor Party received only 26 seats out of 120 in
the 1999 elections. He forged his ill-starred coalition from ten
ideologically diverse parties, ranging from the super-hawkish National
Religious Party representing the settlers to Shas -- a Sephardi
ultra-Orthodox party dedicated to bringing Israel back to religion
-- to the moderately left-wing but fiercely secular Meretz. Given
the incomplete electoral reform, it is difficult for either Labor
or Likud to formulate and carry out a coherent program. Policies
that the public could be persuaded to support -- the "peace
process" or Barak's aborted "secular revolution"
-- get lost in cynical attempts to woo small groups of single-issue
voters.
BARAK'S
THREE-PRONGED STRATEGY
The refusal
of Shas to dissolve the Knesset refocuses attention on the race
for the prime minister's job, which Barak intends to be a "referendum"
on a peace deal with the Palestinians. As always, Barak is using
the Palestinians as a foil rather than genuinely addressing their
concerns. Neither he nor any Israeli prime minister has ever taken
Palestinian positions seriously, or believed that that they have
requirements independent of Israel's will. Barak has a three-pronged
strategy which he believes can lead to an agreement before President
Bill Clinton's term ends on January 20.
First, the
Israeli military will steadily strangle the intifada, isolating
and besieging Palestinian cities, towns and villages. Closures and
sieges will create widespread unemployment, poverty and discontent.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue to assassinate the
Fatah militants who have led much of the uprising, and to clear
thousands of acres of olive groves and farm land on the pretext
that Palestinian gunmen use the trees as cover for attacks on Israelis.
Combined with periodic air and tank strikes, the strangulation policy
will intimidate the Palestinian population into accepting a return
to negotiations on Israel's terms. Second, Barak will continue to
expand the Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories, so that
the Palestinians will have no illusions that a return to the 1967
borders is possible.
Finally, he
will try to make an attractive offer to the Palestinians at the
negotiating table. This time, the offer could include withdrawing
from all of Gaza and 95 percent of the West Bank, "compensating"
for the settlements with a transfer of land within Israel and perhaps
even recognizing Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount, if Yasser Arafat agrees to forego the right of return for
Palestinian refugees. All the while, he will threaten the Palestinians
with the return of Likud rule, holding the Palestinians responsible
for his winning or losing the election in the court of international
opinion. If he can pull off a peace agreement by late January, Barak
believes, he can be reelected.
LIKUD VS.
LIKUD LITE
The Palestinians
will have a lot to say about the success or failure of this strategy.
Meanwhile, Barak has lost the confidence of wide sectors of Israeli
society: not just the right and the religious, but also the moderate
"left" and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Barak needed
a sort of palace coup, quickly convening the Central Committee of
the Labor Party before any opposition could be mobilized, to have
his candidacy ratified. The wild card on the "left" is
now Shimon Peres. Peres, though carrying the stigma of losing past
elections, is the only political leader who could muster support
from the wider political spectrum -- including from Israel's Palestinian
citizens, who would otherwise simply sit out the election.
On the right,
the Likud Party holds only 19 of the Knesset's 120 seats. Despite
being cleared to run for prime minister, Netanyahu feared that,
like Barak, he would inherit an ungovernable coalition. Had the
Knesset dissolved itself, he would likely have scored an easy victory
over Barak and substantial gains for Likud at the expense of Shas.
But Shas, heeding polls that showed it losing ten of its current
17 seats in prospective general elections, was not willing to sacrifice
itself to Netanyahu's ambitions. Shas resented Netanyahu's heavy-handed
tactic of declaring that he would not run in elections limited to
the prime ministership, a tactic clearly meant to pressure Shas
into backing both provisions of the "Bibi bill."
Stepping back
from the details of the electoral process, polls consistently show
that the Israeli public wants to "make peace" with the
Palestinians, though Israeli politicians have never prepared the
public for the compromises that peace will require. Barak's insistence
on maintaining Israeli sovereignty over 80 percent of the settlers,
his exaggerated demands for "security" borders and his
adamant refusal to even consider the right of return for refugees
appear to doom his desperate gambit from the start. Sharon and Likud
present no alternative except force -- letting the IDF "win."
In the end, both Barak and Sharon offer only a kind of truncated
sovereignty to the Palestinians, even if a Palestinian state is
"granted." Although Barak's positions appear to be far
more conciliatory, they remain firmly within the parameters of continued
Israeli control. If Israeli voters are offered the choice of Likud
or what really amounts to Likud Lite, then they see little reason
to vote for the inferior product. Herein lies the tragedy: mortgaged
to small, ideological parties and unwilling to deal seriously with
the Palestinians, neither large party can lead the public toward
a "real" peace. The public is faced with two equally distasteful
choices in Barak and Sharon, a choice based on the arcane dynamics
of the Israeli political system, not on the issues of peace themselves.
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