Damietta
Mobilizes for Its Environment
Sharif Elmusa
and Jeannie Sowers
October 21,
2009
(Sharif
Elmusa is associate professor of political science at the American
University in Cairo, currently visiting at Georgetown University’s
School of Foreign Service-Qatar. Jeannie Sowers is assistant
professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire,
and currently a fellow with the Dubai Initiative, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.)
In 2008, Egypt’s
Mediterranean port city of Damietta saw escalating protest against
EAgrium, a Canadian consortium building a large fertilizer complex
in Ra’s al-Barr. Ra’s al-Barr sits at the end of an estuary,
where the Damietta branch of the Nile River joins the Mediterranean.
It is a prime destination for vacationing Egyptians in the summertime
and the location of the year-round residences of the Damiettan
elite. Fishermen ply the waters offshore. When plans for the
fertilizer complex were announced, a coalition of locals feared
that all three sources of income -- tourism, real estate and
fishing -- would be jeopardized by emissions into the air and
water. As summer temperatures climbed and the protests mounted,
the government found itself caught between its contractual obligations
to international investors and a well-organized local movement
opposed to the project on both environmental and developmental
grounds.
The Damietta
protests may well mark a watershed for environmental mobilization
in Egypt. The coalition that emerged to oppose the EAgrium plant
crossed class and occupational lines, and included representatives
of voluntary associations, members of Parliament, businessmen,
university professors, landowners, and members of unions and
professional syndicates. These groups employed a diverse repertoire
of protest tactics and mobilizing strategies, including coordinated
statements, petitions, marches, vigils, litigation and strikes.
The coalition also framed its concerns in ways that resonated
with the vast majority of Egyptians struggling to cope with the
rapidly deteriorating conditions in the Delta. Mobilization against
the factory emphasized the health threats posed by polluting
industries, the subsidy of foreign investors, pervasive government
corruption and the lack of environmental enforcement. These concerns
were diffused through Egypt’s increasingly lively public and
media sphere, including new independent newspapers, private TV
stations and well-known regional satellite channels such as al-Jazeera.
The diverse
protest tactics employed in Damietta are part of a larger wave
of social protest that has washed over Egypt in recent years.
Strikes, sit-ins, petitions, road closures and demonstrations
of all kinds are increasingly employed by a dizzying array of
actors, including textile workers, ambulance drivers, public
sector employees, syndicate members, farmers and others. Egypt’s
authoritarian regime has responded with a mixture of repression
and accommodation. While the regime has ringed striking workers
with security personnel, often leading to arrests and skirmishes,
it has also sought to placate them with wage increases, bonuses
and other economic benefits. In stark contrast, protesters making
political demands have invariably been met with force.
The Damietta
protests proved effective in part because they did not simply
pit civil society against the state. Local economic elites and
politicians played key roles in articulating a different developmental
vision for the city and its environs than that promoted by the
central government. To wit, they argued that the area’s economic
development should rest on its natural advantages of sun and
surf, capitalizing on the traditional status of Damietta and
Ra’s al-Barr as premier summer resorts for Egyptians. This case
was bolstered by the input of respected environmental scientists,
whose opinion was solicited as part of a broader government commission
of inquiry. And the movement was not merely local. When the idea
of relocating the plant to Suez or Port Said surfaced in the
press, protests erupted in these cities as well.
The protesters,
however, won the battle and not the war to compel the state to
reorder its priorities for development in Damietta and the country.
The eventual “solution” reached by the government in August 2008
was to offer the foreign investors equity stakes in the Misr
Oil Processing Company (MOPCO), mostly owned by the state and
located right next door to the EAgrium construction site, with
assurances that MOPCO would double its production capacity by
2011.
Attracting
Investors
The Damietta
protests must be situated within Egypt’s broader attempt to attract
foreign investment, particularly in the petrochemical sector,
by “underpricing” its energy resources. The proposed fertilizer
complex in Damietta was sizable, encompassing two ammonia plants
that would produce 1,200 tons per day, and two urea plants that
would produce 1,925 tons per day, along with handling and storage
facilities. The consortium backing the project was 60 percent
held by the Canadian firm Agrium, one of the largest global producers
of fertilizer, with minority shares in the hands of Egyptian
state-owned petrochemical and natural gas companies and an inter-government
Arab petroleum investment corporation. It was to be the seventh
identical fertilizer complex designed and constructed in Egypt
by the German engineering firm Uhde since 2002, except that EAgrium
(E stands for Egypt) was to have double the production capacity.
Other turnkey complexes by Uhde have been completed in Abu Qir
near Alexandria, ‘Ayn al-Sukhna on the Red Sea coast, Helwan
south of Cairo and, in 2006, the Damietta free trade zone directly
adjacent to the proposed new site. This last company, the state-owned
MOPCO, remains operational.
Like many
energy producers, Egypt sets the price for natural gas, the primary
input to urea and ammonia plants, below those that emerge in
futures markets or in prevailing long-term contracts. Energy-exporting
countries face powerful incentives to “underprice” domestic energy
resources in order to attract investment in secondary processing
industries such petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel and other
energy-intensive industries. The Cairo daily al-Misri al-Yawm reported
that the Egyptian government would supply the consortium with
natural gas at a price of $1 per million British Thermal Unit
(MBtu) for five years. This price was set at a time when natural
gas had become more expensive on the world market, and the government
was planning to raise it to $2.65 by 2010.[1] Even
after the anticipated increase the price was far below the level
then prevalent on the New York mercantile exchange -- the so-called
Henry Hub price -- that climbed above $11 per MBtu in May 2008.
By keeping
prices on energy inputs low, the government effectively created
a rent that state-owned companies and private investors alike
were quick to exploit. Most foreign direct investment was earmarked
for sectors related to oil and natural gas. Petrochemicals and
fertilizers, reliant on energy inputs, emerged as two of the
fastest-growing sectors in the Egyptian economy. The five-year
plan of 2002-2007 saw industrial investments worth $9.8 billion.
Egypt exported over $1.1 billion worth of fertilizers in 2005,
and that figure more than doubled to $2.5 billion by 2007, according
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Statistics vary widely
among official sources, but the State Department estimates that
investment flows into the country grew steadily from $3.9 billion
in 2004-2005 to $13.2 billion in 2007-2008. The government, eager
to retain foreign direct investment, was thus reluctant to interfere
with the EAgrium project.
The revenues
from these investments, however, accrued only to the operating
and investing firms. The government’s contracts with consortiums
have not included revenue sharing for local communities or offset
funds to invest in remediation of the impact upon public health
and or the environment. In addition, these capital-intensive
plants generated relatively little employment, particularly when
compared to the privately owned workshops that constitute the
backbone of Damietta’s economy.
Investors
in Egypt prefer to locate in “special economic zones” geared
mainly to exports, where they enjoy long-term tax holidays, release
from customs duties, expedited permits and guarantees from expropriation
by the state. These enclaves are often close to large towns as
well as other industrial facilities. Minimally regulated by Law
83, passed in 2002, most “special economics zones” are exempt
from the nascent systems of environmental management in Egypt.
While the Environmental Management Unit of each governorate is
responsible for monitoring industrial pollution, industrial investments
in these zones fall under the General Authority for Investment
and Free Zones, while investments in new cities and settlements
are governed by the mandate of the Ministry of Housing. Agrium
itself was granted an investment permit under said Law 83.
Local
vs. National Development
In Cairo’s
view, multinational petrochemical plants easily met local environmental
standards and contributed to the gross domestic product. According
to the committee of inquiry later appointed by Parliament in
response to the Damiettan protests, EAgrium was licensed on two
conditions, that it export 75 percent of its annual production
and that it meet environmental and safety standards. By 2007,
project approvals had been obtained from the cabinet and the
relevant officials in the Ministries of Transport, Environment,
Agriculture, Industry, Irrigation and Investment.
National priorities,
however, were in distinct contrast to those of Damietta’s elites.
The coastal province as a whole depends upon revenue from summer
tourism, industry, fisheries and agriculture. Industry employs
35 percent of the labor force, while agriculture employs 25 percent.
Ra’s al-Barr itself is primarily reliant upon domestic tourism
and agriculture. Meanwhile, industrial employment in the province
is concentrated in small and midsize workshops, mostly in the
furniture, woodworking and food processing sectors. These workshops
account for over a quarter of Egypt’s national output in these
activities. Workshop production has been expanding; between 1976
and 1996, the state statistical agency CAPMAS reported 400 percent
growth in furniture makers and 500 percent growth in food processing
operations.
Fishing is
another important means of livelihood for the people of Damietta.
Its boats make up 70 percent of the national fleet, although
the increase in aquaculture, or fish farming, means that Damiettans
catch only about 14 percent of the total fish eaten in Egypt.
This diverse
economy gives Damietta a higher per capita income than most other
Nile Valley provinces. The maritime province ranked third countrywide
in the latest UN Development Program index of human development;
real GDP per capita in 2005-2006 was $6,159. But Damietta also
suffers from the poverty, poor education, ill health and lack
of access to sanitation that plague other provinces. Bilharzia,
a waterborne disease, is endemic, and the problems with water
quality and disposal of solid waste are as severe as they are
elsewhere in the Nile Delta, if not more so.
The governor,
Muhammad Fathi al-Barad‘i, had pursued several highly visible
initiatives to “beautify” Damietta and Ra’s al-Barr to lure more
tourists. He issued a decree restricting economic activities
in Ra’s al-Barr to tourism and related enterprises, an action
repeatedly invoked by those protesting EAgrium. During the protests,
the governor quietly sought to play a mediating role: In April
2008, he met with the man who appointed him, President Husni
Mubarak, and emerged to ask for “self-control, solidarity, alertness
and civilized conduct” from the people of Damietta, a theme he
reiterated as protest accelerated.
Black
Banners Over Ra’s al-Barr
The same month,
organizers in Damietta formed the Popular Committee Against the
Fertilizer Factory. This step came on the heels of a rally in
January called by opposition political parties in the city’s
main square. The rally was quelled by state security forces,
leading to a reevaluation of tactics, according to interviews
with participants. Where the initial rally had relied upon “the
street” alone, the Popular Committee held conferences and issued
communiqués laying out their objections to the factory and calling
for presidential intervention. The first communiqué, addressed
to Mubarak from the people of Damietta, declared that the Committee
represented a collection of civil society organizations, unions
and professional syndicates.
In May, the
Committee issued a statement signed by 150 prominent citizens,
some representing political parties and the local chamber of
commerce. The Committee then sent an open message to the Egyptian
delegates at the Davos economic forum, arguing that Egyptians
welcomed foreign investment as long as it was compatible with
geography. Ra’s al-Barr, they suggested, needed investment, but
not in the petrochemical sector. The Committee also noted that
residents were willing to buy the land allocated to EAgrium;
several days later, the head of the local housing cooperative
formally applied to purchase the plot for a new tourism development.
He noted that the land had been sold to EAgrium for about $7.50
per square meter, and that the cooperative could sell it to developers
for much more. Other groups, such as the similarly named Popular
Committee for the Defense of the Environment, emerged. The original
Popular Committee, according to its coordinator, Nasir al-‘Umari,
was made up of independent lawyers. Opposition parties led the
second, and its head, Samih Balah of the Wafd party, claimed
it was equally active, though less media-savvy.[2]
Environmental
activists and the Popular Committees organized a series of workshops
and conferences to educate the public. Among the events were
“Black Industries and Their Impact on the Environment,” “No to
Agrium, No to Dialogue, Yes to Investment in Tourism” and an
Earth Day celebration titled “Against Resource Drain and Pollution
in Damietta…and No to Pollution in Ra’s al-Barr.”
The popular
committees strategically timed vigils and demonstrations to coincide
with holidays and special events. For Sham al-Nasim, the Egyptian
folk holiday celebrated each spring by both Muslims and Copts,
thousands of people trooped to Ra’s al-Barr, where cabins, villas
and apartments were festooned with black flags and anti-factory
statements. Children stood at the city gates, carrying black
banners emblazoned with the slogan “in sympathy with Ra’s al-Barr.”
A day later, an estimated 5,000 citizens marched bearing still
more black banners. The governor, after failing to get the crowd
to disperse, told the protesters that “Damietta is in the heart
and mind of the president” and that the factory would be moved
to Suez. As part of the Earth Day events, children marched carrying
balloons, flowers and banners that appealed to “President Mubarak
and Mama Suzanne” to “save us from Agrium and grant us the right
to a clean life.”
Such pleas
to the president and his family were intended to distinguish
the “legitimate” protests in Damietta from others that had an
anti-regime flavor. This tactic paid dividends when Mubarak,
according to al-Misri al-Yawm’s local correspondent,
announced that the plant would not be built without the approval
of the people of Damietta.[3] From then on, it was a leitmotif
of the protesters to invoke the president’s pledge. For instance,
when the members of the Damietta local councils announced they
would freeze work if the government did not cancel the project,
they reminded the governor of Mubarak’s promise. In early June,
thousands of protesters held vigils outside mosques, calling
directly on the president for a binding decision on the EAgrium
project. They chanted slogans (rhymed in Arabic) like “We want
a decision, disaster beckons,” “If no one listens to your demands,
we’ll remove the factory with our own hands,” and “Governor,
tell the boss, Damiettans are good folks.”[4] The
protesters thus deliberately played upon the paternalist image
cultivated by the regime, in which the president, as head of
the family, should intervene directly to resolve disputes.
Strikes, formal
complaints to authorities and lawsuits were another tactic employed
by various groups in Damietta, such as professional syndicates
and civil servants. The head of the Chamber of Tourist Facilities
in the Middle Delta threatened that his affiliates would strike,
while Damietta’s lawyers did keep their briefcases shut, effectively
delaying the hearing of numerous court cases.
Opposition
members of Parliament also voiced their concerns, as did the
NDP -- though only after the campaign had gained momentum, according
to Balah and al-‘Umari. An NDP deputy from Damietta observed,
“The government with its terrible suspicious silence did not
move forward and was oblivious to the feeling of the street,
which won’t be calmed until the matter is resolved.”[5] The
secretary-general of the NDP Youth in Damietta filed a court
case against the Ministries of Housing, Environment and New Communities
for issuing permits for the project.
Charges of
corruption were rife. Al-Misri al-Yawm reported that
local council members accused Agrium of fraudulently using their
signatures to indicate their approval of the plant, when in fact
they had merely signed their names as attendees of a meeting
called by the firm. Anti-factory campaigners, including members
of Parliament, also alleged that the company had paid various
officials $25 million in kickbacks to secure the required permits.
These allegations were later found by the parliamentary fact-finding
mission to be inaccurate (a finding al-‘Umari disputes). It seems
that Agrium had donated funds to other projects of the ministries
and local official bodies; if the firm bought influence, it did
so indirectly. Nonetheless, the accusations of bribery helped
fuel the protests.
The fact that
the company is foreign did not help its cause. The Popular Committees
played upon nationalism and local pride to stoke public opposition.
Thus one writer observed that Damiettans had vanquished the Crusaders,
and today could defeat the Canadians. Several calls were made
to declare a “national Damietta day” on days when decisive moves
were made against the project, such as June 19, 2008, when the
lower house of Parliament voted to move the proposed factory.
In the same vein, appeals were made to native sons to come to
Damietta’s aid. The secretary-general of Egypt’s Lawyers’ Syndicate,
Samih ‘Ashour, a Nasserist opposition figure, argued that “the
West” refused to build polluting factories within its borders,
but had no such compunctions in Egypt. The people of Damietta,
he wrote, were merely defending their “land, honor and property.”[6]
Experts
Weigh In
The government’s
response to the uproar in Damietta was to convene two expert
committees, one representing environmental scientists and another
composed of authorities from the relevant ministries. Prime Minister
Ahmad Nazif, who had come under sharp criticism for his supposedly
close relationship to Agrium because he had once lived in Canada,
also endorsed a parliamentary fact-finding committee.
Mustafa Kamal
Tolba, the highly respected former director of the UN Environment
Program, chaired the scientists’ committee. His colleague, the
equally well-regarded Muhammad al-Qassas, had headed the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature. These men had been instrumental
in promoting environmental laws and policies within Egypt, and
were widely perceived as authoritative and independent.[7]
The Tolba
report, released on June 8, confirmed the central contentions
of opponents of the project. As summarized by al-Misri al-Yawm, the
report said that the site of the fertilizer complex had been
chosen in the economic interest of EAgrium, and without adequate
regard for its proximity to population centers. In addition,
it noted that Damietta already hosted a large number of polluting
factories besides its wood and furniture workshops. The report
argued that while the direct outputs of the new complex were
not particularly hazardous, fertilizer production was a hazardous
activity and must be handled produced according to well-defined
procedures. Tourism was the better option for development for
Ra’s al-Barr and environs. Nevertheless, the report aptly summed
up the dilemma of Egypt’s cabinet in noting that breaking the
contract with EAgrium would be costly in terms of compensation
and discourage of foreign investment.
The parliamentary
fact-finding committee report, published on June 9, documented
the contract and the permissions obtained by the company from
various government agencies. The committee found no evidence
of corruption, wrongdoing or environmental violations, but did
not address the central question of whether the proposed location
of the complex was appropriate.
The Tolba
report thus provided the seal of scientific authority that parliamentarians
needed to vote unanimously against EAgrium on June 19. Although
parliamentary decisions are hardly binding in Egypt, where Mubarak
and his predecessors have aggrandized the executive at every
opportunity, it was widely believed that the government could
not pursue the project when its own party had roundly rejected
it. In what newspapers described as a “carnival” atmosphere,
celebrations of the vote continued through the night in Ra’s
al-Barr and Damietta. The following day, Agrium announced it
was studying two options put forward by Prime Minister Nazif,
whereby the government would either directly purchase the company’s
investment or offer Agrium stock in the adjacent MOPCO plant.
The second alternative eventually prevailed.
This “solution,”
however, posed new challenges for the Damietta movement. People
living in the vicinity of both MOPCO and EAgrium said they had
no prior knowledge of the construction of the state-owned MOPCO
complex.[8] While press coverage mostly focused on EAgrium,
residents and allied activists embarked on actions against MOPCO.
Residents complained of smoke, dust, dead fish in the canal,
foul odors, skin rashes and respiratory difficulties. In December
2008, MOPCO was in regular operation and residents reported bitterly
that their complaints had produced little response.
The fact that
MOPCO has continued to operate, with plans for expansion, highlights
the privileged position that well-connected firms maintain in
Egypt’s economy. Despite an intensified privatization program
since the early 1990s, a number of new companies in Egypt incorporate
various forms of state ownership, with stakes held by various
holding companies, government and military agencies, and influential
persons within the regime. As a consequence, these firms remain
more insulated from public pressure than foreign investors.
Exception
or Model?
Some have
suggested that the opposition to EAgrium in Damietta was an exceptional
case, in that the campaign succeeded in pressing its grievances
whereas many other environmental protests have failed. But it
is probably misleading to focus on “Damiettan exceptionalism.”
The Damietta protests reflected the coincidence of the economic
interests of the elite with the health fears of the commoners,
the foreign identity of the firm and the previous experience
of the residents with a similar fertilizer plant. These factors
would have converged in any Egyptian city (as they did in Suez,
which also has a massive fertilizer complex nearby). The campaign
further had a limited, well-defined and seemingly apolitical
aim: blocking the factory. In its aims, the movement was similar
to the strikes that have mushroomed in the country since late
2004, where the government has often acquiesced, in whole or
in part, to concrete, specific demands.
One key dimension
of the EAgrium protests was the mobilization of the local elite.
From Cairo’s perspective, EAgrium was another example of its
success in attracting foreign investment, itself a pillar of
the regime’s efforts to improve the macro-economic picture. But
the provincial elite, in their resistance to the factory, anticipated
Cairo’s argument and married the environment to the economy.
In light of this gambit, neither the government and nor the company
could afford to be nonchalant about environmental damage -- and
its associated health and economic costs. In response, they tried
to argue that the project was environmentally sound or offered
fixes that they claimed would make it so.
The other
striking feature of the Damietta protests was the inclusive nature
of the oppositional coalition. Much of the recent protest in
Egypt has been carried out by relatively homogenous groups, such
as members of unions and syndicates. The Damietta protests, however,
mobilized participants across the highly stratified citizenry.
The ability to act coherently and tenaciously as a community
may well reflect the historical mercantile nature of the city
and its diversified economic foundations in private economic
activities of tourism, furniture and woodworking, fishing and
real estate. The political opposition, both parties and individuals,
was a key player as well. They found the EAgrium project an effective
rallying cry against the government, and were able early on to
mobilize civil society organizations, catalyzed in the Popular
Committees, as well as the local councils and ordinary citizens.
The Muslim Brothers -- the strongest organized political opposition
-- were also an important factor, as evidenced by the frequent
use of Friday prayers as occasions to challenge the government.
Environmental scientists played a prominent role by providing
journalists and parliamentarians with expert assessments of potential
risks and environmental impacts.
This relatively
broad-based coalition employed a range of creative protest tactics.
These included holding rallies on holidays, calling directly
upon the governor and the president to intervene, and highlighting
how foreign investors would profit at the expense of the health
of the locals. Campaigners evoked the historical memory of Damietta
as a bulwark against the Crusaders, equating new petrochemical
firms and their associated pollution loads with invading armies.
Protest leaders also made shrewd use of the independent press,
which was eager to enter the fray to demonstrate its centrality
and enhance circulation. Sales of al-Misri al-Yawm in
Damietta, according to its local correspondent, more than tripled,
from approximately 2,000 to 6,000 copies.[9]
Damietta has
already inspired an imitator in the crowded working-class Cairo
district of Shubra al-Khayma against a proposed petrochemical
factory in close proximity to residential areas. The campaign
-- which goes by the name Itkhannaqna, a colloquial expression
meaning “We’ve Been Suffocated” -- has established a Popular
Committee modeled after Damietta’s, and is hoping to be as successful.[10] In Shubra, however, local economic
elites are not at the helm of the protests. It remains to be
seen whether commoners can force the hand of business and the
government on their own.
Author’s
Note: Our thanks to Karim Kasim, the UN Development
Program representative in Damietta, and the students in Sharif
Elmusa’s sustainable development seminar at the American University
in Cairo. Our thanks also to Hoda Baraka for her research and
interview assistance; and ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Salam and Gamal Mareya
for their insights and observations. The authors share equal
responsibility for the content and analysis herein.
[1] Daily
News (Egypt), August 20, 2008.
[2] Interviews
with Samih Balah and Nasir al-‘Umari, Damietta, June 22, 2009.
[3] Interview with Nasir al-Kashif,
Damietta, June 1, 2009.
[4] Al-Misri
al-Yawm, June 7, 2008.
[5] Al-Misri
al-Yawm, April 26, 2008.
[6] Al-Misri
al-Yawm, May 25, 2008.
[7] On
their role in preserving biodiversity through nature preserves,
see Jeannie Sowers, “Nature Reserves and Authoritarian Rule in
Egypt: Embedded Autonomy Revisited,” Journal of Environment
and Development 16/4 (2007).
[8] Interviews
with residents, Damietta, November 22, 2008.
[9] Interview
with Nasir al-Kashif, Cairo, June 1, 2009.
[10] Sharif
Elmusa and Hoda Baraka, “Justice for the Environment,” al-Ahram
Weekly, April 9-15, 2009.
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