After the
Sharm al-Sheikh Summit
An Armed and Temporary Truce
Mouin Rabbani
(Mouin
Rabbani is a researcher living in Ramallah in the West Bank.)
October 17,
2000
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Further
Info
In the
fall issue of Middle East Report (MER 216), Jeff Halper develops
the argument that a two-state solution under Oslo's terms
leaves Israel in control of the West Bank and Gaza. Read his
analysis online.
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Details of
the understandings reached between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat are trickling
slowly out of Sharm al-Sheikh, the Egyptian resort where President
Bill Clinton convened an emergency international summit October
16. The Israelis and the PA say they will both take "concrete
measures" to contain 20 days of violence that has claimed 105
lives, 98 of them Palestinian, in the Occupied Territories and Israel.
Israel is said to have agreed to end its siege of Palestinian population
centers, pulling back its forces to the positions they occupied
September 27. But the popular uprising in the streets of the West
Bank and Gaza shows no signs of abating. Meanwhile, Barak's spin
doctors put the onus squarely on Arafat, stating that if he fails
to quell an uprising he does not control within 48 hours, Likud
leader Ariel Sharon will be a cabinet minister by next week.
Through direct
action and with growing Arab and international support, the Palestinian
people are demanding an immediate end to the occupation, and by
extension the dismantling of the Oslo "peace process."
Seven years after the famous handshake on the White House lawn,
the Oslo process has brought no real progress toward a just and
lasting peace. Despite the heavy price paid by Palestinians so far,
the uprising is unlikely to completely derail the Oslo process so
long as the cost of the Israeli occupation does not exceed its benefits.
As the Sharm al-Sheikh summit concludes, all signs point toward
a turbulent interlude on the way to a new framework agreement that
will restore peace to the occupation and its beneficiaries. Whether
or not such an agreement will hold remains an open question, but
the events of the past weeks have shown that any agreement within
the framework of continued m ilitary occupation is at best an armed
and temporary truce.
A FATAL
"WRONG TURN"
The events
of the Independence Uprising -- as Palestinians are increasingly
calling their 20-day revolt -- cast grave doubt on Arafat's ability
to enforce quiet without resorting to violence of his own. US and
Western media widely reported the October 12 killing of two Israelis
at the PA police headquarters for the Ramallah/al-Bira district.
According to Israel, the men in question were army reservists reporting
for duty who took a "wrong turn" on their way to a military
base, passed an Israeli roadblock unnoticed and unintentionally
entered Area A -- the territory under Palestinian security control.
Palestinians dismiss this explanation, insisting the two were members
of an undercover unit on active duty. Certainly, the numerous road
signs in Hebrew at entrances to Ramallah make it hard to believe
that the soldiers simply missed their turn.
There are too
many competing versions of subsequent events to establish definite
facts at this stage. But it is clear that news of the Israeli soldiers'
apparent arrest quickly reached a funeral procession then underway
for a Palestinian officer shot dead the previous night. Hundreds
of outraged mourners, a good portion of whom had one day earlier
also participated in the funeral of a villager who had been tortured,
murdered and mutilated by Jewish settlers, set upon the police station
where the Israelis were being held. Demonstrators quickly overpowered
the guards, climbed to the second floor where the Israelis were
being held and beat them to death. One of the bodies was subsequently
thrown out of the window, where a furious mob mutilated it further
before dragging it through the street. Crucially, Palestinian and
Israeli security sources concur that Palestinian policemen did not
participate in the killings and in fact sought to protect the Israelis
in their custody.
Israel did
not wait for an investigation of the incident to respond with overwhelming
force. Later that afternoon, Israeli Cobra attack helicopters launched
simultaneous missile strikes against al-Bira, Bait Lahia, Gaza City
and Ramallah. The targets included Yasser Arafat's West Bank and
Gaza Strip headquarters, various buildings associated with the Palestinian
security forces, a Fatah office in Gaza City, Palestinian Broadcasting
Company facilities and the Gaza port. That evening, Israeli helicopters
conducted additional strikes on Hebron, Jericho, Nablus, Rafah,
Salfit and Tulkarm.
IMBALANCE
OF POWER
The October
12 killings and bombing fanned the flames of the uprising sparked
by Ariel Sharon's entry into the Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem
with the full backing of the minority Labor government. At first,
vocal, nonviolent protest of Sharon's visit was led by a coalition
of Palestinian leaders from the Occupied Territories and Palestinian
members of the Israeli Knesset. The following day, seven Palestinians
(including a resident of Umm al-Fahm within Israel) were shot dead
within the Haram al-Sharif by Israeli troops. By September 30, the
flames had spread to most cities within the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
and Palestinian communities within Israel experienced their most
severe confrontations since the establishment of the Jewish state.
Within an additional week, numerous villages became actively involved
as well, a development which in both 1936 and 1988 signified the
transition from popular uprising to sustained rebellion.
Most clashes
have pitted civilian demonstrators armed with stones and Molotov
cocktails against Israeli soldiers firing tear gas, rubber-coated
steel bullets and live ammunition, including high-velocity bullets
which fragment upon impact. Where such confrontations escalate,
and in those instances where armed Palestinians have become involved,
Israel has deployed heavy machine guns, tanks and attack helicopters.
Israeli soldiers most often fire from reinforced concrete bunkers
where they are in no physical danger. The widespread use of snipers,
in combination with the large and growing proportion of head and
chest wounds sustained by unarmed demonstrators, reinforces Palestinians'
conclusion that Israel is applying a "shoot to kill" policy.
ARAFAT AND
THE PALESTINIAN STREET
Israel claims
that Arafat instructed the dominant Palestinian political faction,
Fatah, to incite the Palestinian public to demonstrate and throw
stones at soliders. The uprising is unquestionably being led by
Fatah and its cadres have played a greater role in the armed clashes
than the PA security forces. But Fatah's ability to mobilize the
Palestinian street was circumscribed by widespread disillusionment
with the PA and a more general political apathy. No less importantly,
there is nothing Yasser Arafat could have said or done to incite
Palestinians more than Israel and its actions. Fatah's success in
sustaining the uprising reflects above all the cumulative popular
anger at continuing Israeli impunity in the Occupied Territories
-- driven home today when Jewish settlers at the village of Beit
Furik near the West Bank town of Nablus killed an unarmed Palestinian
man harvesting olives -- and only secondarily reflects Fatah's ability
to channel this anger.
The degree
of Arafat's authority and control over Fatah is another unanswered
question. The "tanzim" routinely touted in the Israeli
and foreign media does not exist as a separate, paramilitary force
within Fatah. Rather, the "tanzim" and Fatah are one and
the same: Oslo's failure to deliver on basic Palestinian national
rights has enhanced the role of the more skeptical, activist wings
of the movement. Furthermore, the current uprising has pushed militant
local leaders to the forefront of decision-making. Today the secretary-general
of Fatah in the West Bank, Marwan Barghouthi, bitterly criticized
the outcome of the summit and promised a renewed "peaceful
intifada."
OSLO: DOWN
BUT NOT OUT?
Today's summit
agreement shows that the Oslo process has so far survived the uprising
and Israel's unprecedentedly direct attacks on the PA, if barely.
Whether by design or default, Israel and the PA are now vying for
advantages at the negotiating table. While the Oslo framework for
Israeli-Palestinian relations has undergone severe strain, it has
remained intact because neither Israel nor the PA have a viable
alternative. Even if Arafat unilaterally proclaims an independent
Palestinian state on November 15, Israel will eventually acquiesce:
Arafat's state will be primarily symbolic and will complement the
Israeli-American proposals made at Camp David. On the Israeli side,
a Labor-Likud coalition government, should one emerge, is highly
unlikely to risk the international isolation which would result
from abrogating the Oslo process. A two-state solution under Oslo's
terms serves Israel's local, regional and international interests
and leaves it in effective control of the Occupied Territories.
But as the current events demonstrate, such solutions are little
more than recipes for further violence.
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