Running
for Cover: The US, World Oil Markets and Iraq
Chris Toensing
(Chris
Toensing is editor of Middle East Report.)
September 28,
2000
| Further
Info
For
background on US policy toward Iraq, see MERIP
PIN 29: "Politics, Not Policy: Behind US Calls for
War Crimes Tribunals for Iraq"
For analysis
of US oil policy in the Middle East, see Simon Bromley, "Oil
and the Middle East: The End of US Hegemony?" in Middle
East Report 208 (Fall 1998).
The summer
2000 issue of Middle East Report (MER 215), "Iraq: A
Decade of Devastation," offers critical assessments of
both US-led economic sanctions and the strategies of the Iraqi
regime. Phyllis Bennis's introductory article, "'And
They Called It Peace': US Policy on Iraq," is accessible
online.
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Last week's
panic within the Clinton Administration over a potential winter
spike in heating oil prices has greatly eased, as oil prices have
begun to fall. The Democrats' political planners feared that Republican
candidate George W. Bush and voters would blame Clinton and Vice
President Al Gore for failing to forestall the price rise that dominated
the news for the last two weeks. Hence Clinton's acquiescence in
Gore's September 21 call for the US to dip into its Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) despite the counsels of Administration technocrats,
like Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, that tapping the reserve
would not significantly lower oil prices over the long term.
The SPR release
was only one of several Administration strategies behind the scenes
to find political cover as oil prices rose. One strategy that briefly
surfaced in the media was to blame the turbulent oil markets on
planned "disruptions" in Iraqi oil production. The Iraqi
regime obliged last week by voicing harsh criticism of Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia -- accusing those countries of stealing Iraqi oil --
and apparently sending an Iraqi plane into Saudi airspace. US officials
appear to believe that the shrill Iraqi rhetoric mirrors Iraq's
threats against Kuwait in 1990. Iraq, they argue, is looking for
ways to increase its leverage in the ongoing debate over economic
sanctions and how to implement the Oil-for-Food program. Will the
Iraqis -- still the sixth-largest supplier of crude oil to Western
markets despite sanctions -- cut back production to drive up prices?
THE REAL
IRAQI CALCULUS
Iraq's belligerence
was about more than Oil-for-Food. Rather, Iraq was greatly concerned
about today's UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) meeting. At this
meeting, the UNCC accepted a huge $15.9 billion Kuwaiti claim for
oil field damage caused by the Iraqis in 1990-1991. Baghdad not
only sees this compensation demand as excessive, but also fears
that the claim could open the floodgates for more large claims against
Iraq by various other countries and companies. The regime can ill
afford this danger to its revenue base.
Faced two weeks
ago with this prospect, Baghdad signaled that it was prepared to
take drastic action, maybe even temporarily suspending its oil exports
under the Oil-for-Food program. On September 20, the five permanent
members of the Security Council concocted a diplomatic face-saving
formula. With Russia, France, China and two temporary members of
the committee, Tunisia and Malaysia, calling for delay on the Kuwaiti
compensation decision, US and UK officials at the UN suddenly began
to emphasize the need for consensus among all UNCC members before
moving ahead with the claim.
September 27,
the five permanent Security Council members reduced the amount of
oil export revenue to be used for Iraq's reparations payment from
30 percent to 25 percent effective in December, probably assuaging
Iraq's anger at the scale of the Kuwaiti claim for now. Given the
recent signs that Iraq's international isolation is lessening --
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez visiting Iraq and French and
Russian planes landing in Baghdad -- the UN allies of the Iraqi
regime are pressing Iraq to claim a political victory and rest easy
that Iraqi concerns are being taken seriously by the council. Iraq's
deputy foreign minister, Riyad al-Qaisi, scoffed today at the five
percent decrease in the oil sales contribution to reparations. But
cooler heads will likely prevail: Iraq has no immediate cause to
suspend exports.
US POLITICKING
IN THE G-7 AND OPEC
To magnify
the effect of the SPR release on the market, the US is pushing a
coordinated release of reserves by the entire G-7 group, or a subset
thereof, on September 29. The US wants broad cooperation from the
G-7, both because world prices would be much more likely to fall
and because coordinated action would insulate the Administration
from Republican charges -- voiced last week by Bush -- that the
SPR release holds long-term energy security hostage to US electoral
politics. The Europeans need the coordinated release because French
and UK Prime Ministers Lionel Jospin and Tony Blair, and even German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, are feeling threatened by deepening
fuel protests. US officials are investigating the impact of a release
among large oil companies. France and Spain have long favored a
release of petroleum reserves, and now the last holdout, Germany,
appears to be wavering. It is likely that a coordinated G-7 action
for a period of three months would cause prices to fall by $3-4
per barrel, diminishing even further the political pressure on governments
on both sides of the Atlantic.
Meanwhile,
the US called on OPEC to hike production at its September 25 meeting.
The OPEC meeting was mostly uneventful, stressing "stability
and cooperation" as usual. Only Saudi Arabia has the spare
capacity to cover the extra production, and the Saudis would prefer
not to tap it. Hence the Saudis welcomed news of a possible G-7
SPR release. The threatening statements emanating from Caracas probably
only reflected Venezuela's position, and do not signal that OPEC
will cut production.
OIL MARKETS,
DECEMBER SURPRISES
Falling oil
prices have lightened the tense atmosphere of the last two weeks,
when Iraqi threats to cut production and US saber-rattling fueled
increased speculation about an "October surprise" -- intensified
US bombing of Iraq. But the latest round of UN compromises doesn't
alter the fundamental irritants to Iraqi-Western relations: sanctions
remain in place and Washington will keep them there as long as Saddam
Hussein rules Iraq. Ironically, the cooling of tensions now may
presage sharper tensions over oil in the coming months.
Iraq is not
especially eager to wield its oil weapon. Key European states --
France, Germany, the Netherlands -- are reeling from the social
impact of high oil prices, and Iraq wants to avoid alienating them
so that the erosion of international consensus on sanctions may
continue. The oil weapon might not be so effective in any case,
since the resulting oil output gap could be partially filled by
a Saudi production increase.
But the UN
compromise on the Iraq reparations payment issue does not preempt
the possibility that Baghdad will suspend oil supply in the coming
months. At the end of the current eighth phase of Oil-for-Food program
in early December, Iraq may be tempted to halt exports. Baghdad
certainly paid attention when the US and UK quieted their clamoring
for the Kuwaiti claim in the UNCC because they feared the consequences
for Iraqi supply. A looming Iraqi export suspension will keep nagging
pressure on the Security Council to soften the terms of the Oil-for-Food
deal, especially the contract approval process that allows the US
and UK to hold up otherwise approved transfers of goods to Iraq.
As early as December, the lame duck Clinton Administration may once
again be running for political cover as Iraqi threats, rising global
consumption and winter weather cause oil prices to rise anew.
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