Investigating
the Cole Bombing
Charles Schmitz
(Charles
Schmitz teaches geography at Towson University in Baltimore.)
September 6,
2001
The
investigation of last October's bombing of the USS Cole in Aden
continues to irritate US-Yemeni relations. Last week, the agreement
worked out between the Clinton White House and Yemeni authorities
in November 2000, in which the FBI was allowed to submit questions
to Yemeni investigators and observe interrogations, seemed to break
down once again. Reports in American papers reiterated US accusations
that Yemeni authorities were not cooperating with FBI investigators.
"Senior bureau investigators say Yemen has denied them access to
prominent Yemenis whom the Americans want to interview in their
bid to link the attack to elements of [Osama] Bin Laden's network
in Yemen, which became a key base for him in the early 1990's,"
the New York Times stated. Yet this week, reports in the Washington
Post and the English-language Yemen Times say that FBI agents have
returned. Earlier reports of the FBI's return have turned out to
be false. At the beginning of August, part of the US investigative
team apparently arrived only to leave shortly thereafter. The current
reports in the Post and the Yemen Times have not yet appeared in
the Arabic-language press in Yemen.
Quick reversals
and conflicting statements in the press are indicative of the considerable
tension in current US-Yemeni relations. Hot on the trail of Osama
Bin Laden, its current arch-enemy, the FBI is treating the Cole
investigation as an issue of US national security. US investigators
remain convinced that the men awaiting trial in an Adeni prison
were only part of a wider conspiracy that includes people in the
Yemeni government. Last fall, a New York Times article on the case
featured pictures of several prominent Yemeni officials and political
leaders, suggesting that they had some role in the bombing or at
least continuing links to Bin Laden. Yet no real evidence to support
these charges has been presented. The only possible link to Bin
Laden in the Cole case is a suspect now thought to be in Afghanistan.
US investigators say he is the key to their claims. Yet US officials
seem to believe that all political groups espousing Islamic rhetoric
in Yemen are suspect, and subject to FBI interrogation. As in the
Khobar Towers investigation concluded in June 2001, where US investigators
insisted on keeping the case open in hopes of finding a smoking
gun implicating Iran, in the Cole case the US foreign policy agenda
takes precedence over the rule of law in a foreign country.
"ENHANCED"
OBSERVERS
In Yemen, things
are seen quite differently. The Yemeni government would like to
try the suspects according to Yemeni law -- which guarantees a speedy
trial -- and they resist giving US investigators access to high
Yemeni officials based upon the FBI's vague suspicions, or perhaps
even prejudices. As Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qurbi put it: "[J]ust
because you have an Islamic connection does not mean that you have
any relationship to the Cole bombing." The Yemeni authorities are
particularly anxious to avoid the appearance that they have surrendered
national sovereignty to US investigators at a time when the confrontation
in Palestine has turned public opinion sharply against US policy
in the Middle East. Like the federal indictments in the Khobar Towers
case, which alienated Saudi law enforcement officials, FBI actions
have caused considerable resentment in Yemen.
Further complicating
the issue are apparent tensions between US diplomats in Yemen and
the FBI team and the repeated issuance of vague warnings about possible
terrorist attacks against US interests in the Arabian Peninsula.
In a series of bizarre incidents in June, following the Khobar indictments
in Virginia, the FBI team in Yemen withdrew to an "unspecified"
country, the consular service at the US embassy in Yemen was closed,
ships of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain were sent out to sea
and US Marines participating in maneuvers in Jordan were evacuated.
In Yemen, American investigators announced that a group had been
caught with plans to attack the US Embassy in Sana'a and asked Yemeni
authorities to round up the suspects. Yemeni authorities cooperated
with American demands, but then reversed themselves when the Yemeni
president said that the local religious group named by the Americans
posed no security threat. US credibility was further strained at
a meeting for members of the American expatriate community in Yemen
where US officials could cite no new evidence of a security threat
justifying the embassy closing. Officials merely listed various
kidnapping incidents over the last ten years and the Cole bombing.
Then reports surfaced that the FBI team in Yemen had withdrawn because
of differences with the US ambassador, Barbara Bodine, over a request
to carry heavier weapons. The head of the FBI team had asked for
greater firepower fearing a looming attack. The ambassador refused
the request, citing local sensitivities to heavily armed American
investigators who were supposed to be mere "enhanced" observers,
and the FBI unilaterally withdrew. Needless to say, the FBI team
slated to return soon to Yemen has new personnel.
CONVERGENCE
OF INTERESTS
In Yemen, the
constant issuance of security warnings is interpreted as political
pressure on Yemeni authorities to allow US investigators free rein
to pursue Yemeni officials with "links" -- however tenuous -- to
Bin Laden. Yemeni authorities find this line of inquiry objectionable,
since they share US interests in a stable security regime in the
region. In recent years Yemen has normalized relations with all
her neighbors, signing treaties to resolve border disputes and demarcate
common borders and submitting to international arbitration to resolve
a territorial dispute with Eritrea over the Hannish islands in the
Red Sea. Yemeni authorities have readily cooperated in building
a military relationship with the US. American soldiers led efforts
to remove land mines after the civil war of 1994, US and Yemeni
troops have conducted joint maneuvers, Yemeni personnel have received
specialized training in the US, Yemen purchased $5 million in arms
from the US and the commander of the Fifth Fleet recently traveled
to Sana'a. The US Navy chose Aden as a port of call for the Cole
and other ships partly to boost the economy of the Port of Aden
while further improving military relations with Yemen.
The Yemeni
government also shares the particular US concerns about domestic
political challenges from religiously inspired groups. After the
two Yemens merged in 1990, many Yemenis who had fought -- with US
backing -- against Soviet influence in Afghanistan returned to south
Yemen to continue their cause against the godless communists in
the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The trouble these
"Afghani Arabs" caused for the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) of the
south was politically convenient for the leadership of the former
Yemeni Arab Republic, for it both weakened the YSP and enabled the
northern leadership to claim that it was the moderate center between
leftist socialists and conservative Islamists. However, after the
civil war of 1994 in which the YSP was defeated, the conservative
groups became the sole political rival of the victorious northern
Yemeni leadership.
GOING AFTER
"EXTREMISTS"
Since the war
the Yemeni leadership has moved decisively to weaken Islamist political
groups and gain tighter military control over its territory. When
Wahhabi groups attacked mosques and other Islamic religious sites
in Aden that they considered "un-Islamic" shortly after the war,
the government swiftly crushed them with a large military force.
Again in late 1998, when militants kidnapped foreign tourists, the
government responded with force of arms, killing four hostages in
the rescue mission. The leader of the militant group, the Aden-Abyan
Islamic Army, was executed after his trial. Yemeni authorities also
expelled thousands of non-Yemeni residents suspected of belonging
to "extremist" groups after the war. In the elections of 1997, 1999
and 2001, the ruling party presented itself as the moderate center
representing tolerance and justice against their erstwhile allies
in the Yemeni Reform Group, Islah, whom they now painted as "extremist."
In pursuit
of the Cole bombing perpetrators, the Yemeni authorities also took
the liberty of rounding up whomever they suspect has ties to any
group opposing the government. Clearly, the Yemeni government is
interested in promoting an image of inclusive tolerance of the widely
divergent political, regional and religious groups in Yemen while
at the same time increasing domestic stability and security, on
its own terms. It has no interest in cooperating with, or even harboring,
groups that actually do work closely with Bin Laden. As was widely
noted in Sana'a, the Cole bombing was aimed at Sana'a as much as
it was at Washington. Why US investigators insist upon their right
to interrogate the upper echelons of the Yemeni regime, when the
Yemenis have been very compliant in their relations with the US,
is a mystery perhaps only the FBI could solve.
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