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Final
Status in the Shape of a Wall
Catherine Cook
(Catherine
Cook is media coordinator at the Middle East Research and Information
Project.)
September 3,
2003
In Jayyous,
a village of 3,000 in the northern West Bank, Najah Shamasneh cradles
her granddaughter in her lap and listens to her husband Yusuf tell
of the loss of their agricultural land. The Shamasneh family's 25
dunams (about 6.25 acres), their sole source of income, now lies
on the western side of the wall that Israel is erecting in the West
Bank.
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The Shamasnehs'
impromptu shelter, near Jayyous. (Catherine Cook)
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Around the
city of Qalqilya, Israel's "security fence" is a 25-foot
concrete wall crowned by watchtowers at regular intervals. In other
areas, such as near the village of Falamiyya, it is a complex arrangement
of structures that together form a formidable barrier. The "fence"
begins in the east with a tangle of concertina wire in front of
a trench between six and 13 feet deep. Behind the trench runs an
unpaved military road, a chain link fence topped by barbed wire
and then a paved military road. According to some reports, the fence
is electrified in some places. Combined, these structures stretch
across 200 to 330 feet. In some places, a second barbed wire fence
bristles on the western side of the paved road. In others, the entirety
of the barrier consists of one military road and a barbed wire fence.
Thermal imaging cameras, radar-equipped observation towers and touch-sensitive
pads have been installed, or soon will be, along much of the wall.
Officially,
Israel argues that the wall is being constructed for security reasons,
but the structure's meandering path betrays underlying territorial
ambitions. In places, the barrier dips over three miles into the
West Bank, leaving on the "Israeli" side settlements,
fertile Palestinian land and valuable water resources. While the
form of the wall varies, everywhere its impact is to confiscate
more Palestinian land, isolate Palestinian communities from one
another and sap their social and economic viability. This much is
well-documented. Less heavily covered are the links between the
wall's humanitarian consequences and political developments. Though
the wall is not mentioned in the US-sponsored "road map,"
it intrudes upon each of the main issues to be negotiated during
the road map's final phase -- the status of settlements and Jerusalem,
the borders between Israel and Palestine, and the fate of Palestinian
refugees.
CONSTRUCTION
AND DESTRUCTION IN JAYYOUS
According
to Abdullatif Khaled, a hydrologist with the Palestinian Hydrology
Group, and regional coordinator of the Apartheid Wall Campaign,
survey markers first appeared on Jayyous lands in July 2002. Two
months later, a resident found, affixed to a tree, an edict from
the Israeli military commander calling the village together to tour
the projected route of construction. At the meeting, villagers learned
that a 3.5-mile wide swath, comprised of 75 percent of their farmland,
thousands of fruit and citrus trees, over 150 greenhouses and at
least six wells, would disappear behind the barrier. At least an
additional 550 dunams were eventually bulldozed to make room for
the wall itself, along with another 8,000 fruit and citrus trees.
With 95 percent of village families dependent on the lands behind
the wall for their livelihood, the economy of Jayyous has been dealt
a serious blow.
Since November
2002, Najah Shamasneh and her family have been living in fields
that are now isolated on the "Israeli" side. A single
gate, controlled by Israel, regulates movement of Palestinian farmers
in and out of the fields. According to Khaled, around 300 families
travel through the gate on a regular basis. The Shamasnehs, along
with 30 or 40 other families, have taken up full-time residence
in the area, battling the flies, dirt and summer heat in makeshift
shelters. Despite these hardships, the Shamasnehs argue that Israel's
arbitrary control of the gate makes it impossible for them to tend
their crops while living in their family home in the village. Others
fear that if they do not maintain a constant presence, at some point
they will not be allowed to return.
The main water
resources of Jayyous also lie in the area behind the fence. Following
the Israeli occupation in 1967, again according to Khaled, villagers
were prohibited from installing pipes to connect the village with
the wells in the fields, forcing residents to rely on water tankers.
Dependence on transported water and restricted access to the wells
have created a serious water deficiency. In the summer of 2003,
Jayyous had running tap water for two hours every three days, prompting
many villagers to warn of potential health risks.
COMPLETED
AND PROJECTED
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A view
of the "security fence" near the village of Falamiyya.
(Catherine Cook)
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In late July
2003, the Israeli government announced it had completed the first
phase of construction of the wall in the West Bank. The largest
completed section runs from east of Jenin to the settlement of Elkana,
southeast of Qalqilya. Smaller segments of the wall run from east
to west, south of Ramallah and on the northern edge of Bethlehem.
In addition, a north-south segment has been built on the eastern
edge of Jerusalem. Fourteen gates provide controlled access to agricultural
areas on the western side of the wall.
The exact path
of the remaining portions of the wall is not yet known. In a March
2003 report, the Israeli human rights organization B'tselem reported
that while the Israeli cabinet approved the construction of the
wall in principle in June 2002, it left authority over its route
in the hands of the prime minister and the minister of defense.
A variety of proposals are currently under consideration, and a
number of factors, including domestic and international opinion,
will undoubtedly influence the eventual reach of the barrier. In
the meantime, Israeli, Palestinian and international organizations
tracking the construction have relied on land confiscation and demolition
orders issued to Palestinians, published maps, official statements
and satellite imagery to forecast a number of scenarios for the
wall's final contours.
Original projections
for the western portion were altered in early 2003, when the Israeli
Ministry of Defense announced that the wall should extend westward
to encompass the settlements of Ariel and Immanuel, deep in the
heart of the West Bank -- a position which Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon publicly supported in May 2003. In March, Sharon proclaimed
his intention to build another segment of the wall on the western
rim of the Jordan Valley. Included in Israeli and Palestinian NGO
projections are three "depth barriers" that will have
only one entry/exit point. Outside the walled areas are numerous
"enclaves" -- pockets of isolated Palestinians -- some
of which are to be encircled with fences of their own. According
to the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON), six such
fenced enclaves will probably be established.
It remains
unclear whether these proposals will be implemented in full. If
they are, the wall will confine the majority of the Palestinian
population of the West Bank to two or three large cantons comprising
some 45 to 50 percent of the West Bank's territory. If not in the
major cantons, Palestinians will be isolated from each other in
the three "depth barriers," the "enclaves" or
East Jerusalem. Tunnels or fenced roads have been proposed to link
the cantons. PENGON estimates that the completed fence will be significantly
longer than the Green Line -- the 190 mile-long internationally
recognized border between Israel and the West Bank. Construction
of the eastern side of the fence would bring the total length of
the wall to between 360 and 435 miles.
Independent
analysts from PENGON, B'tselem and other groups predict that large
tracts of land lying outside the wall may eventually be annexed
to Israel, but even if not, Israeli regulation of all entry and
exit points to Palestinian areas ensures ultimate Israeli control
of the cantons and enclaves. Combined with existing Israeli settlements
and the network of settler-only bypass roads developed during the
1990s, Israel's wall cements a topography of geographically disconnected
Palestinian population centers, cut off from one another and from
their sources of livelihood.
SETTLEMENT
PLANS
One of the
biggest objections to the wall, voiced by both the Israeli right
and the Bush administration, has been that Israel is in actuality
constructing the border of the future Palestinian state. Israel
argues that the wall is a temporary security measure, rather than
a political fait accompli. However, while the security argument
certainly accounts for the widespread Israeli domestic support for
the wall, at an estimated cost of $2.27 million per kilometer during
one of the country's worst economic recessions, claims that the
wall is "temporary" appear spurious at best. As UN Special
Rapporteur John Dugard noted in the International Herald Tribune
on August 4: "What we are presently witnessing in the West
Bank is a visible and clear act of territorial annexation under
the guise of security."
The logic
behind the snaking route of the barrier can be found in Israel's
settlement policy, including settlement construction, expropriation
of land and the network of bypass roads criss-crossing Palestinian
territory. By carefully tailoring the path of the wall to place
existing settlements on the "Israeli" side, Israel can
effectively maintain control over much of the land, resources and,
subsequently, the population and economy, of the West Bank. Particularly
telling is the fact that projections of the final path of the wall
coincide quite closely with Israeli settlement plans dating back
decades, especially those favored by Sharon.
For Jayyous
residents, the confiscation of their land for the wall is part of
a larger pattern of confiscation and settlement dating back to the
mid-1980s. Residents report that in 1986 Israel confiscated 1,362
dunams on which the settlement of Zofin and a quarry were built.
In 1990, Israel confiscated another 30 dunams of land near the eastern
entrance to the village and established a trash heap for area settlements.
During the
first phase of construction, settler lobbyists succeeded in altering
the wall's path to include the Alfe Menashe settlement, which now
lies on the western side of the wall. Alfe Menashe (population 5,000)
now stands within a bubble of territory equivalent in size to the
area remaining for Qalqilya (population 42,000). With the resulting
uninterrupted territorial contiguity between the settlement and
Israel, the future growth of this settlement can be guaranteed.
In contrast, the future of Qalqilya, which is now surrounded on
all sides by 25 feet of concrete, seems bleak at best. Entry and
exit to the city is regulated by one Israeli army checkpoint. Qalqilya
residents have been cut off from surrounding agricultural land and
the 32 surrounding villages have been isolated from what was once
the commercial center of the region.
According to
B'tselem, Israel built the wall north of the Palestinian villages
of Habla, Izbat Jal'ud and Ras Atiyya in order to provide a corridor
of direct access from Alfe Menashe to Israel, via Route 55. Residents
of Habla must now travel 12 miles around the wall and through checkpoints
to reach Qalqilya, a city that lies a mile away as the crow flies.
The Palestinian villages of Ras Atira and al-Dab'a, which are near
Alfe Menashe, are trapped between the wall and the Green Line, their
residents cut off from the West Bank and unable to enter Israel.
Further south,
in the Jerusalem area, the first phase of the wall's construction
solidified what is widely referred to as the "Jerusalem envelope."
The new barriers extending east-west from Ofer military camp to
Jaba village (north of Jerusalem) and from Gilo settlement to Umm
al-Qassis (northeast of Bethlehem), as well as a north-south wall
in East Jerusalem, effectively seal off the eastern portion of Jerusalem
from the West Bank. Settlements already surround the eastern portion
of the city.
To date, the
"security fence" places ten Israeli settlements and approximately
20,000 settlers to its west. With settler groups lobbying to include
major settlements, such as Ariel and Immanuel, on the western side
of the wall, and settlements like Shilo and Elon Moreh on the eastern
side of the Jordan Valley wall, PENGON projections indicate that
98 percent of the settler population will be located outside of
the wall. Israel is creating "facts on the ground" that
will prejudice the outcome of the negotiations over the fate of
settlements that are called for in the "road map."
ISRAEL'S "FINAL
STATUS" NEGOTIATIONS
Despite near
universal international agreement that settlements are illegal and
constitute a violation of Israel's obligations under the Fourth
Geneva Convention, their construction has continued relatively unabated,
under both Labor and Likud governments, since the 1970s. While the
issue of settlements was slated for talks during the final status
phase of the Oslo process in the 1990s, Israel used the intervening
years to double the settlement population and create a network of
bypass roads that divide Palestinian territory, while connecting
settlements with one another and with Israel. The Palestinian leadership
is now faced with having to negotiate the status of settlements
that did not exist when they initially agreed to negotiate over
settlements in the early 1990s. Settlement construction in and around
the Jerusalem area has been so intensive that much of the Israeli
public finds it inconceivable to discuss dismantling Jerusalem "neighborhoods"
such as Ma'ale Adumim, a massive housing bloc to the east of the
city.
The extent
to which the settler movement, thus far, has been able to alter
the path of the wall to include settlements on the western side,
along with ongoing lobbying about its future path, indicates that
the settler population, at least, views (or fears) the wall's construction
as more than a temporary measure. Should the wall be completed as
projected, in all likelihood its contours, rather than Palestinian
needs, will determine the outcome of negotiations on borders. Additionally,
as the wall's path becomes clearer, so too does Israel's position
on which settlements will remain and which ones are likely to be
dismantled.
In effect,
Israel is now conducting its own "final status" negotiations
-- among the Israeli government, the Israeli public and the settler
movement. Should the wall be completed, the issues of borders and
settlements could be largely decided; the fate of Jerusalem could
also be determined, as the city is already enclosed on three sides
by settlements and bordered by Israel to the west. The wall also
severely limits options for Palestinian refugees, particularly those
forced from their homes in 1948. Since Israel has repeatedly stated
that it will allow no refugees to return to homes inside Israel,
many analysts have assumed that the bulk of refugees who leave their
present abodes will eventually be absorbed within the future Palestinian
state. However, if that state will comprise only 45 to 50 percent
of the West Bank, a large-scale resettlement of refugees is doubtful.
CAMP DAVID
PLUS
In July 2000,
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations broke down at Camp David when Palestinian
negotiators rejected an Israeli "generous offer" that
would not have created a contiguous, viable Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Camp David proposal divided the
West Bank into three large cantons, surrounded on all sides, and
consequently controlled, by Israeli territory. Completion of all
portions of Israel's wall will constitute de facto implementation
of the Camp David proposal -- but with less territory for the Palestinians.
Completion
of the wall as proposed will likely impede the development of an
integrated Palestinian economy, leading to further impoverishment,
higher unemployment and ruptures in the already strained social
fabric. Access to existing jobs, education facilities and health
services will be further restricted. If present plans are followed,
not only will Jerusalem be completely separated from the West Bank
and, consequently, political, economic and social ties severed,
but the physical barriers erected around the city will prevent the
Palestinian population there from building outward. The resulting
increase in population density, coupled with wall's hindrance of
commerce and investment, could turn much of Jerusalem and other
Palestinian towns into urban slums. "Without land, without
water, how will people live?" asks PENGON coordinator Jamal
Juma'.
In Qalqilya,
once the urban hub for 32 villages, the effects of the wall are
already plain to see. The wall's sealing off of the city has accelerated
the economic downturn caused by repeated closures and curfews during
the current intifada. Six hundred out of 1,800 shops have closed
due to lack of business, and the unemployment rate has reached 80
percent. In a process of "quiet transfer," as many as
4,000 residents have left town in hopes of brighter prospects elsewhere.
The heads of an additional 2,000 households have been forced to
move outside the city in order to find employment. In the village
of Nazlet Issa, north of Tulkarm, construction of the wall has meant
the total destruction of its market. In January 2003, the Israeli
military destroyed over 80 of the market's shops. On August 22,
the military completed the job, destroying an additional 100 shops
and five houses.
Should the
construction of the barrier proceed, similar effects can be expected
in other Palestinian communities, adding to the already deep frustrations
of Palestinians. "There are no choices for the people here,"
one angry farmer living in the fields of Jayyous asserted. "There
is only one solution: UN resolutions [supporting a two-state solution
following the end of the Israeli occupation]. They live there and
we live here. But this wall shows that they don't want this....
We love life like everyone. Do you think we like to bring our wives,
our children here to live? We have no choice. After this, no one
can hold us responsible for what we do." Because of its political
implications, Israel's "security fence" could very well
lead to greater insecurity and the continuation of conflict.

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