Antinomies
of the Saad Eddin Ibrahim Case
Mona El-Ghobashy
(Mona El-Ghobashy,
a doctoral candidate in political science at Columbia University,
covers Egyptian politics for the Cairo Times.)
August 15, 2002
In the latest
twist in the bizarre saga of the Saad Eddin Ibrahim case, on July
29 an Egyptian state security court sentenced the American University
in Cairo (AUC) sociology professor to seven years in prison, and possibly
hard labor, for the second time. Ibrahim, a dual Egyptian-American
citizen well-regarded in the West as a pro-democracy advocate, is
charged with receiving foreign funds without government permission,
tarnishing Egypt's image abroad and embezzling grant money from the
European Commission. International human rights organizations have
condemned the verdict. The European Commission has vocally denied
the embezzlement charge, and reminded the Egyptian government that,
if the accusation is true, then the EC should try Ibrahim, not Egypt.
In the face
of international disapproval, it seems clear that President Hosni
Mubarak's regime is using the Ibrahim case to send a message to
both domestic and international audiences. To Ibrahim's supporters
abroad, the regime appeared to say that Ibrahim's prominence and
US citizenship cannot protect him from arbitrary prosecution. To
domestic human rights activists and reformers, the government singled
out an unusually well-connected advocate to reinforce the message
that the Egyptian government will tolerate citizen participation
in politics -- not to speak of dissent -- only within proscribed
limits.
While the 63
year-old sociologist languishes in jail, the distinctly quieter
domestic reaction to Ibrahim's plight stands out. Especially after
the June 2002 passage of a new NGO law -- by all accounts more draconian
than its two predecessors -- why have Egyptian intellectuals and
activists not vigorously defended Ibrahim, who is seen in the West
as one of their leading lights?
IN
SEARCH OF A CAUSE
Egyptian observers
were surprised, but not shocked, when Saad Eddin Ibrahim was arrested
at his home on June 30, 2000 and held for 45 days in prison. The
1990s was a decade of steadily increasing regime repression on every
front. The 1995 legislative elections featured widespread rigging
in favor of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and some
of the worst violence in the nation's electoral history. In the
same year, the regime began to refer members of the reformist, non-violent
Muslim Brothers to military tribunals. Only a day after Ibrahim's
conviction, 16 leading Muslim Brothers were sentenced by a military
tribunal to prison terms of 3-5 years. Torture was widespread in
police stations, and the country's many political prisons swelled
with detainees from both the Brothers and the radical Islamist Gamaa
Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad. The government kept a tight grip on
political party formation and rarely licensed new publications.
Continuous emergency rule since October 6, 1981 criminalizes any
gathering of more than five people. Even the relatively independent
professional syndicates took a hit when in 1993 the government rammed
through Parliament a law intervening in their internal elections
and in 1996 when the government placed the Bar Association under
sequestration. After a protracted legal battle, the latter order
was lifted in 1999 and elections held in February 2001.
But Ibrahim's
high-profile trial and conviction by a state security court in May
2001, and second conviction on July 29, 2002, raise the obvious
question of why an avuncular academic with close ties to the regime
is receiving such treatment. Most accounts have pointed to Ibrahim's
satirical article in Arabic, which coined the term "republico-monarchy"
(gumlukiyya) to describe Syria, Iraq and -- bitingly -- Egypt, where
Mubarak is widely rumored to be grooming his son Gamal as his successor.
Mubarak was said to be personally angered by Ibrahim's crossing
of this "red line." Other rumors abound about Ibrahim's
increasingly tense relations with Egypt's first family, and their
growing displeasure with his behavior. Another oft-mentioned story
is Ibrahim's plan to set up a commission to monitor the fall 2000
elections, as he did in 1995. At the trial, defense lawyers were
keen to point out that the Court of Cassation, the country's highest
appellate authority, indirectly endorsed many of the report's findings
by ruling that over half of the representatives elected in 1995
gained their seats through rigged contests.
The arrest
may also reveal heightened tension in US-Egyptian relations -- the
client state may be trying to send a message to its patron by humiliating
an American citizen. The regime has done similar things in the past.
Gamal Abd al-Nasser smeared the journalist Mustafa Amin as an American
agent in order to imprison him. Anwar Sadat desperately tried to
shock the US into taking him seriously again by imprisoning 1,536
leading intellectuals and dissidents (including the Coptic patriarch
Shenouda) a month before he was assassinated on October 6, 1981.
Ibrahim's second conviction comes nine days after the signing of
the US-brokered Machakos framework agreement between the Sudanese
government and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army. Egypt was
not invited to attend the five weeks of marathon talks preceding
the agreement, though a united Sudan has been a consistent theme
of Egyptian foreign policy due to Egypt's pressing interest in retaining
access to Nile water. By reconvicting Ibrahim, the regime may have
been returning a diplomatic slap in the face. It's also possible
that the regime was broadcasting its discomfort with the Bush administration's
increasingly pro-Israel stance and imminent plans to invade Iraq.
AT
HOME AND ABROAD
Despite the
concern of international human rights groups, foreign governments
and press about the Ibrahim case, the domestic Egyptian response
has been noticeably muted. If the right-wing Weekly Standard sees
Ibrahim as "Egypt's Sakharov," Egyptian intellectuals
view their jailed colleague, and his carefully cultivated self-image
as the Arab world's leading democracy advocate and human rights
defender, with a decidedly jaded eye. They would scoff at Thomas
Friedman's assertion that "If there is no room in Egypt for
Saad Ibrahims, then we will only get more Mohamed Attas." Quite
apart from the vicious smear campaign against Ibrahim in the semi-official
and government-oriented press, thoughtful, respected intellectuals
aired their deep differences with Ibrahim well before he became
the target of the state's unsolicited prosecutorial attention.
Perhaps most
alienating for Egyptian intellectuals are Ibrahim's complicated
but unquestionably close ties to the regime, a relationship his
defense team highlighted in both trial and retrial, calling a parade
of character witnesses from Egyptian officialdom, including the
director of a government-affiliated research center and an MP from
the ruling NDP. Board members of Ibrahim's Ibn Khaldoun Center for
Development Studies were a virtual who's who of Egyptian society,
including current Minister of Youth Alieddine Hilal. At both trials,
much was made of a 1994 conference on the future of the Mubarak
regime and Egypt's Islamist movement held at the National Defense
University in Washington, which Ibrahim and other Egyptians attended.
To bolster Ibrahim's nationalist credentials, character witnesses
for the defense reported that Amr Moussa, then foreign minister,
had instructed the attendees to thank their hosts and return to
Cairo immediately if anyone suggested that US aid dollars could
be used a bargaining chip in future US-Egyptian dealings.
For three years,
by order of Minister of Information Safwat al-Sherif, Ibrahim hosted
a half-hour show on state-controlled TV on Friday evenings (peak
viewer time) entitled "Away from the Limelight," in which
he lectured viewers about the evils of terrorism and the importance
of supporting "civil society." He was also close to Mubarak
personally, serving as thesis supervisor for First Lady Suzanne
Mubarak at AUC and professor of Gamal, and drafting numerous policy
papers and official speeches featuring the term "civil society,"
which the regime eventually adopted. Ibrahim was also a fixture
in the groups of academics meeting periodically with Mubarak and
sent abroad to represent the semi-official Egyptian view.
More broadly,
Ibrahim has become identified with the so-called Cairo peace camp,
which has advocated a move toward normal relations and cultural
exchanges with Israel. This stance is highly controversial among
nationalist-leftist intellectuals and others who are sharply critical
of the 1979 Camp David accord and oppose normalization with Israel
until such time as the outstanding issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict
are resolved. Economist Nader Fergany, lead author of the recently
issued UN Arab Human Development Report, maintained in the pages
of the London-based al-Hayat that Ibrahim represents American interests
in the region, as evidenced by his support for normalization and
his public attention to the "Coptic question." Fergany
and his fellow critics perceive Ibrahim's focus on discrimination
against Egypt's minority Coptic Christians as springing less out
of genuine scholarly concern than an ear for what plays well in
the West. In the view of these critics, some of whom are Copts,
a focus on Copts as a minority could lead to the rise of separatist
politics in Egypt, of which only Israel is the beneficiary.
In short, while
they denounce Ibrahim's trial in a state security court, many independent
intellectuals feel that the Ibrahim case is not a civil rights case
to rally around. This feeling is ironically reinforced by the international
outrage over his second conviction. As one leftist activist said
off the record, "I just feel that Ibrahim hasn't sacrificed
anything before his recent ordeal. He was never imprisoned, never
persecuted by the government, indeed he was a son of the regime.
I'm totally against throwing him in jail, but it seems to me he's
now paying the price of his choices." But while they don't
necessarily identify Ibrahim as one of their own, NGO activists
do perceive that one of the regime's primary goals in targeting
Ibrahim was to intimidate them.
STATE
KNOWS BEST
In record time,
the government rushed through Parliament on June 3 a new bill regulating
NGOs to replace the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Constitutional Court in June 2000. The new bill gives the government
the power to dissolve an NGO without court order (Article 42), prohibits
NGOs from working in politics (Article 11), requires government
approval of funding from foreign agencies before NGOs can access
it (Article 17) and requires government approval of candidates running
in NGO board elections. The bill was ratified by Mubarak on June
5.
Opposition,
independent and even some government MPs opposed Article 42 and
called for reinstating the stipulation in an earlier law requiring
a court order to close down an NGO. Deputies also put up a fight
about Article 11, arguing that it is naive to exclude NGOs from
working in politics on the pretext that parties are the proper venue
for political activity. In the words of a Muslim Brother MP, "If
an NGO works to raise literacy, this is politics. If an NGO works
in garbage collection, this is also politics. Anything that contributes
to the public interest in political." Yet when it came to Article
17, there was near unanimity that the administration had the right
to approve foreign funding, most vocally from some independent and
opposition deputies.
In the parliamentary
debate on June 3, several MPs parroted the government's claim that
the Saad Eddin Ibrahim case is a clear-cut example of the misuse
of foreign funds for suspect purposes. As nominally independent
deputy Mortada Mansour said, "We have a clear example of a
professor who received foreign funding and it turned out he was
backed by America. I'm not against social research but I call on
all social research to be made in Egypt." Former state security
officer and government MP Gamal Abu Zekri said, "Foreign funding
is very dangerous. We must be careful because it's a back door for
Zionist infiltration and incitement to sectarian strife." This
last claim was expressed in somewhat more sophisticated fashion
by the late leftist writer Sanaa al-Masri in her book, "Funding
and Normalization," which argues that foreign funding of NGOs
invariably has strings attached -- namely promoting normalization
with Israel. NGOs also fight the common perception that those who
accept grants from abroad are personally corrupt. As Liberal Party
MP Ragab Hemeida said, "Many NGO members wrote reports to outside
agencies, were made rich and began driving around in [their] Mercedes."
The bill's
swift railroading through Parliament offers solid evidence of the
government's success in stigmatizing foreign funding, often the
major means of support for NGOs who monitor the state's human rights
practices and issue periodic, detailed reports on torture, arbitrary
detention and other abuses. Largely as a result, the Egyptian Organization
for Human Rights (EOHR) has significantly curtailed its activities
and drastically scaled back its acceptance of grants from foreign
governments. The Group for Democratic Development had already closed
up shop two years ago, citing the inhospitable environment for human
rights advocacy. Had it not been for the Ibrahim case, parliamentary
opposition to the NGO law would likely have been stronger. But lost
in the parliamentary clamor over foreign funding was the fact --
pointed out by Ibrahim in a statement to the court -- that the Egyptian
government is the recipient of the lion's share of foreign funding
in Egypt.
Throughout
Ibrahim's trial and retrial, the rhetoric of state security prosecutors
and prosecution witnesses revealed a dominant state jealous of its
prerogatives and unwilling to conceptualize politics as anything
other than a zero-sum game. Prosecutors insisted on the right to
prosecute despite the EC's signed affidavits absolving Ibrahim of
the embezzlement charge, the right of the state to monitor and intrude
upon the activities of NGOs, the right of the state to be free of
"defamation" and the right of the state alone to decide
what is best for society, with minimal input from representatives
of society itself. This conception of an omniscient, suspicious,
omnipresent state is a sobering legacy of the July 1952 revolution,
the fiftieth anniversary of which has preoccupied the public reflections
of Egyptians this summer.
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