Declining
to Intervene: Israel's Supreme Court and the Occupied Territories
Jonathan Cook
(Jonathan
Cook is a freelance journalist living in Israel.)
August 4,
2003
Further
Info
For
background on the applicability of international law to
the Occupied Territories, see Richard Falk, "International Law and the
al-Aqsa Intifada," Middle East Report 217 (Winter
2000). The article is accessible online.
See
also Kathleen Cavanaugh and Jamil Dakwar, "Grave Breaches:
A View from Jenin and Nablus," Middle East Report 223
(Summer 2002).
Order
back issues of Middle East Report, or subscribe, via a secure
server at MERIP's home page. |
In its annual
report issued in July 2003, the Association for Civil Rights in
Israel (ACRI) painted a familiar yet surprising picture of Israeli
army maltreatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. A
wide range of army practices -- from house-to-house searches in
villages to "targeted killings" of Palestinian militants
-- came in for harsh criticism, unusually harsh by the standards
of the mainstream human rights group. "Most of the abuses
occur not as a result of operational necessity on the part of
the army," the report continues, "but from vindictiveness
on the part of soldiers, who receive implicit approval to denigrate
the dignity, life and liberty of innocent Palestinians."
ACRI goes on to cite army data revealing that most incidents of
possible abuse, including most shooting deaths, are never investigated.
Between the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000
and June 2003, the army says it opened 362 internal investigations
and brought charges in 46 cases, the majority of them relating
to theft of Palestinian property. Only eight soldiers were indicted
in shooting incidents. To date, not one has been convicted.
Although
indicted soldiers usually face military tribunals, rather than
civilian judges, Israeli government policies and the army's operational
strategies in the Occupied Territories are subject to civilian
judicial review in the Supreme Court. These judges boast a reputation
as tenacious, independent-minded watchdogs on a range of social
and cultural issues within Israel. Yet, despite the illegality
of curfews, home demolitions and other occupation policies under
the Fourth Geneva Convention, almost all these policies have been
sanctioned by the Supreme Court, bolstering the government's claim
to be carrying out a relatively benign occupation needed only
to ensure Israel's security.
THE COURT'S
SHADOW
According
to David Kretzmer, a law professor at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, the court has handed down hundreds of judgments relating
to the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, particularly during the
two intifadas, the first between 1987 and 1993 and the second
since September 2000. These rulings have approved, among other
things, the establishment of civilian settlements, changes to
local laws, the building of bypass roads, land confiscations,
deportations, house demolitions and administrative detentions.
The conclusion of Kretzmer's recent book, "The Occupation
of Justice," is gloomy: "The court has rationalized
virtually all controversial actions of the Israeli authorities,
especially those most problematic under principles of international
humanitarian law."
The mere
threat of a legal challenge -- what Kretzmer calls "the court's
shadow" -- may on occasion have forced the authorities to
reverse a decision without testing it before the judges. But Kretzmer
argues that when cases reach the court, it invariably decides
"in favor of the authorities, often on the basis of dubious
legal arguments." He adds that this has legitimized the occupation
"both for the Israeli public, in whose name the military
authorities are acting, and for foreign observers sympathetic
to Israel's basic position."
During the
second intifada, human rights groups have mounted legal challenges
to several Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. Three
important cases have involved the system of checkpoints and roadblocks
that has suffocated Palestinian economic and social life and led
to dozens of Palestinian deaths because medical treatment has
been withheld, the prolonged curfews imposed on most Palestinian
cities throughout 2002-2003, and the taking of Palestinian civilians
as "human shields." ACRI's report is circumspect in
its criticism of the Supreme Court on these issues, possibly because
the justices offer the only hope of remedy for Palestinians suffering
at the hands of the army. However, a close reading of the document
yields a picture of a judiciary that, in the words of one senior
human rights lawyer, "rubber-stamps any war crime the army
commits." In all three cases heard or adjudicated in July
2003, the Supreme Court refused to intervene in any practical
manner to protect the civilian population.
"NOT
UNREASONABLE" ROADBLOCKS
In March,
ACRI and Physicians for Human Rights petitioned the Supreme Court
in a test case on roadblocks. The Israeli human rights organization
B'tselem has recorded at least 38 Palestinian deaths at checkpoints
in the period between the eruption of the intifada and February
2003. B'tselem believes there have been many more instances but
has included only those where it could verify beyond any doubt
that a delay at a checkpoint led to a death. In the ACRI case,
the petitioners demanded that the army remove barriers preventing
the entry and exit of Palestinians from three villages close to
Nablus in the West Bank. The 11,000 residents of Salim, Deir al-Hatab
and Izmut, which form a semi-circle south of the Jewish settlement
of Elon Moreh, had been effectively imprisoned in their villages
for a year, unable to make a living, gain access to medical services
or attend universities. In July, the court rejected the petition,
admitting that, although other means of preventing attacks on
Elon Moreh were available, the army's chosen method was "not
unreasonable."
In a separate
action, ACRI asked the court to end the curfews that have afflicted
almost every West Bank city over the past year. In Ramallah, residents
have been forced to remain indoors for 100 days; in Hebron, the
city most regularly under curfew, that number of days rose to
200. ACRI presented Hebron as a test case, arguing to the Supreme
Court that the regular imposition of curfews lasting more than
100 hours was depriving Palestinians of the right to make a living
and bringing them close to starvation. Attorneys also posited
that the army's reason for the curfew in Hebron was to prevent
clashes between the 100,000 Palestinian inhabitants and a few
hundred Jewish settlers living in the city center. ACRI argued
that this policy was discriminatory, as Palestinians were not
allowed out of their houses while settlers could move about at
will. In July, the judges rejected this petition too, ruling that
the policy was "coherent" and that the army was doing
its utmost to ease the situation of the local inhabitants.
"HUMAN
SHIELDS"
But perhaps
the most glaring example of Supreme Court inaction has been the
legal saga of the army's use of human shields. Seven Israeli and
Palestinian human rights groups have been battling to end this
practice since May 2002, believing that it so clearly contravenes
international law it would be almost impossible for the court
not to ban it. So far, despite several hearings, they have been
proven wrong.
Attorney
Marwan Dallal of Adalah, a legal aid society for Palestinian citizens
of Israel, has led the fight. Dallal filed his initial petition
against the army's human shield policy in May 2002. After the
invasion of West Bank cities beginning on March 28, as part of
Operation Defensive Shield, the seven human rights groups identified
four common army practices that amounted to taking Palestinians
as hostages, or "human shields": forcing individuals
to enter buildings to probe them for booby traps, making them
remove suspicious objects from the road, requiring them to stand
inside military positions to deter fire from armed Palestinians
and forcing them to walk in front of soldiers to protect them
from gunfire.
The use of
Palestinians as human shields is possibly the most clear-cut of
the human rights violations committed by the Israeli army, not
least because the small "security" benefits accruing
to the army come at the very high cost of endangering civilian
lives. "The policy simply assumes that the lives of Palestinian
bystanders are inferior to those of soldiers," says Dallal.
His view is supported by Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, both of which classify the taking of human shields as a
grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
According
to Adalah, the policy violates seven articles of the convention.
Article 51, for example, states: "The occupying power may
not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary
forces." Even more clearly, Article 28 says: "The presence
of a protected person may not be used to render certain points
or areas immune from military operations." Nonetheless, over
more than a year of hearings, the Supreme Court has refused to
intercede. Instead, it has repeatedly postponed hearings, allowed
the army to redefine what constitutes its human shields policy
and refused to issue contempt rulings when the army has been shown
to have acted in bad faith.
THE "NEIGHBOR
PROCEDURE"
In its original
petition, Adalah submitted several testimonies of Palestinians
used as human shields. In one instance, on April 8, 2002, six
Israeli soldiers were reported to have entered the al-Baq mosque
in the old city of Nablus, which was being used as an emergency
hospital. According to one of the doctors inside, Zahra al-Wawi,
the soldiers arrived with their guns on the shoulders of Palestinian
civilians.
These testimonies
were supported by the accounts of ordinary soldiers. One reserve
sergeant, Nati Aharoni, told the army's weekly newspaper Bamahaneh
on April 12, 2002 of his experiences searching a building in Qalqilya.
"We had entered the building in the past and were afraid
that this time the Palestinians might have left explosive devices
for us," he was quoted as saying. "So according to normal
practice the unit commander took a Palestinian from a neighboring
house and made him look through the place. Then we shook his hand
and thanked him."
The army
refused to admit it had ever adopted such a practice but avoided
a ruling from the court by promising to "immediately issue
a decisive order" banning the use of civilians "as a
means to 'humanly shield' [soldiers] from fire or terrorist attacks"
and to "clarify" for its commanders that Palestinians
must not be forced to enter buildings unless the commander was
sure they were not being put in danger. The court agreed to these
terms, refusing to issue an injunction, despite Adalah's objections
that such decisions taken by soldiers on behalf of Palestinian
civilians still violated international law and that commanders
could not know whether civilians' lives were being put in danger.
The issue
resurfaced in August 2002 when a 19 year-old Palestinian, Nidal
Abu Muhsin, was shot dead by a gunman in the West Bank village
of Tubas as he was forced by the army to knock on a neighbor's
door. Adalah returned to court, challenging the army's reassurances
about the safety of what the state this time referred to as the
"neighbor procedure" -- soldiers using Palestinian civilians
to perform military operations. Dallal claimed the phrase was
merely a euphemism for using human shields. The court issued a
temporary injunction on the "neighbor procedure" to
give the state a chance to provide details of the practice.
But Adalah
was forced to appeal to the court again in November after it became
clear that the army was continuing to use human shields in violation
of the court injunction. B'tselem supplied five detailed instances
of Palestinian civilians taken as human shields by the army. Adalah
demanded that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Defense Minister Shaul
Mofaz and Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon be held in contempt of court.
The court again postponed acting, giving the state more time to
reply to the claims. In the meantime, in late December, Adalah
and B'tselem presented a further four examples of Palestinians
being used as human shields. In one case recorded by B'tselem,
on November 9, 2002, 39 year-old Khalid Kamil, a father of three,
was ordered at gunpoint to enter the home of an armed Islamic
Jihad leader to call to him to give himself up. Kamil was later
exposed to a vicious gun battle.
Rather than
using the mass of evidence to begin contempt of court proceedings
against the army, the court instead chose to reduce the scope
of the injunction, in January 2003 approving a practice now labeled
"prior warning" -- Palestinians being used by soldiers
for "assistance." The army agreed to apply two conditions:
the commander must determine that the civilian was not placed
in danger, and the participant must agree to help. Adalah's objections
that all "assistance" to an army is inherently dangerous
and that no Palestinian would volunteer for such an operation
were rejected by the judges.
DECLINING
TO INTERVENE
In February,
April and May 2003, Adalah was back in court with more cases of
Palestinians being used as human shields, including one incident
photographed by an Israeli peace activist. In one typical testimony,
21 year-old Samer Sharif from Nablus states that on January 21,
2003 he was put on the hood of a jeep, handcuffed to the window
with his back to the driver. The jeep then drove towards stone-throwing
Palestinian youths as one of the soldiers fired at them from behind
Sharif's head.
The court
failed to issue a ruling on prior warning or begin contempt proceedings
at any of the hearings. It also ignored an expert opinion from
law professor Eyal Benvenisti of Tel Aviv University who argued
that the "prior warning" procedure was still a violation
of the Geneva Convention.
Most recently,
on July 8, the court reconvened to hear a new submission from
Adalah. This time the lawyers arrived armed not with affidavits
from Palestinians but from an Israeli soldier. Gedalia Etzion,
a 39 year-old from Jerusalem, said that during his last reserve
duty in February his unit was given instructions on "prior
warning." According to Etzion, the issue of consent was treated
as a joke by his commanders. "One guy asked what we would
do if the Palestinian did not agree to serve as a shield, to which
the instructor answered -- grinning and joking -- 'There is no
such thing.'" As for the other condition -- that a civilian
not be placed in danger -- it was not mentioned at all.
The hearing
offered little hope that the court is about to safeguard Palestinians'
rights. The judges again postponed the case to an unspecified
date, when they said it would be heard by a panel expanded from
three justices. They made no ruling on the contempt of court or
on the "prior warning" order, which will be allowed
to continue.
POLITICS
OF THE LAW
Under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a signatory, civilian
residents of occupied territory are "protected persons"
and must be safeguarded by the occupying power. Though the UN
and the high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions concur
that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in the West Bank,
Gaza and East Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities have traditionally
argued that it is not, because no recognized "sovereign"
power was replaced when Israel took these territories in 1967.
Israel clouds the picture somewhat by agreeing to implement the
convention's provisions "de facto" -- saying, in effect,
that though the convention is not binding in the Occupied Territories,
Israel will respect its provisions because it chooses to do so.
When Israel does not respect the convention, its lawyers can fall
back on the claim that it does not apply in any event. But the
failure of the Supreme Court to overturn illegitimate policies
of occupation has political roots more than it does legalistic
justifications.
The court's
14 justices, as members of a society whose goals and values they
share, are not immune from either the fear or the self-interest
common to the Jewish public. This was neatly illustrated in a
hearing before the court to stop "targeted killings"
in January 2002. Before rejecting the petition, Justice Michael
Cheshin -- on a three-person panel -- expressed a vested interest
in wanting the policy of assassinations to continue if it meant
his son, who was serving in the army, did not have to venture
into dangerous areas to make arrests. "My son goes into that
[Palestinian] territory and I don't want to endanger him,"
he told the human rights lawyers.
Although
opinion polls show the public holds the court in high regard,
it holds the military in even higher esteem. The public is unlikely
to support negative rulings on the army's behavior. The Supreme
Court's chief justice, Aharon Barak, has implicitly acknowledged
this fact, writing that the court "must take into account
the social consensus." Also, the activism often ascribed
to the court in the domestic sphere -- judgments applying to Israeli
citizens only -- has earned it a reputation from the Israeli right
as a bastion of depraved liberalism. The court endures periodic
threats to replace it with a more populist Constitutional Court,
which would be at least partly chosen by politicians. Controversial
interference by the court in the Occupied Territories would doubtless
build pressure for its dissolution.
Most importantly,
the court has dutifully accepted the Zionist premise that Israel's
state interests have primacy over all other considerations, including,
apparently, international law. In disputes between the state and
the Palestinians, the court is not and cannot be neutral. So when
the state deploys the argument that a specific policy is necessary
for Israel's security, the court is almost duty-bound to agree,
whatever the evidence. As Kretzmer observes, "The dominant
narrative holds that the state is being attacked, the authorities
are trying to protect it and the ultimate duty of the court is
to assist them in this task." Cases submitted to protect
Palestinian human rights, therefore, are more likely to test the
judiciary's nerve or its ideological assumptions than legal principles.