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Images
and Realities of Mauritania's Attempted Coup
Alice Bullard
and Bakary Tandia
(Alice Bullard
teaches history at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Bakary Tandia
works for the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Mauritania.)
July 22, 2003
Further
Info
Documentation
of politically motivated arrests and the persistence of slavery
in Mauritania can be found in the 2003 Annual Report from
Amnesty International: http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/
For background
on slavery in Mauritania, see Alice Bullard, "Mauritanian
Activists' Struggle Against Slavery," Middle
East Report 223 (Summer 2002). |
Without the
aid of its foreign friends, the regime of President Maaouiya Ould
Taya in Mauritania would have ended on June 8, 2003. The attempted
coup on that day left 15 reported dead and 68 injured. Taya, well-regarded
in the West but perceived as a brutal dictator by most Mauritanians,
fled his palace with his wife and four children and obtained refuge
-- reports conflict -- in either the Spanish, French or US embassy.
Most accounts of these events, by ignoring the local politics that
drove the coup attempt, have facilitated an interpretation that
serves Taya and even makes the rebellion's defeat seem like a victory
in the US-led "war on terrorism."
HINTED NEXUS
Absent concrete
evidence of the immediate motivations of the coup leaders, widespread
press reports have linked the insurgents, who were members of the
Mauritanian Baath Party and had vocally protested Taya's support
for regime change in Iraq, to the recent suppression of Islamists
in the country. Working under US guidance, Taya has indeed vigorously
pursued advocates of Islamic purity, ordering the arrests of prayer
leaders, Islamic judges and scholars, and teachers. But the regime
has targeted other political opponents as well. Nine members of
the banned Baathist opposition party, Nouhoud, were arrested and
given prison sentences at the end of May. On June 1, the Arabic
weekly newspaper, al-Raya, was banned on charges of sowing subversion
and intolerance.
What political
interest links the Islamists with the Baathists? Two can be identified:
hostility toward Israel and anger at Taya, in part because of his
ties to the US and to Israel. In 1999, Mauritania established diplomatic
relations with Israel, one of three members of the Arab League to
do so. Though stopping short of asserting direct ties between the
Baathists and Islamists, most reporting on the coup has strongly
implied the connection. A June 6 BBC report said that: "While
Mauritania is officially an Islamic republic, the authorities have
cracked down on suspected Islamists and politicians with links to
Saddam Hussein since the beginning of the war in Iraq.... The coup
came after the arrest of 32 Islamists charged with threatening national
security."
Since there
is no inherent link between Mauritania's Baathists and Islamists,
the only means of understanding this implied alliance is that, under
the pressure of the US-led war on terrorism, the two groups have
sought each other out for mutual support. With no evidence emerging
in post-war Iraq to tie al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein, the case of
Mauritania can be trumpeted as proof, albeit far afield, of the
hinted nexus between Baathists, radical Islamists and terrorism.
On July 16, Taya himself publicly accused "those who preach
in mosques" of fomenting the putsch.
PECUNIARY MOTIVES
A more mundane,
yet more compelling explanation of the attempted coup demands detailed
knowledge of power struggles within Ould Taya's autocratic state.
From this perspective, the attempted coup was a battle between previously
intimate rivals for money and the other fruits of corrupt governance.
The chief plotters were Ould Hanna, a former regional military commander,
and Mohamed Ould Cheikh al-Kouti, former head of the armored division,
who was forced from his post less than two months before the failed
revolt. Like their fellow conspirators Ahmed Salem Kabech, also
of the armored division, and Mohamed Ould Abdahman, from the Mauritanian
air force, these men hailed from the region of Ayoun-Nema, in the
east of the country. The first two men come from the tribe of Oulad
Nasser, while Abdahman belongs to the Togounout tribe. These are
warrior tribes. Historically, they pledged loyalty to Smassides
d'Atar, the fiefdom of the president.
According to
the June 12 edition of La Lettre du Continent, a France-based newsletter
covering African intelligence, early in 2003 Ould Hanna had a personal
conversation with Taya in which he explained his tribe's discontent
at their exclusion from the circuits of economic and financial power.
Access to these domains is controlled by men close to Taya, including
Mohamed Bouamatou, head of the General Confederation of Mauritanian
Employers, Mohamed Abdallahi Ould Abdallahi, who oversees water
and electricity utilities, and Abdellahi Noueigued, chief executive
of the National Bank of Mauritania. Excluded from the bounty flowing
from the top state sinecures, Ould Hanna and his fellow conspirators
turned to the men formerly under their command to launch their bid
for power.
More generally,
the coup attempt has roots in the deep malaise among Mauritania's
predominantly Arab political class. Their malaise finds an echo
in cries of racist oppression carried out against the black African
population, a byproduct of the regime's long-standing and concerted
campaign to identify Mauritania as an Arab country, not an African
one.
DARLING OF
HEADS OF STATE
Ould Taya is
an unpopular ruler. After gaining power himself through a military
coup, he has ruled Mauritania for the past 19 years. In 1990-1991,
his regime pursued an "Arabizing" ethnic cleansing of
the armed forces. At least 500 black African officers were murdered
in state-run prisons in this spate of intra-national violence. Taya
also stirred up violence against civilian black African Mauritanians,
leading to the expulsion of over 80,000 people into Mali and Senegal
in 1989. These expelled Mauritanians have languished for 14 years
in refugee camps, unrecognized by the international community. The
United Nations, the only body vested with the authority to handle
complaints over the right to nationality under article 15 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has declined to lend its
aid to the refugees. Taya's regime refuses to criminalize slaveholding
or trafficking in children, despite well-documented problems of
this nature in the country. Finally, Taya's project of making Mauritania
into an Arab nation has victimized and disenfranchised 30 percent
of the nation's people -- those of black African heritage.
Yet especially
after his escape from overthrow in June, Taya is the darling of
heads of state near and far. The attempted coup was condemned by
most African and Arab states, as well as by the European Union and
the United States. Strong US support for Taya's regime has been
apparent in recent years, since it recognized Israel, and George
W. Bush has expressed appreciation to Taya for his cooperation in
the war on terrorism. Following the attempted coup, French Foreign
Minister Dominique de Villepin hastened to Taya's side to congratulate
him on defeating the putschists. Morocco's King Mohammed VI personally
traveled to the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott to offer his consolations.
Arriving on June 22 for a scheduled 24-hour stay, such was the monarch's
desire to forge bonds with Taya that he prolonged his visit for
an extra afternoon. On July 1-2, the president and his wife journeyed
to Spain, where they were feted by the Spanish prime minister and
king. Taya signed an agreement to crack down on African emigrants
using Mauritania as their point of departure for illegal entry into
Spain. The International Monetary Fund, happy with the Taya regime's
adherence to its recommended structural adjustment program, approved
a new $8.8 million "poverty reduction" loan to Mauritania
on July 18.
International
support for Ould Taya, despite his marked unpopularity in Mauritania,
gives him a green light to continue his abusive practices. The contrasting
narratives of the coup attempt coming from Mauritania's neighbors,
Senegal and Morocco, reveal the higher stakes in this shadow game.
CONTRASTING
RESPONSES
Senegal, on
Mauritania's southern border, stands out among African states as
a relatively stable and successful democracy. The Senegalese human
rights organization, the African Association for the Defense of
Human Rights (known by its French acronym, RADDHO), condemned the
attempt to overthrow the Mauritanian government by force. But RADDHO's
press release also called on the Organization of African Unity to
refrain from opposing all coups as a matter of principle, and to
look instead at their deeper causes. RADDHO hopes, in this way,
to isolate politically and diplomatically the "dinosaur"
and "ethnocratic" regimes on the continent.
After the coup
was defeated, Senegalese newspapers reported that some of the defeated
insurgents had fled to Senegal. Journalists editorialized that the
government should resist any demand by Mauritania for extradition
of these individuals. Pointing to the fact that no extradition treaty
exists between Senegal and Mauritania, the editorials argued as
well that any fugitive rebels sent back to Mauritania would invariably
be summarily executed. No independent judiciary would try them.
The investigators would also be the executioners. Human rights activists
in Dakar, Senegal's capital, protested on July 21 when the government
did extradite one alleged coup plotter, Didi Ould Mohammed, to Nouakchott.
The Senegalese
concern for human rights contrasts with the response from Morocco,
Mauritania's neighbor to the north. An Arab-identified monarchy
with a dedication to liberal Islam, Morocco has cultivated increasingly
strong ties with Mauritania since King Mohammed VI ascended the
throne in 1999. The Mauritanian and Moroccan governments express
common concerns about terrorism, security and economic development
in their "Arab-Maghrib region." The designation of Mauritania
as part of Arab-identified North Africa is a politically charged
statement, given the determination of Taya's regime to disavow those
aspects of the country's identity which are African. Mohammed VI
clearly supports the "Arabized" identity of Taya's Mauritania.
After the multiple
suicide bombings in Casablanca on May 16, 2003, which killed 43
people, Mohammed VI was anxious to encourage the Mauritanian state
in its efforts to combat radical Islamism. During Mohammed's visit,
the two heads of state agreed to greater cooperation in the war
against terrorism.
MOROCCO AND
MAURITANIA
But the ties
between the two countries are solidly economic, as reported by the
Moroccan newspaper Liberation on June 23. Mauritania, with a population
of 2.5 million, is currently receiving $1.5 billion annually from
international development agencies. Inflation is under control and
its economy is growing at a rate of 4.5 percent. In the last year,
commercial exchange with Morocco grew by 41 percent, totaling 25
million euros. The vast majority of this commerce flowed from Morocco
to Mauritania. Moroccan corporations are also investing heavily
in Mauritania. An excellent example is Ittisalat al-Maghrib (Maroc
Télécom), which in 2001 acquired a controlling share in the Mauritanian
telephone company, Mauritel, at a price of $84 million.
The Moroccan
Office for Mineral Research and Exploitation owns 2.35 percent of
Mauritania's chief economic powerhouse, the National Industrial
and Mining Corporation, which extracts iron ore and supports more
than 5,000 Mauritanian households. Another Moroccan company, DRAPOR,
a subsidiary of the Moroccan Office of Port Development, has contracted
to dredge the port of Nouakchott. There is also a newly created
partnership between Moroccan and Mauritanian companies for the distribution
of fuel and the building of a refinery.
Morocco is
also participating in internationally financed Mauritanian development
projects, like the planned 292-mile Nouakchott-Nouadhibou road.
The total cost of this road is estimated at $70 million. The principal
financing comes from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development,
which is supplying $51.6 million. The African Development Bank and
the Islamic Development Bank are supplying $10 million, while the
Mauritanian government is contributing $9 million. Four Moroccan
companies contracted to produce the initial studies and plans for
the road at a cost of over $39 million, and the Moroccan government
is bankrolling the construction of nearly nine miles of the road
at a cost of $2.6 million.
"WITH
A FIRM STEP"
Were it not
for the assistance of international financial institutions and his
sympathetic neighbors, Ould Taya would not have the resources to
maintain his repressive apparatus. While Taya assiduously pursues
economic development, human rights groups and anti-slavery activists
have consistently called on the government to criminalize slavery
and to cease incitement of racial divides between Arab and black
African Mauritanians. Without first addressing these social evils,
representatives of the NGOs argue, social inequalities and injustice
will only grow as foreign capital is pumped into the economy. To
these critics, Taya has consistently maintained that Mauritania's
problems are poverty and illiteracy, not slavery and racist injustice.
Ould Taya has
not convinced the Mauritanian NGOs, nor the Senegalese NGOs. But
he has won the support of Morocco, France and international funding
agencies, as well as the US. The State Department, for its part,
praises Mauritania for having "a democratically elected government
that is cooperating in the war on terrorism, combating poverty and
leading the Arab League in constructive engagement with Israel,"
according to a recent report from Amnesty International on trafficking.
The State Department website refers to activists' charges that slavery
continues with impunity in Mauritania as "repeated but later
discredited."
The characterization
of Ould Taya's government as "democratic" is particularly
ironic in light of its roundups of political opponents before and
since the coup attempt. Earlier in the spring of 2003, the International
Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) protested the government's actions
as a deliberate attempt to intimidate any form of political opposition.
In the wake of the arrest campaigns of May and the suppression of
opposition newspapers and political parties, the government has
scheduled a presidential election for November 7. In Spain on July
2, Taya proclaimed that these elections are a sign that Mauritania
is advancing "with a firm step" toward democracy despite
the ill wishes of the Baathist insurgents. The previous day, Mauritanian
authorities arrested the deputy director of the state news agency,
who, like the coup plotters, belongs to the Oulad Nasser tribe.
In this climate of intimidation, it is very unclear how free the
November elections will be. Ould Taya, naturally, plans to run again.

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