Orange
Rampant
Peretz Kidron
July 15, 2005
(Peretz
Kidron is a Jerusalem-based columnist for Middle East International)
Israel’s
national colors are blue and white. In the summer of 2005, however,
an Israeli driver adorning his vehicle with ribbons in those hues
runs the risk of a broken antenna or a vandal’s scratches in the
paint job. Conversely, the motorist would be far safer joining
what appears to be the general trend by accepting the strips of
bright orange proffered at every main intersection by eager youngsters
in orange T-shirts. Indeed, so dominant is the orange that one
may be forgiven for suspecting a mass takeover by Protestant militants
from Ulster.
Of course,
nothing of the kind could happen in this self-proclaimed Jewish
state. Orange has been chosen as the campaign color of the opposition
to the upcoming Israeli “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip and
the northern tip of the West Bank. The smattering of blue-and-white
ribbons is the rather hesitant response from supporters of the
planned pullout of settlers and soldiers, now scheduled to begin
on August 17. The threat of having one’s vehicle defaced may be
one reason why so few moderates dare to display their colors.
(Another may be that the blue-and-white camp is largely drawn
from the left-of-center and centrist circles that harbor a long-standing
dislike for the instigator of the withdrawal, Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon.)
By contrast
with the halfheartedness of their opponents, the orange camp is
bold and self-confident, with thousands of streamers on cars,
backpacks and purses generating the impression that theirs is
the dominant voice in the Israeli debate over disengagement. In
fact, it isn’t. Recent opinion polls published in the Israeli
press show that the Gaza withdrawal enjoys a clear two-to-one
majority among the Israeli public. There is nothing new in this
ratio, which has shown up consistently over recent years whenever
the issue of full or partial withdrawal from the Occupied Territories
comes up. A majority of Israelis are clearly weary of the occupation
and everything it entails.
“GOD ON THEIR
SIDE”
But while
that majority is largely silent and passive, a clamorous and assertive
minority refuses to consider the possibility of relinquishing
Israel’s hold upon the entirety of the territories occupied in
the course of the 1967 war. For some, this refusal stems from
implacable hostility toward the Palestinians and a fundamental
mistrust of their motives and long-term intentions. Convinced
that the Palestinian leadership is intent on nothing less than
“throwing the Jews into the sea,” these circles believe that any
territorial concession can only fan Palestinian hopes of annihilating
Israel, reflecting fears that stand in contrast with the undisputed
fact that Israel has far and away the mightiest conventional forces
in the region, not to mention a tacitly acknowledged arsenal of
200 nuclear weapons and the unqualified strategic backing of the
United States. But a paranoia deeply ingrained over generations
of discrimination and persecution pays little heed to verity.
Those opponents
of withdrawal who cite security concerns may retain some tenuous
contact with objective realities and political specifics (the
dissolution of Israel was, after all, the professed objective
of the PLO in its early years). But the hard core of the opposition
draws its motivation from ethereal and metaphysical realms where
rational discussion of pros and cons has no place. To those true
believers for whom every inch of territory between the Jordan
River and the Mediterranean Sea constitutes the “Land of Divine
Promise,” there is no room for reflection or consideration. There
is only blind faith, to the degree that many of the settlers and
their zealot allies are convinced, even in the eleventh hour of
mid-July, that the withdrawal will be foiled by some unspecified
twelfth-hour “miracle.”
“With God
on their side,” underpinned with chapter and verse of Biblical
quotes, the diehard opponents of the withdrawal display unqualified
fervor in pursuit of their campaign. As an exercise in political
determination, it is indeed impressive. Tens of thousands have
taken part in a variegated assortment of protests, ranging from
mass rallies and marches to a human chain that stretched hand
in hand from the Gaza settlements all the way to the sanctified
Western Wall in Jerusalem. As exemplified by the tireless squads
of youngsters extending orange ribbons at intersections throughout
the country, the campaigners can call up ample manpower for any
task required. Likewise, their financial resources seem almost
unlimited, drawn equally from the donations of wealthy patrons
in Jewish communities worldwide and from government funds skillfully
(and illegally) siphoned off from their earmarked development
projects in West Bank settlements. On top of material plenty,
the settler leaders and their allies command well-lubricated organizational
structures that they wield with considerable imagination, resourcefulness
and theatrical flair. Fueled by faith and commitment, the opposition
has often seemed unstoppable.
“DIRECT ACTION”
In its earlier
phases, the campaign relied mainly on persuasion to evoke public
sympathy for the Gaza “pioneers” about to be “expelled from their
homes.” So effective was this tactic that much of the middle of
Israel’s political spectrum wavered in its support for the pullout.
Elated settler leaders pointed to late June polls that showed
the ratio of support to opposition narrowing to as close as eight
to seven; it seemed that success lay within their grasp, and one
more effort would tilt the scales in their favor.
But the increase
in public backing had already gone to the heads of the more radical
circles, who beginning on May 16 switched to “direct action,”
threatening to bring the country to a standstill unless the disengagement
plan was called off. In coordinated raids, well-drilled teams
of youngsters blocked key highways at the height of rush hour.
By the time sweating policemen managed to haul them away, traffic
throughout the country was hopelessly snarled. The tactic was
repeated to lesser effect on June 27, when convoys of orange-bedecked
vehicles stopped in the middle of highway traffic. Meanwhile,
smaller groups went further, launching nocturnal forays to padlock
the gates of schools and pour glue into the locks of government
offices. Police and domestic security agencies seemed powerless
to halt the disruptions or lay their hands on ringleaders. Having
given a foretaste of the havoc they were capable of wreaking,
the anonymous organizers promised that these actions were merely
a “general rehearsal” for the mayhem they would inflict should
the authorities launch the relocation plan.
The resort
to these intimidating tactics, directed at the public at large,
was a grave blunder. Although the official leadership of the settlers
hastened to dissociate itself from the anarchistic young militants,
the damage was done. Tired drivers anxious to get home after a
hard day’s work showed little patience for the engineered traffic
jams, and the backlash was swift. When telecasts showed footage
of youthful ruffians making determined efforts to lynch a helpless
young Palestinian in Gaza on June 29, and then clashing with police
and soldiers, public tolerance ran out. Within days, support for
the settlers had dwindled to a bare 30 percent, while a clear
majority again expressed approval of the pullout. Notwithstanding
the promises of anti-disengagement organizers, there was no sea
of orange in the stands at the seventeenth Maccabiah Games, popularly
known in Israel as the “Jewish Olympics.”
DUPLICITY
One would
imagine that a government embarked upon a costly and controversial
enterprise would be delighted and reassured that solid public
support seems secure. In fact, that may not be entirely true.
There are clear indications that Sharon’s resolute pursuit of
the Gaza withdrawal carries undertones of ambiguity, and that
the frenzied opposition he is encountering is not entirely unwelcome.
This note
of duplicity has nothing to do with the small faction of ministers
from Sharon’s own Likud Party -- headed by Finance Minister Benyamin
Netanyahu -- who miss no opportunity to register their reservations
over the entire project, or the party’s parliamentary faction,
a third of whose members are in open revolt against the disengagement
plan. In an effort to secure his position as heir apparent to
the Likud leadership, Netanyahu is steering a prudent line, stopping
just short of open defiance of Sharon while keeping his lines
of communication with the party’s hardliners. Sharon has contrived
to weather the storm, treating both the settler protesters and
his rebellious party colleagues with unconcealed disdain. “I am
telling you, the [withdrawal] will be carried out even if every
single road is blocked, even if the entire country is shut down
for two weeks,” he said in June. “It won’t change a thing.”
But even
as Sharon rides roughshod over the objections of his own followers
(clearly recorded in May 2004 when a referendum of party members
returned a majority against the pullout) it seems evident that,
in pulling troops and settlers out of Gaza and the northern West
Back, the prime minister is not embarking upon a first step toward
ending the occupation or implementing the US-sponsored “road map
to peace.” In the early stages of the controversy, Sharon’s close
confidant, Dov Weisglass, was imprudent enough to blurt out in
a press interview that the disengagement plan is “actually formaldehyde.
It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there
will not be a political process with the Palestinians.” In other
words, in going through with the withdrawal, the ex-general Sharon
is pursuing a number of objectives, ending the occupation and
achieving peace not necessarily included.
Following
the tactical manual familiar to any field commander, his first
and most immediate aim is to protect his flanks by withdrawing
from positions he knows to be vulnerable and indefensible. Indeed,
sober-minded strategists have long argued that the Gaza Strip
settlements -- 7,000 Israelis embedded in a hostile Palestinian
population outnumbering them 200 to 1 -- are untenable in the
long run. In discarding them, Sharon is merely evacuating exposed
outposts whose preservation is excessively costly in manpower
and hard cash.
All the same,
this tactical withdrawal is widely seen -- in Israel and in the
international community alike -- as a conciliatory step, for which
Sharon has picked up some badly needed credit. This newfound aura
of “peacenik” is reflected in the parliamentary balance, where
his government survives on the votes of his long-time adversaries
of the Labor Party, and even the left-leaning Meretz (Yahad) deputies
support him against no-confidence motions tabled by the far right.
In the international arena, the once reviled Sharon of Sabra and
Shatila notoriety is once again persona grata.
It is a fine
piece of role playing. As veteran patron of Israel’s colonization
drive, designed to perpetuate its hold on the Occupied Territories,
Sharon has not changed his spots -- far from it. Even as the television
cameras focus on the impending drama of the Gaza withdrawal, Sharon
is going ahead with moves to consolidate his grasp on the West
Bank heartland. While much controversy centers on whether or not
completion of the disengagement plans requires that the 1,700
settler homes in Gaza be demolished, twice that number of housing
units have been approved for construction in West Bank settlements,
in defiance of the “road map” requirement for a total halt on
expansion there. Construction of the cement-slab barrier around
“Greater Jerusalem” moves ahead at a furious pace.
SHARON’S
DRAMATIS PERSONAE
But the wiliest
element of Sharon’s disengagement plan actually relies on the
very opponents who campaign so vigorously to halt it. The erstwhile
followers who now miss no opportunity to revile their former hero,
while proclaiming their firm intention of going to the limits
to foil his plans, may unwittingly be playing the dramatic role
for which Sharon has cast them. With some 3,000 journalists from
every corner of the globe scheduled to come to Gaza to report
on the withdrawal, television viewers worldwide are to be riveted
by heart-rending footage of entire settler families being dragged
from their homes. Cameras will focus on bearded men clinging to
doorposts, head-scarved women wailing in despair, tearful children
struggling in the arms of policemen, “right-wing refuseniks” in
the army disobeying orders to break down barricaded doors. A prelude
came in late June, when Cpl. Avi Bieber abandoned an army unit
tearing down already evacuated settler houses in Gaza. Israeli
newspapers across the political spectrum ran a picture of Bieber
yelling at his commander: “Jews do not expel Jews!” The denouement
to this saga will be a tearjerker on a scale to make Hollywood
green with envy, and the message will go out loud and clear: if
this is the price Israel has to pay to remove 7,000 settlers,
who would dare to demand the displacement of the quarter million
residing in the West Bank?
That this
is the scenario Sharon has in mind is suggested by the way the
opposition is being handled by authorities not famous for their
tolerance of dissent. Mere weeks ahead of the planned relocation,
militants from the West Bank settlements -- the ferocious “youngsters
of the hilltops” -- were streaming into the Gaza villages, until
finally checked by the army roadblocks which control every access
route. The Gaza Strip is under military control, and the local
commander has the authority -- regularly invoked to halt Israeli
and Palestinian anti-occupation protesters -- to proclaim a “closed
military zone” into which entry is forbidden. That measure was
belatedly and reluctantly imposed, but only after hundreds of
militant reinforcements had poured in with the avowed intention
of putting up violent resistance to the army and police.
In a further
show of forbearance, the young zealots who have repeatedly blocked
key highways throughout Israel are treated with kid-glove mildness
by a police force that employed gunfire against Arab protesters
who dared to do likewise in the early days of the 2000 intifada:
13 were killed, dozens injured. Israeli leftists and peace campaigners,
whose non-violent protests encounter systematic beating and tear-gassing
by police riot units, can only look on in envy as young rioters
are hauled off the jammed roads by policemen taking evident care
to avoid subjecting them to pain or discomfort.
Sharon launched
his disengagement plan with multiple objectives in mind. The rival
camps, whether conveying their views in orange or in blue and
white, each have a role to play in their attainment. The blue-and-whites
provide much needed public support for the mid-August relocation
of settlers and soldiers. But the orange camp will also come in
handy if or when Sharon comes under pressure to undertake further
withdrawals.
