Smart
Sanctions
Rebuilding Consensus or Maintaining Conflict?
Marc Lynch
June 28, 2001
(Marc
Lynch teaches political science at Williams College.)
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Further Info
See the
Foreign Policy in Focus Policy Brief accessible online.
The summer
2000 issue of Middle
East Report (MER 215) focuses entirely on the impact of
sanctions on Iraq. Phyllis Bennis's critique of US policy,
"And They Called It Peace," is accessible online. |
Heated debate
in the UN Security Council on June 26 previewed the coming showdown
over the US-British "smart sanctions" initiative, designed
to "re-energize" the international consensus on sanctions
against Iraq. Faced with declining international support for and
compliance with the current sanctions, the United States and the
United Kingdom are pushing a major package of sanctions "reforms."
The US-UK proposal would allow some civilian goods into Iraq, while
tightening embargoes on others and retaining the UN's financial
control over the Iraqi economy. Security Council Resolution 1352,
passed on June 1, requires a decision on sanctions reform by July
3. But it now seems unlikely that this target will be met. Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned on June 25 that his country
"cannot allow [this measure] to pass." France and China
are working to reshape the proposal rather than rejecting it outright.
Iraq, for its part, has emphatically denounced the proposal from
the start. Most of the frontline states which would be charged with
implementing the new sanctions regime -- particularly Jordan --
have expressed strong opposition.
It is important
to be clear about what is, and what is not, at stake. The Security
Council debate foreshadows the end of the current sanctions regime.
Should it succeed, "smart sanctions" would revitalize
the sanctions on Iraq -- against prevailing international opinion.
The plan would rebuild a narrow Security Council consensus, and
blunt the force of rising opposition to the sanctions. But the reform
would emphatically not end the sanctions on Iraq, and probably would
not significantly improve the lives of Iraqi civilians. Continued
"dual-use" restrictions and the escrow account would keep
the Iraqi economy highly centralized and cash-poor. What is more,
the current emphasis on making the sanctions more efficient comes
at the expense of moves toward lifting the sanctions outright. Should
"smart sanctions" fail, the status quo -- a deeply unpopular
formal sanctions regime which is increasingly ignored -- will remain
in place. But given US dissatisfaction with the status quo, the
failure of sanctions reform might well lead the US to adopt a more
aggressive and unilateral approach to the persistent problem of
Iraq.
WHY "SMART
SANCTIONS"?
"Smart
sanctions" are not motivated by humanitarian concern. The US
and UK advanced the "smart sanctions" proposal because
the existing sanctions are unpopular and full of holes. After the
Desert Fox bombings of December 1998, the US and UK stood almost
alone in support of sanctions. Media reports and public debate increasingly
focused on Iraq's humanitarian disaster rather than on Iraqi non-compliance
with weapons inspections. US and British arguments placing blame
for the humanitarian crisis solely on the Iraqi regime's shoulders
were clear losers in the international public sphere. On the ground,
the volume of oil smuggling has grown exponentially, as the price
of oil increased, sympathy for the Iraqi people mounted and the
moral stigma of violating UN sanctions eroded. Painstaking negotiations
over Resolution 1284 in December 1999 failed to achieve either Security
Council consensus (Russia, China and France abstained) or Iraqi
compliance with the new inspections agency UNMOVIC. The US and UK
needed to shift the terms of the debate if they hoped to keep the
sanctions in place.
United against
the status quo, the Bush administration divided internally over
what to do. Conservatives -- led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
-- called for increased military pressure and support for the Iraqi
opposition. Even this proposal only temporarily appeased Republican
hawks in Congress. But two years of unpublicized, stepped-up bombing
of Iraq around the no-fly zones -- with little tangible gain and
the specter of US losses -- has worn down the morale of US forces.
The Iraqi opposition in exile remains in disarray. Iraq's neighbors,
focused on the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict, were unwilling
to endorse such an aggressive policy. Russian, Chinese and French
opposition made it clear that there would be no Security Council
authorization forthcoming. "Smart sanctions" emerged as
a strategy to save the sanctions by addressing the major points
of international critics, while also fending off pressure from domestic
hawks. As Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked on March 8, "smart
sanctions are meant to rescue the sanctions, not to abandon them."
Should Powell's initiative fail, the hawks will be well-positioned
to push their alternatives.
TOWARD
PERMANENT SANCTIONS?
The "smart
sanctions" proposal would open up trade in civilian goods,
allowing such contracts to be approved directly by the UN Secretariat
instead of being reviewed by the controversial UN Sanctions Committee.
Not only anti-sanctions campaigners, but also UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan and other UN officials, have sharply criticized the US
and British "holds" on contracts submitted to the Committee.
As of May 31, $3.7 billion in contracts were in limbo due to US
or UK objections. But "smart sanctions" retains a list
of "dual-use" items -- items that could have military
applications -- that would still be reviewed by the Sanctions Committee,
allowing further US and UK "holds" or vetoes. The contents
of this list have been the object of intense and so far fruitless
negotiations, with the US defending an expansive definition of "dual-use."
If the US definition is adopted in a final resolution, then little
will change besides the transparency of the contract review process.
Re-establishing
UN control over Iraqi finances by channeling all oil revenue through
the UN escrow account lies at the core of "smart sanctions."
The US and UK have been deeply troubled by the dramatic increase
in the flow of revenues into Iraqi government coffers from smuggling
and a surtax on oil. Because they fear that Iraq will use unmonitored
revenues to rearm itself, the US and UK insist on maintaining control
over all Iraqi financial transactions. "Smart sanctions"
attempts to cut off these independent revenue sources. The UK draft
of June 20 offers "states sharing land borders" the right
to purchase 150,000 barrels of oil per day in exchange for eliminating
smuggling.
Powell's "smart
sanctions" plan allows limited foreign investment in services
but not, as the French in particular want, in the oil sector. As
for the controversial compensation fund that skims 25 percent off
the top of Iraq's oil sales to pay reparations to Kuwait and others,
the UK draft of June 8 suggested pushing the percentage up to 30.
The US-UK proposal makes almost no reference to inspections, which
had been a primary bone of contention in the arduous 1284 negotiations.
Where those talks revolved around the "trigger" for the
lifting of sanctions, the US and UK now seem inclined to present
"smart sanctions" as a more or less permanent system,
quietly removing the option of lifting (rather than suspending)
the sanctions from the table.
UNLIKELY
CONSENSUS
Iraq immediately
rejected "smart sanctions," and halted oil sales on June
4 to protest Resolution 1352. The regime has every reason to expect
the continued de facto erosion of existing sanctions without its
concessions on weapons inspections. With smuggling revenue exploding,
and borders increasingly porous, the Iraqi regime -- if not the
Iraqi people -- is doing better economically. Despite US insistence
on a policy which does not depend upon Iraqi cooperation, the reality
is that the UN's Office of the Iraq Program, with its elaborate
system of contracts and administration of the Iraqi economy, can
not operate without Iraqi oil sales. Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin
Ramadan has warned that the adoption of "smart sanctions"
would be the end of the Oil for Food program. Iraq has denounced
France in scathing language for trying to achieve Security Council
consensus, and repeatedly threatened to punish any neighboring state
which cooperates with a new sanctions plan. The regime's furious
response reflects its recognition that -- however unlikely it is
-- the rebuilding of Security Council consensus could derail its
strategy for escaping sanctions.
Within the
Security Council, strong support for alleviating the humanitarian
crisis in Iraq mingles with hesitations about the "smart sanctions"
reforms. Russia has taken the lead in opposing the proposal. After
forcing the postponement of the decision until July 3, on June 25
Russia leaked a letter stating that it would not support the proposed
resolution. In an open Security Council debate that it called for
June 26, Russia complained that "smart sanctions" would
perpetuate the sanctions rather than move towards lifting them through
the disarmament process. France has attempted to minimize the extent
of international control over the Iraqi economy, pushing for a restrictive
definition of "dual-use" items, a minimal UN bureaucratic
presence in the administration of the Iraqi economy and permission
for investment in the Iraqi oil sector. The French want to further
loosen trade restrictions for Iraq's neighbors, and further cut
the percentage of revenue channeled to the compensation fund. Their
approach, which holds out the potential for creating a new consensus
among the Western powers, has come under the most ferocious attack
from the Iraqi regime. China has been more vocal than during previous
deliberations over Iraq, probably reflecting the deteriorating US-Chinese
relationship.
Most of the
frontline states which would carry the burden of enforcing the new
sanctions regime have outspokenly opposed it. Only Turkey has offered
conditional support. Jordan has taken an unusually direct position
of opposition to "smart sanctions." While Iraqi threats
of retaliation played some role, the Jordanian position more reflects
the overwhelming Arab public consensus against the sanctions and
the enormous economic stakes. Arab League Secretary-General Amr
Moussa reflected widespread Arab opinion by attacking the proposal
as simply repackaging the sanctions rather than addressing the real
problems.
With considerable
justification, the anti-sanctions movement has criticized "smart
sanctions" as an attempt to salvage a morally bankrupt policy.
The Bush administration's alternative plans may be worse. The US
will block Russia's counter-proposal to simply lift sanctions. Failure
in the Security Council may well push the US to a more unilateral
approach, including the revival of escalated military options, while
keeping the existing sanctions in place.
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