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Turkey's
Tentative Opening to Kurdishness
Nicole F. Watts
(Nicole
F. Watts is assistant professor of political science at San Francisco
State University.)
June 14, 2004
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Further
Info
For background
on politics in southeastern Turkey, see Marcie J. Patton,
"Voices from Turkey's Southeast," in Middle East
Report 227 (Summer 2003).
Order
back issues of Middle East Report, or subscribe, via a secure
server at MERIP's home page.
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In December
2003, Osman Baydemir was finishing his first semester of English-language
instruction in San Francisco when he received a phone call suggesting
it might be an opportune time for him to return to Diyarbakir, the
largest city in Turkey's mostly Kurdish southeastern region. Somewhat
reluctant to abandon his English study, Baydemir hesitated before
going back to his home town. Three months later, the long-time human
rights activist was sworn into office as the new mayor of Diyarbakir,
becoming the second consecutive candidate from Turkey's pro-Kurdish
political party, currently known as the Democratic People's Party
(DEHAP), to win the post. Indeed, the soft-spoken, 33 year-old Baydemir,
an ethnic Kurd and a lawyer by training, was considered such a sure
winner that Radikal, one of the country's national dailies, opined
that there was "no need to have an election" in Diyarbakir.
The March
2004 municipal elections were a kind of benchmark for democratization
in the southeast, an area that was consumed by fighting between
the Turkish military and the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
between 1984 and 1999, and that remained under emergency rule law
until late 2002. The prominence of pro-Kurdish candidates in the
contests also highlighted the dramatic, if halting relaxation of
Turkish state policies that, in the name of national unity, have
long sought to suppress public expressions of Kurdish identity and
even deny its existence. Perhaps the most dramatic moment came on
June 9, when the state released Leyla Zana, a parliamentary deputy
who had been imprisoned with three colleagues since 1994 on charges
of supporting the outlawed PKK. On the same day, state television
inaugurated nationwide broadcasts in Kurdish. After nearly a century
of conflict between Kurdish activists and the Turkish state, Zana's
release seems the latest portent of a tentative normalization of
pro-Kurdish politics in Turkey.
NEWFOUND FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT
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Traveling by pickup
to Newroz festival, March 21, 2004. (Nicole F. Watts)
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Upon their
release, Zana and her fellow parliamentarians staged a triumphal
return to Diyarbakir, symbolizing a newfound freedom of movement
for pro-Kurdish politicians in the southeast. For almost a quarter
century, Diyarbakir was under martial law or emergency rule law,
which suspended civil liberties and allowed the authorities to curtail
political activities of all kinds, sometimes forcefully. Zana was
one of many Kurdish activists who were arrested during the most
brutal phase of the confrontation with the army in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. In the last municipal election, in 1999, police
detained 551 pro-Kurdish party members, sending 57 to prison, according
to Turkey's Human Rights Association. Candidates were prevented
from campaigning in some villages and towns.
In 2004, by
contrast, Baydemir and other mayoral candidates from DEHAP (running,
confusingly, under the banner of the centrist Social Democratic
Populist Party, or SHP) were able to campaign where they liked.
Other than time-wasting gendarme checkpoints along the highways
east and west of Diyarbakir, they encountered few obstacles to the
dissemination of their electoral platform. Like candidates anywhere,
they went door to door on streets lined with small businesses, shaking
hands, kissing children and reassuring shopowners -- often, in Kurdish
-- that they would do their best to fix Diyarbakir's roads, reduce
unemployment from its current rate of over 50 percent and prevent
the sale of "dirty bread" that did not meet weight quotas.
They put up glossy posters at bus stops and on billboards, visited
Friday markets, met with local civic and trade union leaders, gave
numerous newspaper and TV interviews, and attended taziye (remembrance)
ceremonies to cement relationships with local families. They organized
lively canvassers' convoys to far-flung towns and villages, where
Baydemir gave public speeches -- in Turkish and, sometimes, for
brief moments, in Kurdish -- calling for democracy, human rights
and equal recognition of all of Turkey's cultural and ethnic minorities.
Perhaps even
more than the election campaign, the Diyarbakir Newroz festival,
held a week prior to the elections, bespoke the freer climate. Newroz
is a new year holiday celebrated in Iran and Central Asia and among
Kurds. Although Turkish officials claim it as a Turkic holiday as
well, Newroz has become a potent symbol of Kurdish identity in Turkey
and was banned across the southeast until recently. At one Newroz
demonstration in 1992 at least 70 people were killed in clashes
between security forces and demonstrators; in some years, hundreds
have been detained. In 2004, buoyed by good weather and confidence
that the event would be safe, an estimated 800,000 people attended
the Diyarbakir Newroz celebration to listen to music, light bonfires,
dance and picnic. The event passed "more like a holiday,"
as one newspaper put it, than a violent political protest. Although
police closed the highway to the festival site, forcing thousands
of people to walk several kilometers along the dusty road to the
grounds, and a military helicopter buzzed overhead, the biggest
threat to security came from poor crowd control, rock concert-style
body passing and ardent fans who climbed onto the stage to embrace
the singers.
UNCERTAIN
DIRECTION OF REFORM
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The
Newroz fire burns at the Diyarbakir celebrations. (Elsa LePennec) |
Since the Turkish
parliament passed a series of reforms in August 2002, as part of
Turkey's attempt to meet human rights standards for accession to
the European Union, there has been a palpable "Kurdification"
of civil society in parts of the southeast. Kurdish private language
instruction has become legal and selected news stations can broadcast
in Kurdish for several hours a day. Music and video stores in cities
like Diyarbakir proudly display posters advertising the latest locally
produced Kurdish films, Kurdish-language newspapers are sold openly
on the streets and pro-PKK newspapers are read in public -- even
on a Turkish Airlines flight from Istanbul to Diyarbakir, for instance.
These very
real changes notwithstanding, the Newroz celebrations -- and Baydemir's
election -- also highlight the uncertain direction of the contemporary
Kurdish rights movement in Turkey. Few of the state-directed reforms
have been fully or even partially institutionalized in the military,
the police, government bureaucracies or the judicial system. Hence,
restrictions on publishing, broadcasting, teaching Kurdish and collective
action continue, as do human rights abuses including police misconduct,
torture and arbitrary detention. Only a few private institutes have
actually been given formal permission to hold Kurdish language classes.
Whereas political
support for democratic liberalization exists among some civilian
leaders in the Turkish capital of Ankara, there appears to be little
serious effort to foster new cultures in institutions that have
typically functioned with impunity in the southeast. Only an hour
after Baydemir gave his victory speech on national TV, an argument
between bystanders and police concerning the transportation of election
ballots into the Diyarbakir courthouse resulted in a police assault
on civilians and members of the press. Dozens of people were hospitalized
and some TV cameras were destroyed. Baydemir and other pro-Kurdish
activists may be pushing the envelope on the sensitive topic of
Kurdish rights, but they still work carefully within clearly understood
parameters. It was acceptable to demand the release of Leyla Zana,
but it is not acceptable to discuss Kurdish autonomy or the legalization
of the former PKK. Even speaking Kurdish in public is still not
without its risks. In defiance of a political party law mandating
the use of Turkish, Baydemir said he speaks Kurdish "maybe
10 percent" of the time in public speeches, just enough to
connect with Kurdish speakers, but (he hopes) not enough to get
him in trouble.
CHALLENGES
OF MODERATION
Perhaps not
surprisingly, though, even moderate liberalization has produced
another set of challenges for Kurdish rights activists, who must
now contend more openly with the movement's internal diversity.
There is little consensus, for example, on exactly how to define
and present the movement's goals, or on how to balance the competing
demands of Kurdish nationalism and legal strictures. Most pro-Kurdish
activists genuinely want full democracy in Turkey and some may be
content with that, but many also dream of at least some degree of
Kurdish regional devolution. Although perhaps more muted than in
the past, these tensions and contradictions were apparent at the
2004 Newroz celebration (as they are at nearly every large, pro-Kurdish
gathering). On the one hand, festival organizers billed the event
as a multicultural "rainbow" celebration, a tactic pro-Kurdish
activists have increasingly used as a way to duck charges of separatism
and to recast notions of Turkish nationhood. On the other hand,
there was no doubting that organizers and participants saw Newroz
as a Kurdish national (though not necessarily nationalistic) event.
Songs were mostly in Kurdish, and Kurdish national colors of red,
yellow and green flags were everywhere on clothes and banners.
Particularly
challenging for festival organizers -- and the pro-Kurdish political
parties more generally -- are ubiquitous groups of PKK supporters,
for whom DEHAP's moderation may grow increasingly frustrating. At
Newroz these activists periodically broke into chants of "Long
Live Apo" (invoking the nickname of jailed PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan) and wave his picture in the air (helpfully published
that day on the back page of the pro-Kurdish newspaper Ülkede
Özgür Gündem). While pro-Kurdish politicians are
working within the Turkish political system, many Kurdish youth
in the southeastern parts of the country are distrustful of "the
state," openly celebrate Öcalan as "our president"
and make no secret of the fact that they would vote for the PKK
(or its successor) given the chance. Given that more than 50 percent
of Diyarbakir's population is under 15, this sort of grassroots
pressure on moderate party leadership cannot be ignored. It may
become harder to ignore in the upcoming months: elements of the
PKK based in northern Iraq pledged -- just prior to Zana's release
-- to resume their armed struggle against the Turkish state. The
Ankara government has refused to grant those fighters full amnesty
though the PKK stopped its attacks in 1999.
APPEAL OF
THE NO LONGER FORBIDDEN
It is not
certain how pro-Kurdish mayors like Baydemir will navigate these
waters, or whether they can at all. Swept into office on what they
themselves admit was a "vague" mandate of Kurdish identity
politics, the 37 mayors elected in the 1999 municipal elections
from DEHAP's predecessor, the now banned People's Democracy Party
(HADEP), mostly set about trying to improve local budgets and services,
confining open struggle for Kurdish rights to a series of symbolic
acts. Along with their sponsorship of festivals like Newroz, these
acts included efforts to name new streets after pro-Kurdish activists
and the rewriting of local history textbooks along more Kurd-friendly
lines. Such symbolic challenges chipped away at the official emphasis
on the Turkish character of the nation, carved out new spaces for
the public enunciation of Kurdishness and sent a vehement message
to local, national and international audiences that the Kurdish
rights movement had not collapsed when the PKK retreated in 1999.
But these
measures may not have satisfied the mayors' youngest and most active
supporters. In the March 2004 elections, the pro-Kurdish DEHAP/SHP
lost major cities to the governing Justice and Development Party
in four southeastern provinces they expected to win, and their overall
share of the municipal vote dropped even in strongholds like Diyarbakir.
Some party members chalked the losses up to election fraud, but
although there were reports of an overt military presence outside
some rural polling stations and "open" voting in some
locales, in the major cities of the southeast the elections appeared
to be mostly free and fair. Upended desks turned into makeshift
walls and small curtains in the schoolrooms-cum-polling stations
afforded voters some privacy, and in most cases representatives
from all the participating parties were present during the voting.
It is more likely that some Kurdish voters shunned SHP/DEHAP and
jumped to the ruling party because they knew it would be better
able to deliver money and services to the southeast. However incomplete
the Turkish state's concessions to the movement for Kurdish rights,
Kurdish identity politics may simply be less relevant to such voters
today than five or ten years ago. No longer entirely forbidden,
pro-Kurdish politics may be losing ground to the promise of political
and economic reform from Ankara.

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