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Reform
Retreats Amid Jordan's Political Storms
Curtis Ryan
June 10, 2005
(Curtis
Ryan teaches political science at Appalachian State University in
North Carolina. He is the author of Jordan in Transition: From
Hussein to Abdullah [Lynne Rienner, 2002]. He contributed this
article from Jordan.)
| For
background on rollbacks of Jordanian liberalization, see Jillian
Schwedler, "Don't
Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing,"
Middle East Report Online, July 3, 2002.
For
background on the "ethnic divide," see Marc Lynch,
"No
Jordan Option," Middle East Report Online, June 21,
2004. |
For weeks in
the spring of 2005, banners advertising an international gathering
at the Dead Sea resort of Shouna adorned every main street in Jordan's
capital city of Amman. The government was touting what it regarded
as a significant national success: for the third year in a row,
the lightly populated, resource-poor kingdom would host the high-powered
World Economic Forum on May 20-22. Jordanian officials were also
proud to be hosts of a conference of Nobel laureates convening in
Petra around the same time. As the dates of the World Economic Forum
approached, however, heavily armed soldiers and commandos soon outnumbered
the banners in the streets. Units of the Jordanian army and special
forces spread out across the capital, posting armored vehicles at
all major interchanges.
The shows of force may
have been intended more to reassure the international visitors than
to intimidate the Jordanian population, but they underscored how
political reform in this US-allied Arab state has repeatedly taken
a back seat to the regime's plans for economic development. Since
assuming the throne upon the death of his father Hussein in 1999,
King Abdallah II has emphasized economic development above all things,
with a particular focus on attracting foreign investment and manufacturing
more goods for export. The showpiece achievements of Abdallah's
foreign policy are Jordan's entry into the World Trade Organization
in 2000 and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States that
took effect in 2001. Meanwhile, even as the Bush administration
and Western commentators herald an "Arab spring" of democratizing
change, political reform has stalled.
ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO
STEPS BACK
Jordan's political liberalization
process has surged forward and fallen backward repeatedly since
its inception in 1989. The Hashemite regime began its experiment
in limited democratization largely as an attempt to quell widespread
protests and rioting triggered by an austerity program prescribed
by the International Monetary Fund and by charges of government
corruption. The political opening proceeded apace until 1994, when
King Hussein signed a peace treaty with Israel, whereupon the regime
rolled back previous reforms in an effort to rein in dissent. With
the 1999 royal succession, public expectations for reform increased.
The regime's initial
moves under the new king appeared to signal a solid commitment to
restarting the process of political reform. In the same year of
Abdallah's accession, municipal elections were held throughout the
kingdom. In 2003, when Jordan held its fourth round of national
parliamentary elections since 1989, the electoral law was supplemented
by a royal decree reserving six seats in Parliament for women. But
for every move toward liberalization, there have been corresponding
signs of deliberalization. The 2003 parliamentary contests, originally
scheduled for 2001, were twice delayed. During the two years that
Parliament was suspended, the king issued a series of controversial
edicts creating "temporary laws" that, among other things,
imposed additional restrictions on freedom of assembly and press
freedoms. In 2002, prominent feminist activist and former parliamentarian
Toujan Faisal was arrested and convicted of "defaming"
the prime minister and the government. While Faisal was later pardoned
and released, she was barred from running in the 2003 elections.
Today, pro-democracy activists complain of the increased role of
the intelligence services (mukhabarat) in public life.
As political reform
retreats, the regime's economic development priorities are increasingly
clear in its government appointments, with top ministries going
to business people and technocrats fond of neoliberal economics.
In the words of one analyst, these new ministers amount to "liberal
authoritarians," in that they support economic liberalization
far more than they do political reform. "The community running
Jordan is made up of English-speaking people with PowerPoint presentations,"
he continued. "Even in government, they are still business
people." Though many of these officials have previously served
in government jobs, a conservative former prime minister suggested
that the new ministers seem "more like Western consultants"
than public servants.
Especially since the
start of the liberalization process in 1989, the Jordanian regime
has allowed its critics room to dissent from its domestic policies,
but has kept foreign policy -- or "national security"
-- off limits to serious opposition. This general tendency was reinforced
when the regime signed its peace treaty with Israel. Now, the Jordanian
opposition increasingly finds that questions of economic policy
are off limits as well. Given the international emphasis of the
regime's economic ambitions -- specifically, its emphasis on direct
foreign investment, tourism and export-driven development -- economic
reform may be seen as an increasingly international issue. The government's
emphasis on economic development therefore appears to be causally
linked to the stalling of the political reform process.
There may be an ethnic
dimension to these dynamics as well. The public sector has traditionally
been dominated by the ethnic Transjordanians who make up the regime's
social base, while the private sector has tended to be a stronghold
of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, many of whom are descendants
of refugees from the 1948 war or refugees from the 1967 war. Given
the ethnic politics underlying the Jordanian political economy,
even privatization, seemingly a purely domestic aspect of economic
reform, carries a decidedly politicized tinge. It is difficult to
even broach the subject of privatization without appearing to be
adding to inter-ethnic tensions or undermining the regime's "Jordan
First" policy.
A TALE OF TWO CRISES
At the beginning of
April 2005, King Abdallah appointed a new prime minister, Adnan
Badran, to succeed the dismissed government of Faysal al-Fayiz.
The Fayiz government had earned the ire of the king for failing
to convince the Arab League to revive the Arab peace initiative
originally put forward by Saudi Arabia in Beirut in March 2002.
Jordan's proposal to revive the initiative, intended to assert diplomatic
leadership for a regime marketing its closeness to Washington, instead
drew the derision of Arab delegations who felt that such a move
would reward Israeli military actions against the Palestinians.
Arab objections focused not only on the substance of the Jordanian
initiative, but also on the perceived inappropriateness of its timing.
Several veteran Jordanian policymakers shared this view. But within
Jordan, anger at the Fayiz government focused not on Arab summitry,
but on the government's controversial attempts to change the laws
on professional associations, political parties and the right of
free assembly.
The government submitted
draft laws it insisted were cornerstones of Jordan's political reform
program. But in each case the draft laws actually increased restrictions
upon civil society. A draft law on political parties prohibited
political and party activities from taking place in clubs, mosques
and educational institutions. Parties would further be banned from
political activities within Jordan's professional associations.
The associations, meanwhile, were to be the subject of still another
draft law, curbing their political activities and even changing
their leadership selection procedures from direct elections by all
members to selection by nebulous "commissions." Non-governmental
organizations also came under the watchful eye of the Ministry of
the Interior, which announced its intention to review carefully
foreign sources of funding and even to shut down NGOs suspected
of being overly susceptible to foreign influence.
Pro-democracy activists
reverse the charge of foreign influence. In the words of one, "There
is a huge gap between the king's reform rhetoric and the actual
policies. It's like they are doing all this to impress the West....
We are actually cutting back on the freedom of the people."
The draft laws turned into a kind of showdown between the interior
minister and the professional associations, as well as influential
parties such as the Islamic Action Front (IAF). With the dismissal
of the Fayiz government, including his unpopular interior minister,
Samir Habashneh, the latter groups felt they had won a victory.
But soon angry parliamentarians
were also mobilizing against the new Badran government, in a crisis
that has yet to be resolved. By late May, the list of MPs in the
lower house threatening to withhold their vote of confidence in
Badran had grown to 48 out of 110. The MPs charged that the makeup
of Badran's government had been sprung on them out of nowhere. They
argued that it under-represented almost the entire southern part
of the country, especially ethnic Transjordanian strongholds such
as Kerak. The prime minister insisted that the allocation of posts
in the new government was based not on ethnic or geographic considerations,
but rather on expertise and qualifications. He thereby unwittingly
insulted the entire parliament (none of whom were included in the
cabinet) and perhaps even all of southern Jordan.
Members of Parliament
objected not only to who was apparently excluded from the cabinet,
but also to who was included -- specifically the cabinet's economic
team with its neoliberal priorities. The main complaints center
on the regime's emphasis on export-oriented growth, foreign aid
and foreign investment, along with its lesser emphasis on social
welfare and income distribution. Of the new team, by far the most
controversial is current Minister of Finance Basim Awadallah. As
a minister in the previous Fayiz government, Awadallah had managed,
largely by his impatient manner, to antagonize many legislators.
"The reformers in the government are just not credible people,"
said one analyst. "Basim Awadallah may be brilliant. But the
thrust of the no-confidence movement against the government is against
him more than anyone or anything else."
With 48 MPs officially
opposed to the new government, and 17 IAF members sitting on the
fence, parliamentarians submitted a request for an extraordinary
session. The extraordinary session would presumably be held sometime
during the summer, but in any case before the October 1, 2005 regular
session is slated to begin. The king did not immediately respond,
but did remark to the press that dissolving parliament was not an
option. This remark suggested that the session will take place,
but a no-confidence vote is not certain to be on the agenda, since
the agenda is set by the monarchy.
If a vote were held,
the Badran government would almost certainly lose, in what would
be a major defeat for the regime. Yet several other possibilities
remain. Many pro-democracy activists expect that the mukhabarat
will "cajole, persuade and perhaps even threaten" MPs
to change their positions. Alternatively, a cabinet reshuffle prior
to the vote could easily address issues of representativeness of
the south, while presumably replacing some of the most polarizing
appointments. Finally, it is possible that the Badran government
could actually win the confidence vote, if the prime minister can
persuade IAF MPs to vote for him. In a series of meetings with the
prime minister, IAF parliamentarians made several demands, including
implementation of sharia law and abandonment of the peace treaty
with Israel. These measures have no chance of approval from the
government, and so the IAF may in effect have to vote against the
government in order simply to ensure some level of credibility.
Indeed, the IAF may be under even more pressure to bolster its own
credibility than is otherwise apparent, given that it is viewed
by many Jordanians "on the street" as having been coopted
by the regime.
Yet the Islamist party
may be willing to risk that credibility, if it can secure a commitment
from the new government to abandon the draconian draft laws on associations,
parties and assembly. Since the IAF remains the country's best-organized
political party, and since Islamists have won the elections for
leadership of each major professional association, they would have
much to gain from such a reversal. Sadly, while the IAF has sounded
decidedly progressive in its defense of the parties and associations,
the party has echoed the state's reactionary line on NGOs, decrying
the "foreign influences" on groups working under the "guise"
of women's empowerment, democratization or human rights. Aside from
this clear contradiction regarding civil society, however, the IAF
may have worked its way into a corner in which it will lose something
whichever way it votes on the Badran government.
AN ERODING BASE?
While this wrangling
continues, polling by Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies has
shown a steady decline in public confidence in successive governments,
including the new Badran administration. Public dissatisfaction
appears to be based on a very accurate read of these government
shifts as little but reshuffling and recycling of elites. There
is also a basic demand for democracy that may be reaching a kind
of tipping point. Parliamentarians and civil society activists have
increasingly called for a democratically elected government wherein
the prime minister and cabinet would be drawn in large part from
the elected parliament itself rather than appointed by the monarchy.
The emphasis by some regime officials on the current crisis as a
north-south or even a Palestinian-Transjordanian issue may be intended
to deflect the focus from this deeper issue of democratic representation.
The "ethnic divide" remains the wedge issue in Jordanian
politics; anyone who so much as notes its existence can be made
to appear backward-looking and even un-Jordanian.
What should be most
troubling to the regime, however, is that these vocal objections
to its government choices are coming from a largely gerrymandered
parliament. Jordanian electoral districts are unequal in size, and
the electoral law over-represents rural conservative districts while
under-representing urban areas that tend to be bastions of Palestinian
or Islamist support. The strategy has worked as intended, yielding
a parliament made up overwhelmingly of ethnic Transjordanian conservatives,
and at times governed by tribal affiliations rather than secular
left or religious right party loyalties. Yet it is this parliament
that is on a collision course with the monarchy's chosen government.
Critics within the parliament even include the powerful and conservative
Transjordanian speaker, Abd al-Hadi al-Majali.
Opposition to the government's
continued emphasis on economic over political reform has for some
time included Jordan's fairly weak secular left parties as well
as the more well-organized Islamist movement. The opposition is
mainly opposition to policies and priorities, not opposition to
the Hashemite state. Yet if this opposition to large aspects of
the state's agenda is starting to include many elements of conservative,
Transjordanian and even Bedouin society, then where exactly is the
regime's base of support?
Perhaps fearing an eroding
political base, in early June King Abdallah issued a new order,
setting aside shares of privatized companies to be offered at reduced
prices to past and present members of the security forces. Like
the public sector in general, the security forces tend to be bastions
of ethnic Transjordanian power, and so the king's announcement appears
to shore up this traditional base of the monarchy in a very material
way. The new policy applies to members (including retirees) of the
public security department, the civil defense forces, the armed
forces and the mukhabarat. All are now eligible quite literally
to profit from the privatization process. The policy may help the
monarchy achieve three goals simultaneously: it allocates direct
benefits to the domestic security apparatus, it allows the economic
reform process to continue and finally -- and most importantly --
it may undercut much of the Transjordanian opposition to privatization
and economic reform, as well as the current slate of neoliberal
ministers.
ANOTHER STORM TO WEATHER
In concert with such
pork barrel politics, and in the absence of substantive political
reform, the regime has launched a series of "initiatives"
accompanied by major marketing campaigns that seem to play better
with Western creditors than with the Jordanian population. "Jordan
First" was succeeded or at least augmented by "political
development" and now the new call is for a "national agenda"
to be launched by September 2005. Pro-democracy activists in Jordan
argue that these initiatives generate plenty of conferences and
workshops, but little material change. The question is how long
the wheel spinning can continue, and for that matter, why it should.
Even the regime would benefit from meaningful political reform that
would buy it some popular support -- and thereby enhance its security.
Many Jordanians would be content with incremental progress. "People
are not in the streets here really," said one analyst. "This
isn't the same as the Kifaya movement [in Egypt], at least not yet."
But whether because of resistance from the mukhabarat or for other
reasons, the wheels keep on spinning.
As the crisis of confidence
in the government continues at several levels, another crisis may
loom ever closer. Previous bouts of unrest in the kingdom, such
as the riots of 1989 and 1996, have often been triggered by austerity
measures. But with the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and the
rise of a new Iraqi government, Jordan no longer gets its oil supplies
at artificially low prices. Rather, Arab Gulf monarchies are increasingly
charging Jordan full prices, even as these skyrocket to previously
unthinkable levels. The Jordanian government budget simply cannot
absorb the difference between the rising cost of imports and subsidized
in-country oil and gas prices. Some "adjustment" of prices,
probably over the summer, will likely occur, possibly triggering
unrest once again. International aid to maintain current prices
would avoid this scenario, but at present such a dollar influx does
not appear to be forthcoming. The already unpopular neoliberal and
technocratic economic team in government may, in short, have yet
another storm to weather.

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