Bring
In the Dead: Martyr Burials and Election Politics in Iran
Rasmus Christian
Elling
March 19, 2009
(Rasmus
Christian Elling is a Ph.D. fellow at the University of Copenhagen
and a visiting researcher at New York University. He also contributes
to the collective blog cuminet.blogs.ku.dk.)
Beating their
chests and wearing black, a procession of young men and women
filed toward the gates of Tehran’s Amir Kabir Polytechnic University
on February 23. The mourners -- drawn primarily from the ranks
of the Basij militia and unaffiliated hardline Islamist vigilantes
-- were carrying the remains of five unknown soldiers, martyred
during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, to campus, where they intended
to rebury them. Inside the gates, a gathering of angry students
had assembled to protest what they saw as a blatant show of state
force, and when the procession crossed onto campus, a confrontation
ensued. Students claimed the fight pitted 1,500 protesters against
a smaller group of mourners, most of whom were armed with clubs,
knives and martial arts weapons.[1] Security
forces arrested more than 70 of their number, the students reported,
and nine were hospitalized. In subsequent days, more student
activists were picked up in police raids, and at press time,
some of them were still in detention.
State-affiliated
media portrayed the events differently. They maintained that
only “50 persons” had “created tensions” by provoking the mourners
and attacking the dignity of the martyrs. A pro-Ahmadinejad news
bureau reported that a small student “militia” had assaulted
the otherwise peaceful ceremony.[2] The media outlet went on to accuse these “extremists”
of trying to tear up mourning banners and shouting “slogans against
the Order,” that is, against the political-religious system of
the Islamic Republic of Iran. On their weblogs, members of Student
Basij -- a state-funded student organization affiliated with
the paramilitary Basij, which was created under Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini in 1979 -- explained that they had shown restraint in
the face of insults and bodily abuse.[3] Indeed,
the Basijis claimed, only the student protesters had resorted
to violence at Amir Kabir.
The phenomenon
of martyr burials at universities has a history. The idea was
first floated in 2003, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, current
patron of the Basijis, was mayor of Tehran, and it has been hotly
contested ever since. The leading student group, the Office for
the Consolidation of Unity, has long objected to the notion,
raising the slogan, “Don’t turn universities into graveyards!”
Students condemn the burials as political manipulations, a way
for the hardline establishment to impose upon the university
milieu a militant ideology that praises “martyrdom” and promotes
military values associated with the Revolutionary Guards, to
which the Basij is now officially subordinate. The students feel
that since the Iran-Iraq war and the tumult of the immediate
post-revolutionary period are over, the militant ideology is
obsolete. They call for the rule of law and transparent, accountable
government, instead of the unquestioning loyalty to the clerical
hierarchy that is the hallmark of the Basij and their social
peers. The interments, students feel, are also a practical means
of clamping down on student activism: Gatherings are prohibited
near the tombs of martyrs for any purpose other than mourning.
Thus, the students see the burials as part of a state strategy
to suppress dissident voices within Iran’s lively university
environment.
Several martyr
burials took place on campuses before the February 23 events,
most of them at universities dominated by Islamist students.
Amir Kabir was the last university chosen as a burial ground,
because the authorities were well aware of the school’s reputation
as a hotbed of radical dissent and knew there would be clashes.
In the weeks leading up to February 23, students reported a tense
atmosphere as outside elements came onto campus to lay the groundwork.
The day before the actual burials, Khomeini’s successor as Supreme
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a statement hailing the
martyrs and stating that the youth of today is indebted to these
“unknown war heroes.” The declaration was plainly a blessing
from Iran’s highest authority for the ensuing operation. As in
many other countries, universities in Iran are key arenas of
the political and ideological battles in the broader society.
The conflict over martyr burials, the latest in a series of confrontations
between dissident students and the Islamic Republic’s authorities
and supporters, reveals the deep rifts in Iranian society in
the leadup to the presidential election slated for June 12.
Contested
Space
Under the
Pahlavis, universities harbored the main movement against the
Shah that played a pivotal role in the 1978-1979 revolution.
That movement was ideologically diverse, encompassing Marxists
and liberals as well as Islamists. It was radical Islamist students,
however, whose voices grew louder as the revolution proceeded,
and it was they who overran and occupied the US Embassy in 1980.
The same year, Khomeini closed down the universities to curb
the secular opposition; during the ensuing “cultural revolution,”
institutions of higher learning were thoroughly “Islamized.”
Many spots in incoming classes were allocated to loyalist forces,
in particular to young war veterans from the lower-income strata
of society. On campus, morality police and intelligence agents
rooted out dissenters. The universities were firmly in the grip
of the state apparatus. In the 1990s, however, alternative voices
slowly emerged. Mobilizing the 1970s baby boom generation, a
reformist student movement spearheaded the surprisingly effective
grassroots campaign that led to President Mohammad Khatami’s
landslide election of 1997. For a brief period, pro-democracy
activity blossomed at Iranian universities. The activists of
this period wished to strengthen the country’s quasi-democratic
institutions and limit the power of unelected clerical bodies
such as the Guardian Council. For most, the goal was not to abolish
the Islamic Republic, but to reform and “democratize” the religious-political
system.
The conservatives
responded in July 1999 when security forces and vigilantes stormed
the dormitories of Tehran University. Scores of students were
wounded and one killed. The following week, riots exploded throughout
Iran in what seemed to be the most widespread unrest since the
revolution. As disgruntled youth took to the streets, military
commanders threatened to intervene. In the aftermath, authorities
severely repressed the student movement. Khatami’s weak and vague
attempts to stem the repression fueled student radicalization
as many came to see reformism as little but veiled conformism.
Frustrated with the fickle politicians of the reformist movement,
student groups initiated a painful divorce from Khatami and his
coalition. The Office for the Consolidation of Unity announced
that it would henceforth concentrate on making change at the
grassroots, such as protecting and expanding the budding Iranian
civil society groups.[4] Other
students went “underground,” where they were able to discuss
more radical democratic, secular and Marxist ideas.
The 2005 election
of Ahmadinejad -- a severe defeat for the reformists that was
partly due to student boycotts -- has posed a fresh challenge
to Iranian students and other proponents of greater democracy.
Ahmadinejad is a staunchly hardline Islamist with the declared
goal of reviving Khomeini’s revolutionary tenets. Among Ahmadinejad’s
many far-reaching decisions since taking office is his attempt
at revitalizing the “cultural revolution” of the early 1980s.
Echoing years of frustrated conservative rhetoric about the loss
of their foothold on campus, his aim is to “re-Islamize” the
universities. Among other things, Ahmadinejad’s government has
fired “liberal” and “secular” faculty, installed loyal officials
in key positions and strengthened the branches of Student Basij.
Thus far,
however, it seems that Ahmadinejad has unwittingly provided new
impetus for the pro-democracy student movement. Despite the ever
increasing control of the state, there have been clear signs
of campus discontent almost since the outset of Ahmadinejad’s
term. In November 2005, students forced Ahmadinejad to reverse
his decision to appoint a cleric as head of Tehran University;
in December 2006, students shouting “Death to the dictator!”
interrupted Ahmadinejad’s speech at Amir Kabir University; in
October 2007, student protesters at Tehran University likened
the visiting president to the late Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet;
and in December 2008, thousands of students at major universities
throughout Iran marked Students’ Day with anti-government
demonstrations. The 2008 protests were so severe that Ayatollah
Khamenei was compelled to cancel a campus visit.
The protests
against the martyr burials are also protests against Ahmadinejad’s
government. The pro-democracy students see Ahmadinejad and his
faction as representatives of an ultra-conservative culture,
an authoritarian and even “fascist” approach to politics, and
a violent interpretation of Islam. They therefore regard the
recent burials as part of the conservative program to regain
control of the universities and other public spaces. This program
is also executed in the streets of major cities throughout Iran,
where Basij and police patrols campaign against bad hejabi,
that is, “indecent” clothing. The current “cultural revolution”
is presented as a counterattack on the tahajom-e farhangi,
or “Western cultural invasion,” which the conservatives profess
to espy and which they see as a threat to traditional and revolutionary
values among Iranian youth. With the martyr tombs, the authorities
have established a permanent, visible presence in a contested
physical space as well as a convenient excuse for giving external
“pressure groups” access to the academic sanctuary.
Champion
of the Dispossessed
It is not
only the proponents of greater democracy like the Office for
the Consolidation of Unity who are active in the university milieu.
With stepped-up state support, Islamist organizations such as
Student Basij have also become more influential. Most are ardent
supporters of Ahmadinejad, whom they see as the last bulwark
against a tide of moral corruption and foreign aggression. Islamist
students’ blogs and Internet forums reveal the profound differences
in outlook among Iranian youths, as embodied in the February
23 mourners and their adversaries. Writing on February 24 on
his blog Upside Down, the Islamist Mohammad Elias summarized
those differences:
Those who
oppose martyr burials at universities say that this action
turns martyrs into something omnipresent and commonplace. Well,
what could be better to make omnipresent and commonplace than
martyrs and martyrdom? Where does this idea that martyrs should
only be buried in the martyrs’ section of the graveyard come
from? It is modern materialism that ostracizes the dead, and
with its baseless separations and differentiations, [materialism
demands that] martyrs be cast out to some distant place, so
that the nightmare of death does not disturb its carnal sleep.[5]
Another Basiji
blogger, writing at Living Corpse on February 25, allowed that
the protesters were, to some extent, right to claim that Basijis
use the martyr burials to pursue political goals:
We are not
afraid to say that we aim at extending the culture of martyrdom
to the whole universe. The university didn’t take much effort:
We will even conquer the White House and bury a martyr in the
courtyard!... We see a university without a martyr as a graveyard.
We see a university, where people such as you study and belch
out words of anti-Islamism, socialism and liberalism, as a
graveyard.… We believe that the martyrs are not dead; they
are alive.[6]
The martyr
burials are connected to an Islamist culture that praises martyrdom
as the ultimate sacrifice for the community of believers and
for God. It is not simply a question of factional squabbling
between reformists and conservatives within the Islamic Republic:
Deep, existential issues of ideology, ethics and faith, and the
struggle among the different cultures of Iran, are at stake.
In his personal account of the February 23 events, Basiji student
Ali Allahyari points to a moral rather than a political conflict:
After briefly
paying my respects [at the martyrs’ tomb], I saw that a small
number [of protesters] had gone into the cafeteria where they
started to harass and abuse sisters [female students] who were
eating their food. [The protesters] had thought that we guys,
like them, were without honor! They hadn’t realized that a
Muslim protects the honor not only of his own kin, but also
that of others.[7]
Allahyari
describes how furious his fellow Basijis were at the scene in
the cafeteria, but adds that he had intervened to prevent bloodshed.
Such statements are typical of the Basiji discourse: opponents
are portrayed not only as political deviants but as louche and
perverted.[8] The
Basiji, on the contrary, is one who will stand up for the honor
of others, protect traditional values and defend public order
against anarchy. Such a portrayal echoes a central worry of many
pious Iranians: that reformism, democratic change and the influx
of Western culture will undermine the religious identity of Iran.
Conservatives see social corrosion appearing in the form of drug
abuse, crime, prostitution and teenage suicide -- all of which
are very real and evident problems in Iranian society. They link
these phenomena with the perceived spread of social anomie, promiscuity,
nihilism, secularism, the “obscene” or “Western” behavior and
clothing of many youngsters, and even devil worship. Many Iranians
from this segment of society see Ahmadinejad as the hero who
will rescue Iran from moral decay.
While the
pro-democracy student activists generally belong to the urban
middle class, often hailing from families with secular views,
the Basijis are mostly of humbler class origins. Many come from
the poverty-stricken neighborhoods of southern Tehran, where
the population is composed mostly of rural families who migrated
to the city from poor provinces in the 1970s and 1980s. Many
Basijis’ families depend for their sustenance upon government
subsidies and for their social position upon privileges arising
from the Basiji or war veteran status of their sons or fathers.
There is thus an element of social and cultural clash between
the austere, conservative and highly religious worldview of those
from lower classes and the moderately religious or even secular
worldview of Iranians from the upper middle class. Issues such
as the mingling of sexes and appropriate dress are just some
of the many sites of contention between these two groups.
Conservatives
thus view the upcoming presidential contest as a round of virtual
combat between the righteous, patriotic forces of Ahmadinejad
and the decadent, nation-betraying reformists who have suggested
rapprochement with the West. On an Internet forum, a student
wrote about the Amir Kabir protesters: “Even though I hate them,
I also feel sorry for these people who have become instruments
of people who do not have the guts to declare who they are, these
unpaid mercenaries, these poor students who sacrifice themselves
for their masters without getting paid or thanked.”
Conservatives
often portray their domestic rivals as “agents” of foreign enemies,
a fifth column unwittingly pursuing neo-imperialist powers’ agenda
of sowing discord in Iran. This view is in line with a foundational
myth of the Islamic Republic: that Iran is threatened on all
sides by the schemes of arrogant superpowers in the West, and
first and foremost the United States. It is also the product
of a sort of “clash of civilizations” theory, the mirror image
of that promulgated by the late Samuel Huntington, according
to which, conservatives believe, the Muslim world is engaged
in an epochal cultural war with the West. Islamist students thus
deem their pro-democracy peers to be “sellouts” who have lost
their Iranian identity amidst the Western cultural onslaught.
Hamed Talebi, another Islamist blogger, recently wrote:
Why do all
the revolution’s sworn enemies in the world -- who have never
wanted what is good and expedient for Islamic Iran -- and the
[domestic] reformists suddenly have this mutual understanding
in opposing Ahmadinejad? Have our foreign enemies become well-intentioned
toward us?! If not, what is this broad and historical consensus
and understanding for?! They are all working frenetically against
Ahmadinejad. But that’s OK. We, too, have a God.[9]
A like-minded
reader, himself a conservative blogger, commented: “Enshallah,
in the forthcoming election, the American reformists will be
consigned to the graveyard of Iranian political history, and
with the victory of Dr. Ahmadinejad, a crushing answer to the
foreign enemy and its domestic followers will be given, once
and for all.”
Return
of the Smiling Mullah and Co.
Iran watchers
were quick to attribute the February 23 confrontation at Amir
Kabir University to maneuvering in advance of the presidential
election. “The government of President Ahmadinejad is desperately
trying to silence all independent voices ahead of the upcoming
June election under any conceivable pretext. The university students
are being targeted for their outspoken advocacy and defense of
freedom of expression,” said Hadi Ghaemi, spokesman for the International
Campaign for Human Rights in Iran.
The atmosphere
in Iran is indeed tense and uncertain. Mohammad Khatami, who
was president for two terms between 1997 and 2005, announced
on February 9 that he would join the presidential race, and then
withdrew just over a month later. Before he dropped out, Mehdi
Karroubi, who was speaker of Parliament from 1989-1992 and again
from 2000-2004, and former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Musavi
also put their names in the mix. Until recently, therefore, there
were three “moderate” or “reformist” candidates aiming to wrest
the presidency from Ahmadinejad. Though there are clear signs
of discontent with the president, it will not be an easy task
to unseat him, as Khatami’s withdrawal may show. The president’s
opponents face a host of obstacles. Khatami was the target of
character assassination in the state-run media, perhaps signaling
that the Supreme Leader would throw his weight behind Ahmadinejad
(though, after Khatami’s withdrawal, this is far from certain).
Some also criticize the reformist bloc for failing to come up
with a new face and a new political program. In the words of
the famous blogger Khorshid Khanum (Miss Sun):
Do the reformists
have an actionable strategy or program, say, for truly reforming
Iran’s economy…for reaching out to the layer of society engulfed
by poverty and people who felt closer to Ahmadinejad [than
to Khatami] during last election? Do they really have a practical
program for reforming the country’s educational system? Do
they have a program for defending women’s rights?... Dear reformists:
Please present your programs. Apart from a choice between bad
and worse, what reason is there for us to vote for you?
In an echo
of 1999, Khatami himself did not stand up for the students at
Amir Kabir, so as to avoid taking sides. A key member of his
reformist coalition, Mostafa Tajzadeh, did state, “With the announcement
of Khatami’s participation in the elections in mind, students
and civil society activists should brace themselves for more
and heavier pressures in the near future.… Because of the government’s
negative actions at universities, the authoritarian camp knows
that if the students are going to be active in the elections,
it will definitely mean that the authoritarians will suffer a
severe defeat.”[10]
Even with
Khatami out, there is reason to fear that the remaining opposition
candidates might split the “reformist” vote. A cleric with revolutionary
credentials and a long political career, Karroubi has been quite
vocal in criticizing the repression of students, Sufi dervishes,
artists and human rights activists such as Nobel Prize laureate
Shirin Ebadi. A week after the martyr burials, Karroubi was prevented
from speaking at the university in Hamadan. Karroubi is not widely
seen as a serious contender for the presidential post. Yet his
populist slogans, such as his promises to give cash handouts
from Iran’s oil income to all Iranians and his appeals to ethnic
minority voters, may steal some of Ahmadinejad’s thunder. Karroubi
has managed to win over some of Khatami’s erstwhile key supporters.
Not all reformists see Karroubi as one of their own, however,
and the 72-year old cleric does not seem to have a wide base
among the students.
After several
months of deliberation, Mir-Hossein Musavi announced his candidacy
on March 10. Just like other reformists, Musavi belongs to the
“traditional left wing”; as opposed to Khatami and Karroubi,
however, he is not a cleric. His credentials as prime minister
during the Iran-Iraq War are impeccable. An academic, painter
and architect, Musavi withdrew from politics after being ousted
by Khamenei and his “right-wing” conservative allies in 1989
and devoted himself to the cultural scene. To some Iranians,
Musavi represents the early days of the revolution, before factional
rivalries and internal corruption tarnished the state’s image.
Musavi’s quasi-socialist notions of an economy based on collective
cooperatives might appeal to many people across the board, including
hardline Islamists. It remains to be seen, however, if Musavi
can prosper in the Marxist-inspired political milieu found at
many Iranian universities. Furthermore, his recent statements
combining the discourse of reformism with that of osulgara’i (“principle-ism,”
that is, Khomeinist fundamentalism) can be seen as a sign of
Musavi currying favor with the same conservatives whom the students
oppose. Indeed, because of his credentials, Musavi is certainly
a man of the system, and radical pro-democracy students will
see him as nothing more and nothing less.
Thus, the
reformists might have gotten one thing right: that the deteriorating
economy and social inequality are the number one concerns of
most Iranians. Most students are still disillusioned and pessimistic,
however, and, as this entry at the Be Free blog shows, they have
not forgotten Khatami’s -- and other reformists’ -- lack of support
for political dissidents:
Why did
Khatami join [this election]? Has he come to entertain people
a little while the political system prepares its future programs?
Has he come to tranquilize this nation’s twenty-something-year
old pains so as to prepare it for future ones? What happened
to eight years of talking -- and just talking -- about students?
[This talk] has only resulted in the crowding of cells in Evin
prison. In the last three years, while the universities were
smeared in blood, where were you, Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami?[11]
This skepticism
is likely to be transferred to other presidential candidates
and national politicians who evoke the 1997-2005 “reformist moment”
in their attempts to attract student support.
Another
Iranian Surprise?
The conservative-dominated
state uses martyr burials in Iranian universities as a means
of intimidation against a crucial, but restive segment of the
population. The interments are intended to reclaim a key social
space that is “threatened” with secularization. Pro-democracy
student activists are constantly harassed and beleaguered for
one simple reason: Those in power see them as a potential peril.
The Amir Kabir
protesters did not receive much attention in Iranian media, however,
apart from the negative portrayals circulated by state-run news
agencies. Indeed, the question is whether the latest incident
redounded to the student activists’ advantage at all. The issue
of martyrs is extremely sensitive, since the Iran-Iraq war was,
by all accounts, the most traumatic event in recent Iranian history.
Most Iranians lost a family member during the war, and this living
memory is certainly not limited to conservatives. Even though
it is perfectly clear from the protesters’ blogs and websites
that they do not want to disrespect the martyrs, this might,
nevertheless, be the conclusion that conservatives and others
drew in February. Indeed, it has often been argued that radical
pro-democracy groups have distanced themselves not only from
the reformists, but also from the broad population. The students
might have lost touch with reality in a society that has lost
interest in grand notions of democracy and “dialogue of civilizations,”
to use Khatami’s famous phrase, and is instead preoccupied with
daily struggles for survival.
There is no
doubt that the reformists have their eyes fixed on universities,
hoping for a revival of the pro-reformist movement. Indeed, without
their support, no reformist candidate will be able to mobilize
the grassroots among the young, women, ethnic minorities and
opposition circles that swept the reformists into power in 1997,
2000 and 2001, and that are needed for an election victory today.
But the reformists cannot count on the students’ support, unless
they revise their tactics, program and image. It will take serious
amends for past misdeeds and a much bolder and outspoken plan
before the reformist movement can come alive again. So far, reformists
have showed no sign of taking these steps, and it remains to
be seen if Musavi can become a charismatic movement leader like
Khatami used to be.
When Iran’s
2 million students return from their Nowruz (Persian New Year)
vacations at the beginning of April, Iranian universities will
likely become political battlegrounds again, buzzing with controversy
over candidates and their platforms. Many students, of course,
will not care. Indifferent and apathetic, they will treat the
whole election process as one big charade; others will take it
seriously and treat it as a showdown between good and evil. With
Iran’s recent history in mind, it is too early to predict an
election result or to dismiss the reformists completely. When
Iranian voters go to the polls in June, the world might be in
for another surprise.
Endnotes
[1] Amir
Kabir University Newsletter, February 24, 2009.
[Persian]
[2] Rajanews.com,
February 23, 2009. [Persian]
[3] See
the post at http://basijisiasi.parsiblog.com/851114.htm. [Persian]
[4] See
Rasmus Christian Elling, “Reviewing and Redefining the Student
Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Humanisierung der
Bildung (Germany/Russia) (Summer 2006).
[5] See
the post at http://vajgoon.blogfa.com. [Persian]
[6] See
the post at http://jasadezende.ir. [Persian]
[7] See
the post at http://www.eilia13.ir. [Persian]
[8] For
insight into Basij culture, see Fatemeh Sadeghi, “Foot Soldiers
of the Islamic Republic’s ‘Culture of Modesty,’” Middle East
Report 250 (Spring 2009).
[9] See
the March 10, 2009 post at http://hamedtalebi.blogfa.com. [Persian]
[10] Emrooz,
February 28, 2009. [Persian]
[11] See
the February 20, 2009 post at http://aaazaaadbaaash.blogspot.com/.
[Persian]
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