Interventions:
A Middle East Report Online Feature
The
Peace Movement Plans for the Future
Mark LeVine
(Mark
LeVine teaches Middle East history at the University of California-Irvine.)
July 2003
As the Bush
administration struggles with occupying Iraq, the anti-war movement
is in the midst of intense self-evaluation. For all of the movement's
success in raising doubts about and opposition to the March 2003
invasion, as of July George W. Bush's war is still popular among
Americans. The war caused thousands of Iraqi civilian deaths,
and Iraqis may be dying for years to come due to widespread use
of cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions. While some local
Kurdish and Shi'i leaders have cautiously decided to work with
the occupation regime, the inability of US forces to restore law,
order or public services, along with the imperial style of US
viceroy L. Paul Bremer, have led to increasing opposition to the
occupation among ordinary Iraqis. Yet sentiment among Americans,
amidst concerns over post-war casualties and the missing weapons
of mass destruction, still supports (albeit cautiously) the invasion
and occupation of Iraq.
Despite this
situation, most leaders of the peace movement are sanguine about
its achievements. As one activist explained, "the fact that
we connected with the doubts of millions of Americans in the post-September
11 environment is amazing. We built a strong degree of unity in
action against the war while allowing for groups that had substantial
differences to work together -- a big improvement over the way
the left has operated for the past three decades." "The
most important aspect of the movement is that it's global,"
adds Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies. "Internationally,
what was so interesting was the intersection of civil society
and government -- groups of individual member states, some of
the smallest and weakest in the UN -- and the UN as an institution
defying the US."
At the same
time, the passage of 165 anti-war and anti-PATRIOT Act resolutions
and thousands of demonstrations in cities across the country reflected
success at the grassroots. As Leslie Cagan, the chair of United
for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), argues, "millions of people
are in motion. Because it's become an anti-war movement beyond
just Iraq, if the US takes action anywhere else, we'll see large
numbers in motion again."
MOVEMENT
FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND JUSTICE
Making this
possible, in no small measure, was the coalescence of anti-war
and anti-corporate globalization forces into one larger global
peace and justice movement. Heralded by the New York Times
as "the second superpower," this combined movement is
perhaps the most important unintended consequence of Bush's drive
to war. The merger provided the anti-war movement with a highly
politicized, worldwide activist base of millions, an organizational
network and a sophisticated analysis of the existing world system
to ground its own critique of the administration's justifications
for invasion.
"Outside
of the US, there was a quicker realization among globalization
folks that these issues were tied together," recounts Medea
Benjamin of Global Exchange. "Thus, at the World Social Forum
in Brazil this year, it was clear that the [global justice] movement
had totally embraced the peace movement. War sessions were the
biggest ones, while the idea for the February 15 worldwide protest
day was actually hatched at the European Social Forum in November."
The combined anti-war and anti-neoliberal globalization discourse
raised consciousness among Americans of the link between the largely
economic vision of globalization that prevailed in the 1990s and
militarization. As Antonia Juhasz of the International Forum on
Globalization says, "our contribution was to develop a plan
for something beyond just opposition to the war. Our focus on
globalization showed that it's all the same system."
Continual
images of millions of Europeans, and especially Americans, marching
against the war had a deep effect on Arabs and Muslims around
the world. According to Pakistani scholar Pervez Hoodhboy, because
of strong public opposition in the West, demonstrations in his
country featured the sort of signs that were seen in New York
or Paris -- "No Blood for Oil," "No to War"
-- rather than the blanket condemnations of America and the Christian/Jewish
West or the radical Islamist slogans that one might have expected.
The anti-war movement "proved to Muslims that their enemy
was the US government, not the American people or the West per
se."
The groundwork
for future solidarity across cultures and continents was laid
by two waves of protest, largely independent of each other, in
the US and Europe and in the Islamic world. Yet in a strange irony,
the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East might thank the vibrant
anti-war movement in the West for helping to contain their own
populations. The Western anti-war movement was just as angry at
US policy as Middle Easterners were, but it refrained from offering
sustained indictments of Middle Eastern regimes -- even the one
in Baghdad.
WHAT ABOUT
SADDAM?
In the months
before the war, did the movement focus enough on the crimes of
Saddam Hussein's regime, the need to bring the deposed dictator
to justice and support for a democratic transformation in Iraq?
Most organizations in the movement concentrated on countering
the specific justifications offered by the White House for war
-- especially the alleged threat of weapons of mass destruction
-- rather than offering an alternative to George W. Bush's version
of "regime change." Bennis, who disagreed with calls
to focus more on Hussein before the war, still felt that "there
was not enough discussion inside the movement about what our posture
should be regarding Hussein. There was a lot of unevenness between
those who thought we should focus on the US, those who felt it
would be politically untenable not to deal with him in some way
and those who felt we needed specific proposals to be credible
as an anti-war movement."
Progressive
religious publications such as Sojourners and Tikkun
did call for the removal, indictment and trial of Hussein, while
simultaneously opposing a US invasion. Yet according to Rami Elamine,
an activist in Washington, most organizers believed that focusing
on Hussein "would have taken away from our argument and even
supported people saying that his regime is the reason we needed
to go to war to get rid of him." According to a senior member
of UFPJ, such fears contributed to the deeper reticence about
pointing to oppressive and violent Middle Eastern regimes besides
Iraq, for fear that the administration would use such arguments
as a pretext to invade those countries next. Most senior organizers
interviewed for this article in the wake of the invasion
remained opposed to offering a systemic critique of Middle
Eastern political economy or an alternative to war for "democratizing
the Middle East" for fear of diluting the simple "no
to war" message, and because coalitions might not have agreed
upon a broader platform.
This reluctance
brings to light the more general problem of ideology. Hany Khalil,
a senior organizer with three organizations, including UFPJ and
Racial Justice 9/11, believes that "we should have focused
more on Hussein and a more holistic discourse, and in fact, the
movement should have done a better job at thinking ideologically
to counter Bush. We weren't sophisticated enough." Lack of
ideological sophistication likely limited the movement's ability
to mobilize the tens of millions of Americans whose active participation
would have been necessary to prevent war, and now to view more
critically the goals of the occupation-as-reconstruction. Could
war have been prevented had a more coherent and positive public
discourse been put forth?
Few in the
movement asked this question before the war. A review of the websites
and literature of over three dozen organizations heavily involved
in anti-war protests revealed almost nothing mentioning the realities
of Baathist rule or the need to bring Hussein to justice, and
still less addressing problems of autocracy and militarization
in the Middle East. Instead, visitors could read "10 things
to do to stop the war" -- none of which mentioned Hussein
-- and find out about the "catastrophic casualties predicted
by a US invasion." If you clicked enough times, you might
reach a discussion of "Big Problems: Even Bigger Solutions:
A More Humane Foreign Policy."
Organizations
such as ANSWER remain satisfied that everything possible was done
to stop the war. In the words of Sara Flounders, "this was
a war for empire, which is almost impossible to stop at the beginning.
In fact, the current in the movement that supported inspections,
sanctions, a war if the UN approved, was in fact more ideologically
muddled than our direct stand against war. These groups now might
not stand firm against occupation, or call for what amounts to
a UN fig leaf to replace US troops." Cagan concurs that while
it would not have been "unreasonable for the anti-war movement
to provide thoughts on how Hussein could be handled differently,…we
must consider how quickly the US government moved onto a war footing,
which made it hard to focus on anything other than stopping war."
But was it not the job of the leadership of the movement to think
about all scenarios?
WHERE WERE
THE SCHOLARS?
Middle East
scholars, NGO professionals and human rights activists with long
experience in the region were naturally positioned to help contribute
ideological depth and alternative ideas about "what to do
about Saddam." But while many such people spoke at anti-war
teach-ins and argued against war in the media, few participated
in the leadership and organization of the peace movement. Of the
dozens of scholars interviewed for this article, including many
of the most well-known members of the profession, none said they
were asked to become involved in shaping the strategy and message
of the movement, a fact that was confirmed by leaders of the various
organizations. Several said their attempts to become involved
received no response.
Many interviewed
activists were vexed at the general absence of scholars in the
leaderships of groups like UFPJ and ANSWER. Others, like Phyllis
Bennis, one Middle East specialist who is involved at the highest
level of the movement, strongly disagrees that scholars were not
sufficiently utilized or that it was the movement's fault they
didn't play a greater role. "Middle East intellectuals weren't
a community we were worried about excluding, as opposed to communities
of color other historically excluded groups. They should have
invited themselves in." This was a sentiment shared by Leslie
Cagan, who explained that while "I agree that they weren't
involved enough, it's not like we got a lot of calls from them."
Indeed, most of the scholars I spoke with said they had not reached
out to organizations on the national level, a lack of mobilization
that Khalil of UFPJ attributes to the general tendency of "academically
oriented researchers who don't involve themselves in movements
-- the whole ivory tower issue." Several organizers argued
that, whatever the problems at the national level, local organizations
did work with academics in their communities, and one past president
of the Middle East Studies Association expressed satisfaction
with scholars' involvement in campus activities and local organizations
and media.
Yet the founder
of one of the fastest-growing anti-war groups said that they didn't
consult scholars in their planning of delegations to Iraq and
other activities, relying instead on recommended books to fill
in the knowledge gap. This leads to the question of whether organizations
with no previous experience in the Middle East can understand
and negotiate the complex history and political dynamics of Iraq,
let alone the larger region, by reading a few books and articles.
"We went to Iraq to find out for ourselves what was going
on. We knew that Hussein was a nightmare, and we'd mention that
fact at all our gatherings. But we didn't pretend to know an alternative
strategy to war to deal with him." Such alternatives are
potentially what a greater involvement of scholars could have
helped to produce.
How can we
account for the absence of Middle East professionals at senior
levels of a movement whose fate is so closely tied to the dynamics
of the region they know best? Their absence seems particularly
odd when the Bush administration has forged strong ties with scholars
on the right, and has even tapped NYU law professor Noah Feldman,
whose new book, After Jihad, has won acclaim from many
Muslims (and who previously worked for Al Gore), to help draft
a new Iraqi constitution. There is no agreement on this issue
among either scholars or organizers. The general consensus among
the former, as another past president of the Middle East Studies
Association put it, is that: "The anti-war coalition, the
left and Arab intellectuals have not come to grips with the problem
of the lack of democracy and development in the Arab world. Period.
They have thus left this issue to Fox and the neo-cons."
The final
communiqué produced by the landmark meeting of American,
European and Arab anti-war activists in Cairo in December 2002
reflected this problem. On the one hand, the communiqué
contains perhaps the most concise explanations of the relationship
between globalization and US military aggression yet offered by
the movement. Yet it could only "admit" to "restrictions
on democratic development in Iraq," while the majority of
the document focused on Israeli and US crimes. While attendees
ignored the oppressive reality of the Egyptian or other Arab regimes
-- which angered at least a few organizers and participants --
the declaration was, according to one Egyptian academic with ties
to Gamal Mubarak, used as a propaganda tool by the Mubarak regime
as part of its campaign to deflect public anger. By allowing the
conference to proceed, the government appeared to be criticizing
the war, but then arrested scores of local activists after the
media and foreign activists moved on.
Sara Flounders,
who was in Cairo, disagrees with this assessment, explaining that
"the coalition at the meeting was composed of Nasserites,
leftists, communists and Islamists, which acted as enormous restraint.
At the same time, we felt that the best way to challenge the Egyptian
government was to challenge the coming war, because in challenging
the US war and Israel, by subtext, we were attacking the government
that supports both. So the meeting reflected a peoples' movement
from below looking for ways to find political space to resist
and to link up globally." Yet without underestimating the
symbolic and networking importance of the gathering (one US-based
Egyptian scholar who attended exclaimed, "I've never seen
anything like it before. It seemed like all of Egypt was there"),
one could question whether the event "conceptualized the
Iraq problem in a global context" when it refused to address
the regional, let alone Egyptian, situation as part of its critique.
DUCKING THE
QUESTION
Scholars
and Middle East professionals interviewed for this article were
most unhappy with the lack of a clearly articulated critique of
Hussein in favor of a more negative, "anti-"US and anti-war
rhetoric. Joe Stork, Middle East advocacy director for Human Rights
Watch, believes that "the demonstrations were single-issue:
stop the war. There was a clear ignoring, or even willful ignorance,
about the realities of the Hussein regime." While some groups
and speakers did mention Hussein, by and large the largest groups
either "ducked the question" or seemed "pretty
apologetic" about the Hussein regime, and even dismissive
of those who would focus on its crimes.
Another senior
scholar felt that "ANSWER, of course, supports Saddam Hussein
as an anti-imperialist hero. There is also a tendency for Not
in Our Name to do that. United for Peace and Justice is well aware
of the character of the Iraqi regime, but has chosen not to make
it a major issue." Where does this perception come from?
A review of ANSWER's literature and public statements does not
suggest any kind of public, open "support" for Hussein.
When confronted with this perception, Flounders argued that "we
were not addressing Saddam at all, let alone defending him. [But]
Saddam is now gone and I don't see the US leaving. So he was never
really the issue, US occupation was. Those who would constantly
raise Saddam and 'their solutions' -- it just reeks of arrogance,
because they wound up being a shadow of Bush."
Why is it,
then, that so many people, including senior Middle Eastern scholars,
felt that ANSWER was somehow defending Hussein when their literature
and official rhetoric in fact avoided discussing him in any systematic
way? Part of the answer is clearly that Hussein's crimes and oppression
were so great that those who did not address them were perceived
as either apologizing for or defending his rule, or at least hoping
-- in the manner of the much-reported "Arab street"
-- that he'd put up a good fight. (Indeed, one wonders how movements
whose explicit goals are stopping racism, ending war and fighting
for peace and justice decided that the Hussein regime was not
relevant to their program.)
Perhaps the
perception stems from the fact that while ANSWER and other left
groups officially did not apologize for the Hussein regime, at
rallies or in interviews speakers did in fact give this impression.
Indeed, most of those who made this complaint did so on the basis
of hearing representatives of the anti-war organizations, or
speakers at rallies or in interviews. As this was also a widespread
public perception that negatively reflected on the movement at
large, this issue needs to be addressed in a timely manner.
The same
assumptions underlying the belief by members of the anti-war movement
that they could navigate the complicated terrain of national,
religious and communal politics in Iraq -- or Egypt -- led other
groups to coordinate delegations with the Iraqi Culture Ministry,
generalize (inaccurately) from visits to wealthier, middle-class
Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad that the political and human rights
situation had improved significantly countrywide, or report to
audiences, as did a group of nuns at a Washington Square Park
rally, how "nice their [official] Iraqi hosts were."
A different
dynamic has prevailed in Europe, although the implications are
similar. In France, the supposedly pro-peace position of the conservative
Chirac government gave little space for French intellectuals and
academics to adopt an independently critical tone. In Britain,
Blair's wholehearted support for the war alienated the majority
of the population, including academia, which mobilized en masse
with many of the most eminent scientists and professors of humanities
and social science at the forefront. Yet according to London School
of Economics professor Martha Mundy, who was quite active in the
movement, the British Middle East studies establishment did not
in fact play a strong anti-war role. The British media was more
critical than in the US, which lessened the need to focus on public
education. Furthermore, leading figures of the prestigious Middle
East Studies Group were decidedly pro-invasion. This group "occupied
a space of commentary about Iraq that prevented more critical
voices from getting an airing outside of the Guardian or
Independent," although scholars and activists did coalesce
in smaller groups.
"More
positively," Mundy continues, "the lead-up to the war
marked the first time in British history you had major Muslim
and South Asian groups involved at the highest level, with significant
crossover between the old British left and Muslim associations,
against the wishes of many of the more conservative Muslim leaders.
But a lot of this community building died the minute the war started.
Once Stop the War failed to stop the war, what else was there
for it to do?"
"IT'S
AMERICA NOW"
Whether in
the US or Europe, most groups (particularly on the left) paid
less attention to Hussein because they felt, and continue to feel,
that the United States and its current drive to empire constitutes
the most important, and perhaps even sole, threat to world peace
and security. With the obvious exception of centrist or mainstream
organizations such as Win Without War and MoveOn, this sentiment
was shared across the board in the anti-war and anti-corporate
globalization movements. "We have no option but to demonize
the United States," an Italian participant at the Cairo conference
declared.
The IFG's
Juhasz explains, "the criticism shouldn't be that we didn't
pay enough attention to the Middle East, but that we didn't pay
enough attention to the US willingness to use all means to further
its agenda.… We must face that it's America now." Yet
another senior activist warned that Americans must be educated
to how their government is "building its empire with an unprecedented
combination of military and economic aggression. We are now 'enemy
number one' for the peoples of the world."
Indeed, the
US did handily beat Iraq and North Korea as the biggest threat
to world peace in a CNN/Time poll taken before the war. But there
is no precedent in the history of empire for masses of citizens
to oppose, let alone transform, a state's imperial policies. Majorities
of British and French citizens alike were proud of their countries'
world dominance -- only the financial and physical losses of large-scale
war, and massive indigenous resistance, changed their minds. Few
remember the last American "Anti-Imperialist League,"
started in 1899 to oppose the invasion of the Philippines, and
the Vietnam war was only rendered unpopular by heavy American
casualties. Today it takes little to inspire new imperial visions
at the heart of our political system, while raising public consciousness
about the dangerous repercussions of such policies has so far
proven an elusive goal.
Indeed, to
bet that Americans will respond to anti-imperialist discourse
in the hyper-patriotic and consumerist post-September 11 society
seems an unwise wager. In resisting and countering discourses
of imperialism, the movement needs to consider that the US has
become a country where professional wrestling and Britney Spears
are the cultural dominants, the government flouts international
conventions at no domestic political cost and the obesity of our
bodies is matched only by that of our cars. If the new anti-imperialism
is to succeed where earlier incarnations did not, it will be crucial
to develop a positive yet viable alternative paradigm that resonates
with the concerns and highest ideals of most Americans.
Naomi Klein,
a prominent leftist author on globalization, expressed concern
about the focus on anti-imperialist discourse, because "it's
no longer about the US building empire in a traditional sense,
but rather a multinational imperialism. Europe is laughing at
empire discourse because it lets them off the hook. They enjoy
the idea that they're a counter-power -- Chirac playing the hero
of the oppressed -- when what Europe is doing on the international
stage is 90 percent the same as the US. What we need is an analysis
of empire that understands that the forces are genuinely transnational.
They can't be tied to the nation-state, and the class of global
managers within the developing world are part of the same class
as their northern counterparts." Moreover, as Arundhati Roy
points out, nationalist and religious forces from Yugoslavia to
India have profited from the rise of free-market globalization,
making this dynamic dangerous to ignore.
ANTI-WAR
TO ANTI-OCCUPATION
For now,
the movement is faced with the difficult task of defining a precise
message about the US occupation of Iraq. Activists around the
world who were inspired by the sight of Cameroon refusing to vote
for a Security Council resolution authorizing force now hope that
the UN, perhaps led by France and Germany, could act as a check
on US ambitions in post-war Iraq. While a few groups, like ANSWER,
oppose a UN takeover of Iraq's reconstruction because it would
be a "fig leaf" for continued US control, most groups
have advocated the transfer of authority to the UN as part of
a US pullout of the country.
Advocating
a UN supervisory role makes sense for the peace movement, not
least because a majority of Americans believe that the UN and
not the US should control the reconstruction process. Americans
retain a surprisingly positive image of the UN, considering the
ferocity of the conservative assault. Phyllis Bennis and John
Cavanagh, also of the Institute for Policy Studies, argue from
this evidence that in the time it takes for a "unifying agenda
for the global peace movement to emerge we must emphasize the
primacy of internationalism and the centrality of the UN, claiming
the UN as our own." But, apart from UN Security Council Resolution
1483, which placed Iraq under a US-British condominium, serious
structural constraints mitigate against a UN takeover of Iraq.
As a senior official in the Arab Department of the UN Development
Program explained: "The UN is an instrument in the hands
of its members. The rules governing it, sadly, do not allow the
UN as an institution to impose itself, and will not allow the
international community to impose the UN, if it is against the
will of the US."
As the heavy
fighting wound down, Erik Gustafson, executive director of the
Education for Peace in Iraq Center in Washington, argued that
"calling for an 'immediate end to occupation' -- unconditional
US withdrawal -- would likely create chaos, more violence and
a humanitarian disaster. We should be more interested in making
sure the US takes responsibility for the consequences of occupation
than just picking up and leaving." Not surprisingly, ANSWER's
Flounders vehemently disagreed, believing that "Iraqis are
capable of taking charge themselves if we pulled out." Since
the beginning of the occupation, both views would seem to have
been simultaneously challenged and confirmed. The occupation regime
remains unable -- or unwilling -- to commit the kind of resources
necessary to bring the country "back online." Meanwhile,
some Iraqis are resisting occupation with coordinated peaceful
activism, while others are employing violence.
Both UFPJ
and ANSWER are now devoting significant energy to attacking Bush
administration policies around the world and domestically. At
the June 2003 UFPJ organizers' conference, the first such gathering
since the coalition's inception, the leadership called a vote
on priorities for the joint agenda in the next year. The occupation
of Iraq came in eighth, well behind issues such as the defense
of civil liberties and justice for Palestine. There is also a
clear desire to link the militarization of US foreign policy to
globalization, with groups such as Direct Action Against the War
turning their mobilization efforts toward other targets of US
military or economic power, while waiting for the situation in
Iraq to become clearer.
EMBEDDING
THE PEACE MOVEMENT
If Iraq is
no longer the center of activity for the US peace and justice
movement, perhaps it should be. "Iraq isn't colonized yet,
but it will be soon," explained one activist just returned
from Iraq. "By this time next year, after 'elections' the
game will be over, and until then you can bet the country's getting
the full attention of the CIA and Halliburton." The most
innovative initiative since the end of large-scale combat has
been the establishment of Occupation Watch, a project led by Global
Exchange, UFPJ and Code Pink. Among its ambitious goals are monitoring
the role of foreign companies in Iraq, advocating for Iraqis'
right to control their own resources, acting as a watchdog over
the military occupation and US-appointed "governing council,"
researching Iraqi movements to resist the occupation, supporting
the creation of independent Iraqi civil society organizations
and monitoring the physical impact of the US-British invasion,
including civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure.
How can Occupation
Watch serve as a model for the evolving global peace and justice
movement? According to Medea Benjamin, "We failed miserably
as a movement in Afghanistan in terms of not following up to push
the US government to deliver on its aid pledges and other promises,
and more broadly to understand just how difficult it remains in
Afghanistan for the people." Besides stopping the US from
prosecuting new wars, "we have a responsibility as a peace
movement to try to make people's lives better in [countries the
US has attacked].… It's easier to talk about 'get the troops
out now,' but it's far more important for Iraqis to talk about
getting electricity and water online." Occupation Watch has
made an effort to involve Middle East scholars and specialists
directly in its activities. The advisory committee includes scholars
such as Martha Mundy, Phyllis Bennis, Kamil Mahdi and Tariq Ali.
(This author has also been asked to join.)
Jodie Evans,
founder of Code Pink and an organizer of Occupation Watch, hopes
that this effort will differ from the delegations of the sanctions
era because the movement will have an institutionalized presence
in Baghdad with strong ties in Iraqi society. Evans was infuriated
at the situation in Baghdad upon her return from an exploratory
visit in July 2003. "I was with a group of women when Bremer
spoke [about the new Iraqi "governing council"], and
there was lots of grumbling. He basically admitted that he holds
all the power, can kick anyone off the various appointed committees
if he deems it necessary and has already approved their budget
without consultation. It is still very controlled, and each ministry
will have a Bremer person in the office… He said he has
already spent $1 billion and no one can find out where yet, except
maybe in the palace."
While NYU's
Noah Feldman helps to write the Iraqi constitution, other American
scholars are engaged in even more troubling relationships with
the occupation regime. Perhaps the most egregious involves a professor
from a major West Coast graduate school who has become
one of Bremer's top intelligence advisers. When privately asked
by a leading American activist in Baghdad why the US can't get
basic services up and running when Iraqis were able to do so within
weeks after the 1991 war (in which Baghdad was much more heavily
bombed), he replied: "When you make a dog hungry he'll follow
you." The professor/intelligence adviser frankly acknowledged
that his phrase alluded to the goal of breaking the occupied population,
in the manner of Israel's tactics in Palestine.
Another problem,
according to Evans, is that no one in charge of the reconstruction
of the country has ever done his or her job before: "The
airport guy never built an airport, the 'mayor' of Baghdad is
a police chief from Florida, the head of trash was a Brit who
showed up and said he wanted to volunteer. So he was handed sanitation
but he's spending his days in Uday's palace playing with his tigers
and cheetahs. It's so bad -- much worse than anyone in the US
can possibly imagine -- that people are saying not just that things
were better before the war, but even during the war."
These problems
are compounded by the opening of the border to imports, which
are flooding the country with foreign goods at a moment when Iraqi
industry can barely function, let alone compete. But as Evans
notes, the idea that the peace and justice movement will be able
to shed light on the situation using imperialist language "is
not going to fly. The movement isn't going to be able to say it's
imperialism, because every day scores of US businessmen are setting
up Iraqi front men for their operations…. Once the elections
happen next year, they'll be able to say that there's democracy
and Iraqis control the resources and we've done our job and can
leave. Good luck convincing Americans otherwise unless we are
embedded in the country with our own resources for getting the
truth out on a daily basis."
WALKING THE
TALK
Along with
the monitoring function of Occupation Watch, the model of the
Christian Peacemaker Teams and the International Solidarity Movement
in Palestine, both of which seek to limit occupation violence
by "getting in the way," is on many activists' minds
at present. As Khalil puts it, "What could be better than
a thousand college students -- not just Americans, but Arabs,
Europeans too -- going to Iraq, witnessing what is going on, and
returning to tell their fellow citizens what they've experienced."
There has been some disagreement in the movement over whether
this kind of grassroots peace work is logistically and economically
feasible in Iraq.
People with
direct experience in Palestine are interested but cautious. Adam
Shapiro, a leader of the ISM, traveled to Iraq in July 2003 to
investigate the possibilities. He believes the answers will be
determined by the extent to which active resistance to the occupation
comes from the people rather than Hussein loyalists or outside
forces, whether those organizing resistance are willing to work
through grassroots and non-violent means and whether potential
factionalism -- for instance, the seeming alignment of the Kurds
with the US -- frustrates the possibility of coordinated countrywide
resistance.
CPT is more
sanguine, and already has a permanent presence in Iraq. Rick Polhamus,
a long-time member of CPT who has worked in Palestine and Iraq,
believes that Palestine holds many lessons for such work in Iraq.
"First, in any occupation, the occupier has a tendency to
distort the truth to cover up mistakes and make anything the indigenous
population does look bad." He cites the example of US forces
firing upon a non-violent demonstration in Falluja, killing 15
Iraqis, and claiming that soldiers had been under attack. Eyewitness
accounts from Falluja finally forced the US to retract this claim.
Polhamus says the CPT presence in Falluja bears another similarity
to its presence in Hebron in the West Bank: "We can intervene
early and even anticipate escalations by having relationships
within the community." Where Polhamus sees the peace movement
making the greatest contribution is in helping Iraqis who are
promoting non-violent strategies for resisting the occupation.
"The international peace community must be on the ground
to support those efforts, so they don't say, 'What good does it
do for us to resort to non-violence.'" Code Pink's Evans
confirms this sentiment, adding: "We need a holistic approach
because Iraqis are not feeling whole now. They're feeling like
a wounded animal, like they've been raped twice -- by Saddam and
now by the US."
ADDRESSING
INTERNAL PROBLEMS
Besides the
challenges on the ground in Iraq, the movement is facing problems
that have surfaced closer to home. First, the focus on Palestine
has alienated some progressive Jewish members of the movement.
While publicly the debate surrounds accusations of anti-Semitism,
as epitomized by the controversy over Tikkun editor Michael
Lerner's disinvitation to speak at an anti-war rally in March,
at root the issue is different. Some in the movement have difficulty
embracing critical voices or avoiding generalizations about groups
perceived as too implicated in the power structure they are combating.
A significant
number of Jewish peace activists who attended the June UFPJ conference
felt alienated by the discussions on Palestine, even though the
policies advocated by UFPJ were close, if not identical, to those
of the Jewish members of UFPJ. As one participant said, "Look,
I'm an anti-Zionist, but the issue is an essentialization and
utter lack of respect or recognition for Israeli Jews (and even
Jews in general) as people. While the leadership is trying to
be strategic and inclusive, on the grassroots level if you compare
the discourse to the language of the ANC, with its calls for a
multi-racial society in South Africa, it's just absent here. The
left is doing the same thing as the US government -- going around
and attacking certain regimes as illegitimate and unworthy of
existence (Israel and in some ways the US), and giving a pass
to others, like Sudan or Saudi Arabia. Nor was there a willingness
to address issues of violence and terrorism, which is surprising
from a group that is vocally committed to non-violence."
While important,
this criticism is in fact not necessarily related to anti-Semitism.
Indeed, at the UFPJ meeting, an overwhelming majority of participants
voted down a call to join a march commemorating the outbreak of
the second intifada because it fell on Rosh Hashanah (ANSWER
and al-'Awda ultimately changed the date too). The managing editor
of Tikkun was elected to the steering committee. It is
true, as a few people complained, that no members of self-identified
Jewish organizations were invited to the meeting of the Palestine
Caucus, but Mitchell Plitnick, co-director of A Jewish Voice for
Peace, counters that "Jews were part of it. The US Campaign
to End the Israeli Occupation wasn't invited, and they have Arab
members. I don't think it was about excluding Jews per se, but
rather about bringing together people who had more radical views
of the conflict. Ultimately, while there is a tendency toward
insensitivity and perhaps even anti-Semitism among a few
people, as an organization UFPJ clearly respected Jews and desired
Jewish participation."
The simmering
controversy over Jewish participation in the leading anti-war
coalitions does highlight that, if the movement intends to make
Palestine a central focus, it needs to address the sensitivities
of Jewish members and push for dialog even as it rightly challenges
some of the red lines of progressive Zionism. Moreover, the dynamics
surrounding the Palestine issue are related to the problems with
the strategic vision of the movement as a whole. By focusing on
"Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq," the movement prevents
itself from considering the reality that the forces responsible
for the lack of peace, justice and adequate human development
in the Middle East are far more diffuse and numerous than just
the US and Israel, however important their role. Indeed, the public
discourse on the occupation of Palestine reveals a myopia similar
to the movement's discourse on Iraq, in that there has been little
discussion of the corruption and brutality of Yasser Arafat and
the Palestinian Authority, or the crucial debates over non-violence
and democracy now taking place among Palestinian activists
and intellectuals. The Occupation cannot be confronted successfully
without addressing these issues, whether in Palestine or the US.
UFPJ leaders
are aware of these issues. As Khalil explains, "important
concerns were raised by some Jewish participants. However, Israel
is engaged in a brutal occupation that must be challenged on its
own terms. The problem is that some Jewish participants seemed
to want to make a moral critique of the occupation without actually
calling for changes in US policies to combat it. But yes, we should
expand our critique to be more systematic, and it is true that
as long as every regime in the region is in some way working with
the US, its military and economic aid to these regimes is part
and parcel of maintaining regimes that are not acting in the interests
of their peoples."
"MAINSTREAMING"
The global
peace and justice movement also cannot forego its core support
as it expands its reach to "mainstream" America. Medea
Benjamin notes that before the war "the movement relied heavily
on the Internet, which many poorer people and minorities don't
use as actively as the white, middle-class core of the movement,
when it should have been using canvassing, phone banks and other
more hands-on techniques." She continues that "both
the globalization and peace movements had a hard time making the
connection with the people at home who suffer the brunt of these
policies. Even though we talk about it a lot and try hard, we
continue to be a white, middle-class movement. We need to reach
minority communities even as we also reach out to conservatives,
libertarians, independents and Reform Party folks who share concerns
on many issues, particularly the domestic implications of Bush's
war policy." These concerns echoed those of a group of Arab,
African-American and other "non-white" activists who
in February 2003 sent an open letter to leaders of the movement
warning against an uncritical "mainstreaming" of the
movement toward the white middle class.
According
to Rania Masri of the Institute for Southern Studies, a long-time
activist against sanctions and war on Iraq, among African-Americans
"support for war was small, and many were doing their own
protesting, but there was a reluctance to get involved with the
larger coalitions. Even in New York, where we went out of our
way to make sure 75 percent of the speakers were people of color,
only 25 percent of the marchers were. More research needs to be
done as to why they haven't been so involved. It could be a lack
of trust, no coordinated base or existing relationships to build
on, or even that we're approaching them with racism that we couldn't
see. Ultimately, we didn't do the nitty-gritty organizing. We
did the sexy organizing -- talking to the press, protests, getting
arrested, but not canvassing, neighborhood committees, building
relations on the ground."
It is clear
that the major organizations have gotten this message. At the
June 2003 UFPJ activist meeting in Chicago, it was resolved that
fifty percent of steering committee members should be women and
fifty percent people of color, with other groups such as gays
and lesbians also being guaranteed a minimum proportion of spots
on the committees. To ensure greater support among Arabs and Muslims
in the US -- who have tended to work with ANSWER because of its
vocal criticism of US and Israeli policies -- UFPJ has started
a campaign devoted specifically to fighting the Israeli occupation.
According
to Hany Khalil, to increase unity within the movement UFPJ will
call for a meeting of a number of anti-war coalitions to discuss
collaborative work during October 4-11, possibly culminating with
a mass mobilization against the occupation. "We seek to be
a coalition that can bring together many sectors of civil society
around a politics which targets the threat of Bush's empire-building
agenda," says Khalil. "Within that, there will be anti-imperialist
politics, but not expressed in a crude manner."
TWO SUPERPOWERS?
The post-occupation
period is a moment of transition and growing pains for the global
peace and justice movement. Activists have identified several
issues that need attention and development, but as of now it appears
that anti-imperialism, civil rights and the occupation of Palestine
will be the primary strategic foci. What is clear, however, is
that in developing ideological coherence, unity and strategic
vision, the global peace and justice movement has to cover a lot
of ground to catch up to the right, with far fewer resources at
its disposal.
Soren Ambrose
of 50 Years is Enough provides a cogent assessment: "What
we didn't have was enough structure to take us through and keep
unity and organizational identity past the war. That's the crisis
we're in now." While some organizers feel there is a strong
base on which to build for future activities, Ambrose argues that
"there's just not a sense of an ongoing movement for peace
in this country, a permanent bulwark against the military side
of the empire. Organizations like my own have been recalcitrant,
or did insufficient work making plain the links between US militarism
and the dominance of the world economy. Part of that is lack of
knowledge, time and being intimidated by how much we need to know."
Juhasz agreed: "If it takes so long to figure out the policies
of the World Bank or trade issues, taking on the much larger task
of understanding the intricacies and dynamics of a worldwide US
empire is even more daunting." Where to start?
Benjamin
suggests that the global peace and justice movement needs to put
forth the positive idea that Americans need the rest of the world.
"We can't bomb to liberate people. We can't continue to be
5 percent of the world's population and consume 25 percent of
its resources. That's what brings on wars like Iraq." Change,
she feels, can only come from "global pressure on the US"
generated by "massive popular pressure on allied governments
not to cooperate or align themselves with US imperial policies."
She cites the Turkish refusal to grant basing for US troops as
a case where foreign anti-war sentiment energized activism in
the US, and educated Americans about the limits of US power. The
US-based movement needs to link with movements elsewhere to continue
this education on a larger scale. These links are growing, says
Flounders, because "people are realizing that their real
enemy, the enemy that stands against all human progress is the
US and its imperialism."
But while
organizers like Benjamin see the need for a "positive"
message, Flounders adopts the proposition the US is the only enemy
to "all human progress." In the absence of the US, might
not other powers pursue their elites' interests with similar disregard
for the consequences for their own peoples or humanity at large?
Precisely this thinking, prevalent during the Cold War, has helped
build the structure of neo-liberal globalization. Imperialism
never succeeded without the active cooperation of crucial sectors
in the colonized or "peripheral" countries. As one frustrated
participant "furiously" criticized the tone of the December
2002 Cairo anti-war gathering: "The Iraqi people are also
suffering because...their regime is as corrupt as all the others.
You can only be credible if you don't turn a blind eye to your
own failures."
This could
be a tall order for a left that, in many ways, has yet to address
the problems caused by the infighting and dogmatism of the 1960s
and 1970s. Yet it is perhaps the sine qua non for the ideological
maturity that would make possible a more holistic message by the
peace movement, one that would resonate with much wider numbers
of Americans.
While this
occurs, however, there is much work to be done. Some of the most
creative actions are being undertaken by local organizations such
as the Bay Area's Direct Action Against the War. Since its inception
in the weeks leading up to the war, this group has sought to "take
it to the next level," initiating civil disobedience against
corporations such as Bechtel that are profiting from the war.
But organizer Leda Dederich adds that "we need to develop
an alternative discourse beyond being anti-war. We need to let
the rest of the world lead us and teach us." The question
remains whether the movement outside the US has the discipline
and maturity to focus on these issues rather than directing their
fire solely at Washington.
Naomi Klein
is particularly worried about the trend toward fetishizing US
imperialism as the source of all the world's problems. Viewing
the Iraq crisis from Argentina, where she was filming a new documentary
on the rise of social movements in the wake of the economic collapse
of the last three years, Klein explained that such a narrow discourse
is "replete with dangers. I'm disturbed by a resurgence of
a very limited understanding of empire in left academic circles.
Powerful and dangerous interests are served by this retrograde
focus solely on US empire, because it's not just the US that is
imperialist. Argentina is suffering under imperialism, but part
of what's made Argentina so vulnerable has been that the main
imperial players here are European -- Spanish, British, French
and Italian companies are the owners of most of the privatized
industries, and their interests and modus operandi are little
different from the US in the Middle East."
In a forum
of leading Islamist activists in Budapest in late May 2002, Tariq
Ramadan and Nadia Yassine forcefully argued that Muslims and Europeans
must move beyond facile denunciations of the US. Ramadan explained:
"To face this reality, we have to speak of the common risks
we are facing -- not just the Muslim world but everyone. It's
important to find a way to come to universal values and to say
this period is a challenge to all of us together. The current
security strategy is against all of us as citizens -- we are losing
our civil rights in Europe, in the US, not just Muslims, but everyone…
That's why we have to avoid simplistic and superficial anti-Americanism."
EPIC's Gustafson
considers this type of cosmopolitan thinking and international
action to be the core of the necessary transformation of the anti-war
movement into a genuine solidarity movement. "[The movement]
must become more about human rights, balanced perspective, recognizing
just how US has contributed to the Iraqi people's suffering, but
also how the Hussein regime, the UN and outside powers contributed
too. Only then can we show true solidarity with the Iraqi people…
At the same time, it's about ideology. We must create more think
tanks and institutions in Washington itself that can have influence
on the policy process and be guided by values and principles of
the progressive community while incorporating -- and in so doing,
transforming -- issues related to 'national security.' Because
if we can't speak that language, we'll continue to be relegated
to the street, unable to build cultural change in Washington and
thus the country." As of today, concurs another senior organizer,
"what's still missing is both depth of message and more heavyweight
people to deliver it against the likes of William Kristol and
Richard Perle."
If the peace
movement is to develop a more sophisticated message and strategy
and offer a positive alternative discourse, intercommunal solidarity
through dialogue and committed non-violence will be the key mechanisms.
If such relationships can be forged between Iraqis, the larger
Arab and Muslim worlds and activists in the West, the global peace
and justice movement may yet gain the upper hand in the struggle
against global empire.