The
tumult in Iran since the June 12 presidential election
is, without a doubt, the most significant sequence
of events in the Islamic Republic since the 1979 revolution
itself. No other occurrence—not the Iran-Iraq war,
not the 1989 turmoil that sidelined Ayatollah Hossein
Ali Montazeri, until then the designated successor
to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and led to revamping
the constitution, not the rise of reformist politics
in the late 1990s—has shaken the system so deeply.
The legitimacy of fundamental institutions, including
elections and the office of the supreme leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, is being questioned by a wider swath
of the body politic than ever before in the Islamic
Republic’s 30-year history.
The
outcome of the post-election confrontation is uncertain.
Even as the hardliners proceed with tragi-comic show
trials of key reformist politicians and leaders of
the forcibly dispersed street protests, their victory
is far from guaranteed even in the medium term. No
one—not Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
not the various security forces involved in the crackdown,
not the erstwhile protesters—can see much further than
the immediate future. Regardless of which direction
Iran moves, however, there is no doubt that the election
and the ensuing disputes have been badly mishandled
by the highest authorities of the Islamic Republic.
The hardliners are paying for their clumsiness with
the corrosion of their domestic political position.
The show trials in late August brought a stinging rebuke;
for instance, Ayatollah Montazeri said: “They should
at least have the courage to declare that this government
is neither a republic nor Islamic, with nobody allowed
to protest, comment or criticize.”[1] But the hardliners will also pay
through the weakening of Iran’s posture in the international
arena, in general, and in negotiations over the country’s
nuclear research program, in particular.
It
is a bitter irony for Ahmadinejad’s government, which
manipulated the June election results in part to boost
Iran’s leverage in the anticipated nuclear talks with
the United States. The intent of the manipulation was
to show that the hardliners have a popular mandate.
Yet Iran’s leverage is eroding, as is apparent in what
the hardliners themselves are now asking Iranians to
do: Forget about the principled argument, crafted carefully
over many years, that Iran has a “sovereign right”
to nuclear technology, and become consumed instead
with fear of Western conspiracy and a fifth column
aiming at a “soft” revolution. While the former argument
was designed to bring the “Iranian people,” inside
the country and in the diaspora, under a big tent of
nationalism, presenting the nuclear program as part
of Iran’s historical aspiration to take its rightful
place in the world order, the latter zips the tent
flap shut, depicting confrontation with the “enemy,”
including alleged traitors inside the establishment,
as the only way for Iran to maintain its sovereignty.
The
consequences of this move go beyond rhetoric. The nationalist
insistence on Iran’s right to uranium enrichment holds
out the possibility of compromise with a sensible US
administration, allowing Iran to enrich uranium, either
by itself in limited amounts or with multinational
partners on Iranian soil in larger amounts, under a
robust inspection regime. The talk of enemies, on the
other hand, relies on the persistence of external conflict
and internal polarization. It will not be possible
to decouple the two as long as Iran’s post-election
crisis remains unsettled.
A Narrative of Rights
Some
have argued that the hardline consolidation at home
is the ticket to compromise abroad. This argument is
part and parcel of a pathology emanating from the traumatic
history of foreign intervention in Iran. Ahmadinejad,
for example, has gloated that what he alleges were
“childish acts of interference” by the West in the
election will let Iran “enter the global stage several
times more powerful.” Conversely, it is often said
in Iran that whoever makes a deal with powerful outside
players, above all Washington, to end the Islamic Republic’s
international isolation will tighten his grip on the
state for good. Ayatollah Khamenei has been less bombastic
than Ahmadinejad in blaming foreign actors for the
“green wave” that engulfed Tehran and other Iranian
cities in protest of Ahmadinejad’s anointment as president
in June. But Khamenei was explicit in his Friday prayer
speech on June 19 that, in general, he stands with
the cocky Ahmadinejad and not more conciliatory conservatives
in matters of foreign policy. So it may be the case
that the hardliners are united in the belief that their
toughness will impel the US to cut them a deal that
will assure their political dominance for years to
come. But, so far, the hardliners seem more concerned
with eviscerating reformist and centrist forces than
with cutting a deal. The specter of the death penalty
is raised at the show trials to terrify the demonstrators
of the “green wave” into submission. And in its fourth
indictment, the prosecution has explicitly asked that
the two main reformist parties, Islamic Iran’s Participation
Front and the Islamic Revolution’s Mojahedin, be banned.
In any case, the indiscriminate crackdown on the demonstrators
has meant that, even if there is a nuclear deal with
the US under the hardliners’ auspices, the arch-conservatives
will not be able to assert the legitimacy of their
cause or methods. Their “win” in the nuclear showdown
will not be sufficient to justify the crackdown or
to affirm their nationalist credentials.
This
fact has to do with how the conversation about the
nuclear issue has been shaped in Iran since 2002, when
the exiled Mojahedin-e Khalq revealed to the world
the existence of a nuclear research facility at Natanz,
and international scrutiny intensified. The reformist
Mohammad Khatami was then president. His government,
drawing upon deep-rooted Iranian nationalism and anti-Americanism
related to the CIA’s role in the 1953 coup reinstalling
the Shah, wove an intricate narrative avowing Iran’s
right to nuclear energy and promising it would be a
source of broader technological advancement, bolstering
Iranian status in the region and worldwide, as well
as pride and existential “resistance” to bullying foreign
powers.
The
narrative was plausible to Iranians because Khatami’s
nuclear negotiators deployed an argument that emphasized
international law, specifically the point that Iran
could not be deprived of its rights under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it signed in
1968. Article IV of the NPT stipulates: “Nothing in
this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination.” Khatami’s government maintained
that Iran’s purposes were solely peaceful, that Iran
would continue to accept regular inspections under
the supplement to the NPT it signed in 1974, and that
Iran would demonstrate good faith by voluntarily acceding
to implementation of the Additional Protocol to its
safeguards agreement. Therefore, the government said,
there was no reason for the UN Security Council’s unusual
concern with the Iranian program—much less Washington’s
calls for punitive action. With this approach, Iranian
leaders were able to give the impression of political
cohesion, which in turn was an asset for Iran in the
rounds of talks about the program with the UN and European
states. Iran’s determined stance, which presumably
was indeed popular at home, became the bottom line
to which Iran’s interlocutors had to adjust. Indeed,
by the end, even the Bush administration signaled its
quiet acquiescence in the strength of Iran’s position
when Undersecretary of State William Burns joined a
meeting with Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed
Jalili, in July 2008. Barack Obama’s decision, as a
presidential candidate, to propose talks with Iran
without the precondition that Iran suspend its enrichment-related
activities was a further acknowledgment of political
reality.
According
to Kayhan Barzegar of Tehran’s Center for Strategic
Research, Iran’s nuclear conduct had two important
messages for the outside world. It suggested that Iranian
leaders think strategically because they would not
be browbeaten into relinquishing treaty rights at a
time when the international community was highly sympathetic
to international law-based arguments, due to the illegality
of the US invasion of Iraq. And the fact that the leaders
spoke with one voice across the well-known reformist-conservative
spectrum indicated that Iran’s decision making was
based on institutional interaction among the office
of the supreme leader, the office of the president,
the defense and intelligence apparatus, and, occasionally,
the parliament.[2] To be sure, a degree of difference in preferred diplomatic style
was apparent in the Iranian press, with the hardliners
more angrily defiant of international pressure. But
hardliners, centrists and reformists generally adhered
to the same sine qua non: Iran would not back
down on its “right” to enrichment and it would use
the nuclear program to improve the country’s regional
standing. Such, not coincidentally, was the position
of Mir-Hossein Mousavi and his fellow opposition candidates
during the 2009 presidential campaign.
Yet,
taken as a whole, the June election undermined this
narrative by showing that the seeming consensus over
Iran’s nuclear program is a sideshow. The main foreign
policy debate in the country is about Iran’s overall
attitude toward the world: Should the Islamic Republic
embrace dialogue, as Khatami tried to do, and Mousavi
and others would like, or should it remain the recalcitrant
revolutionary state, splendid in its half-imposed,
half-chosen isolation? It took massive election fraud
and harsh state violence for the truth to become apparent;
the truth is that it was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency
and the campaign he ran in 2009 that initiated the
breakdown of the narrative of political cohesion.
An Astounding Claim
What
Ahmadinejad and his supporters never understood—or
chose to ignore in order to justify their hold on power—was
that the popular support they received for their own
“principled” stance on Iran’s nuclear program was ushered
in by two years of frustrating negotiations between
their reformist predecessors and the Bush administration.
Ahmadinejad, in fact, inherited a stance agreed upon
by the various factions within the Islamic Republic.
The
argument was simple: Iran had tried the conciliatory
approach. For over seven months, from mid-November
2004 through July 2005, it suspended its preparations
to enrich uranium, as its interlocutors had demanded,
but the result was simply more demands. European negotiators
persisted in asking Iran “not to pursue fuel cycle
activities other than the construction and operation
of light water power and research reactors,” and to
acquire reactor fuel abroad, in essence denying Iran
its treaty rights to develop mastery of the nuclear
fuel cycle itself. These demands were little but the
Bush administration’s iron fist in Europe’s velvet
glove. The West, it appeared, would not budge as long
as Iran played nice. The decision to lift suspension
was made during the last days of the Khatami presidency—in
a meeting announced to have included all the post-revolutionary
executives of the Islamic Republic, among them former
Prime Minister Mousavi.[3] When Ahmadinejad assumed office
shortly thereafter, he minced no words in promising
that nuclear research would proceed without impediment
from the Europeans or anyone else. He told Parliament
on August 6, 2005: “I don’t know why some countries
cannot understand that the Iranian people will not
succumb to force.”[4] Many Iranians accepted such positioning because it was a response
to the threats of an aggressive Bush administration.
Ayatollah
Khamenei himself enunciated the consensus clearly in
a speech to Iranian officials on October 10, 2006.
Why had he supported negotiations under Khatami but
now backed the move away from compromise? “For two
and a half years,” he said, “we took a certain path,
and if we had not taken it, we could have reproached
ourselves, asking ourselves why we didn’t. Not now—with
a strong heart and a clear vision, we know what we
are doing.” During the 2009 campaign, however, Ahmadinejad
and his supporters ignored this history, instead casting
his way of handling the nuclear dossier as the true
safeguard of the program’s success.
In
Ahmadinejad’s campaign rhetoric, he became the protector
of Iran’s nuclear ambitions not only from condescending
foreigners but also from the weak-willed among his
countrymen. The Khatami government’s agreement to suspend
uranium enrichment-related activities voluntarily and
implement the Additional Protocol was no longer an
olive branch, as Khamenei had indicated, but a source
of national shame and—just maybe—treason. Nothing that
was done before Ahmadinejad took over was done right.
While others brought disgrace to Iran, he brought dignity.
It
was an astounding claim, given that Iran’s nuclear
program was restarted in the 1980s, when his primary
rival Mousavi was premier. The research was sustained
during the presidency of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,
who Ahmadinejad had defeated in the 2005 runoff, and
then it was resuscitated with generous funding under
Khatami, the mild-mannered advocate of a “dialogue
of civilizations.” The claim elicited immediate rejoinders
from such figures as former nuclear negotiator Hassan
Rowhani, who described Ahmadinejad’s narrative as “complete
lies.”[5] Rowhani noted, pointedly, that
previous nuclear teams had been able to avoid Security
Council resolutions against Iran, several of which
have been passed under the present administration.[6] More
importantly, because it was the sitting executive who
had made the nuclear issue a campaign topic, the gag
rule imposed by the Supreme National Security Council
no longer applied. Newspaper columnists and pundits
still had their own tongues tied, but they felt less
compunction in reporting the words of former officials
who were defending their more low-key negotiating styles.
Suddenly,
the substance of Iran’s nuclear stance was no longer
significant—since everyone agreed that Iran was legally
and morally justified in refusing to back down on uranium
enrichment. Rather the debate became about at what
political and economic cost, and in what terms, Iran
should insist upon its rights. The choice was between
a confrontational foreign policy that purported to
make Iran stronger and a return to a kinder, gentler
approach that might dim the international spotlight
upon Iran and allow greater attention to domestic problems.
Ahmadinejad’s
supporters assayed a simple argument of their own:
In the confrontation with the US, the reformists had
negotiated from a position of weakness and they would
do the same if the voters were so unwise as to return
them to office. No wonder the Western powers preferred
the election of a reformist. No wonder they busied
themselves promoting the Western-oriented and relatively
affluent part of the Iranian population in opposition
to Ahmadinejad, whose political base remained the provincial
poor and the devout.
Ahmadinejad
has hewn to this line since the election. On July 7,
in his first major state television performance following
the post-election unrest, he insisted that Iran’s had
been “the most clean and free election in the world.”
He was equally bullheaded in defending his foreign
policy orientation, asserting Iran’s prerogative to
challenge the handful of states that rule the rest.
He explicitly disagreed with those who argue that Iran
should first address its domestic problems before getting
involved in world affairs. The way of the world, he
said, is that the weak do not prosper by knuckling
under to the powerful few. In order to achieve basic
socio-economic development, smaller countries must
be prepared to assert themselves in the international
arena. “The West should know that the more it interferes,
the more we will enter the international scene with
strength and decisiveness.”[7] The
days of empire are over, he concluded, and a “new era”
of more democratic relations among states has begun.
Misplaced Bravado
Talking
of global imbalances to paper over domestic ones is
one of the oldest saws in the shed of authoritarian
governments. The Islamic Republic had, however, wielded
the saw to great effect during the debates over its
nuclear program since 2002. The core inequity of the
NPT system, whereby nuclear states may keep their weapons,
but no other state may acquire them, was eclipsed by
the Western position on the Iranian program. Now the
nuclear weapons states were appointing themselves arbiters
of who could conduct nuclear research protected under
the treaty. It was a perfect opening for a government
intent on keeping its population in line while maintaining
a high level of domestic support for its regional and
global ambitions. But this cleverly constructed argument
lost luster during the events of June 2009, as the
arch-conservative establishment resorted to conspiratorial
logic.
Hossein
Shariatmadari, the intractable editor of the hardline
daily Keyhan, declared that fifth columns in
the country—meaning Mir-Hossein Mousavi—would ruin
the country if they were allowed to form political
parties.[8] Yadollah
Javani of the political bureau of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps thanked Providence that the “blessed event”
of the June 12 election had “occurred to nullify the
dream of velvet revolution” and unmask the agents of
Western powers.[9] In remarks reported on the Islamic Republic’s
English-language Press TV, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1989, went
so far as to dictate the identities of Iran’s future
negotiating partners—something generals are not supposed
to do in the Islamic Republic. If the European Union
does not apologize for its support of the “green wave”
protesters, he said, it has “no right to hold nuclear
talks with Iran.” The hardliners’ invective continued
throughout the summer, with Ahmadinejad denouncing
the protesters as “subversives” and “enemy-affiliated
infiltrators” on August 28. A day earlier, Khamenei
said on state TV he had “no proof” of foreign involvement
in the post-election demonstrations, but cautioned
against complacency: “Our enemies were given a slap
in the face by the Iranian nation, but they are still
hopeful and they are pursuing the issue.”
The
hardliners’ purposeful humiliation of reformist figures
at the show trials that commenced on August 1, and
their utter disdain for the outcry at home and abroad,
might be seen as a sign that they are confident of
prevailing on both the domestic and international fronts.
Despite their bravado, however, the hardliners cannot
ignore “the great harm these incidents have wrought
to the collective spirit and unified body of the society.”
These words appeared in the Revolutionary Guard’s weekly, Sobh-e
Sadeq,on July 6. The author, Reza Garmabadri, went
on to call for “reconstructing” the unity that has
been lost. The problem for these would-be peacemakers,
of course, is that their standard-bearer, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
is the most polarizing political figure in Iran. And
the president has blunted the Islamic Republic’s most
effective ideological instrument for building “social
unity”—the nuclear issue.
The
Iranian people can be convinced once more to take pride
in Iran’s nuclear program and its breakthroughs if
they see it as putting the country on the pathway to
respect and, ultimately, improved relations with the
world. Iranians are significantly less excited now
that the nuclear program appears to be a mere trump
card in the hand of hardline politicians who desire
a confrontational foreign policy with no end in sight.
During the election campaign its aftermath, the protesters
have been primarily concerned to curb arbitrariness
and strengthen the rule of law in the Islamic Republic.
But they have also chanted a running commentary on
the president’s blustery rejection of any and all international
entreaties regarding uranium enrichment: Ahmadi-ye
hasteyi, boro bekhab khasteyi.“Nuclear Ahmadi,
go to sleep!” the Persian translates. “You are tired.”
MERIP
OP-EDS Sects
and the City New York Times Magazine May 17, 2010
Moustafa Bayoumi
I
had almost forgotten I’d sent
in an application when the e-mail message
appeared, like Mr. Big, out of nowhere. “Hi,
Moustafa,” it began, as if we
were old friends. “Thank you
for e-mailing us regarding your interest
in working on ‘Sex and the City
2.’ ”
No
way. Last August, I half-jokingly answered
an e-mail message posted on a list-serv
requesting “lots of Middle Eastern
men and women” as extras for
the second “Sex and the City” movie
(opening this week). Although I must
have been one of the very few in the
tri-state area to possess all the talents
requested in the e-mail (legal to work,
Middle Eastern and between 18 and 70
years old), I still never thought I
would be selected. Two months later,
I got the call. Full
Story>>
At
first glance, there’s a clear
need for expanding the Web beyond the
Latin alphabet, including in the Arabic-speaking
world. According to the Madar Research
Group, about 56 million Arabs, or 17
percent of the Arab world, use the
Internet, and those numbers are expected
to grow 50 percent over the next three
years. Many think that an Arabic-alphabet
Web will bring millions online, helping
to bridge the socio-economic divides
that pervade the region. But such hopes
are overblown. Full
Story>>
Iyad
Allawi, the not terribly popular
interim premier of post-Saddam Iraq,
is in a position to form a government
again because he won over the Sunni
Arabs residing north and west of
Baghdad in the March 7 elections.
The vote, while it did not “shove
political sectarianism in Iraq toward
the grave,” as Allawi would have
it, rekindled the hopes of many that “nationalist” sentiment
has asserted itself over communal
loyalty. Full Story>>
Americans got a crash course on Yemen for Christmas.
That’s
because we’ve wanted to know more about the little-known, dirt-poor
country in southwestern Arabia where the “underwear bomber” who
tried to blow up a plane—bound for Detroit from Nigeria on
Christmas Day—says he was trained. President Barack Obama says,
correctly, that “large chunks” of Yemen “are not
fully under government control.” So it seems to make sense
to strengthen the Yemeni government, to get at “al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula,” as the local gang of Islamist extremists
is known. Full Story>>
Bethlehem,
Palestine is a special place to celebrate Christmas. It’s
home to the Church of the Nativity and the field where shepherds, tending
their flocks by night, spotted the star heralding Jesus’ birth.
But apart from the historical mystique, here in Bethlehem we celebrate
Christmas much like Christians throughout the world. We hang lights
from the rooftops. We erect a tree in Manger Square. We host a Christmas
market. Our children carol and perform Christmas pageants. Christmas
in Bethlehem, as elsewhere, is a time for family, peace, love and joy. Full
Story>>
For
the past two months, President Barack Obama has been weighing Gen.
Stanley McChrystal’s request to send an additional 40,000 troops
to Afghanistan to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” al-Qaeda.
That same effort, according to Obama, entails ensuring that the Taliban
can’t regain control of the country. But a military strategy
alone won’t beat al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Achieving lasting
stability in Afghanistan will require national political reconciliation,
the establishment of a functioning, accountable political system,
and a credible government. In this respect, the outcome of Afghanistan’s
presidential election, marred by cheating, was a step in the wrong
direction. Full
story>>
So
much is still unknown about the shooting at Fort Hood Army base and
the motives of the alleged shooter, Nidal Malik Hasan, but still
I have that same queasy feeling in my stomach that I've had before:
this will not be good for Muslims. Full
Story>>
Morocco
serves as the backdrop for such Hollywood blockbusters as Gladiator,
Black Hawk Down and Body of Lies. The country’s breathtaking
landscapes and gritty urban neighbourhoods are the perfect setting
for Hollywood’s imagination.
Unbeknown
to most filmgoers, however, is that Morocco is embroiled in one of
Africa’s oldest conflicts - the dispute over Western
Sahara. This month the UN Security Council is expected to take up the
dispute once more, providing US President Barack Obama with an opportunity
to assert genuine leadership in resolving this conflict. But there’s
no sign that the new administration is paying adequate attention. Full
Story>>
Shortly
before assuming office, President Barack Obama was handed a missive
signed by such Washington luminaries as ex-national security advisers
Zbigniew Brezezinski and Brent Scowcroft, urging him to “explore
the possibility” of direct contact with Hamas. One month after
he entered the White House, Obama received an epistle from Ahmad Yousef,
a Gaza-based spokesman for the Islamist movement, making the same recommendation. “There
can be no peace without Hamas,” Yousef told the New York Times
when asked about the letter's contents. “We congratulated Mr.
Obama on his presidency and reminded him that he should live up to
his promise to bring real change to the region.”
There
is no word, as yet, on how the foreign policy doyens' message was
received, but Yousef's occasioned a huffy US rebuke of the UN Relief
Works Agency, whose top official in Gaza, Karen Abu Zayd, passed the
letter to Sen. John Kerry while he was visiting the devastated territory
in mid-February. Even a single sealed envelope, it seems, creates the
appearance that the Obama administration is breaking with the US vow,
enunciated first under President George W. Bush, not to speak with
Hamas until it agrees to renounce violence, abide by previous Palestinian
agreements with Israel and recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Full
Story>>
It
has been quite a week. For the first time, the international community
indicted a sitting president of a sovereign state. Omar al-Bashir
of Sudan stands accused by the International Criminal Court in The
Hague of "crimes against humanity and war crimes" committed
in the course of the Khartoum regime's brutal suppression of the
revolt in the country's far western province of Darfur. Having indicted
two other figures associated with the regime in 2007, ICC prosecutor
Luis Moreno Ocampo began building a case against the man at the top,
and on Wednesday, the court issued a warrant for Bashir's arrest.
Full Story>>
Speaking
to his people on January 18, hours after Hamas responded to Israel’s
unilateral suspension of hostilities with a conditional ceasefire
of its own, the deposed Palestinian Authority prime minister Ismail
Haniyeh devoted several passages of his prepared text to the subject
of Palestinian national reconciliation. For perhaps the first time
since Hamas’s June 2007 seizure of power in the Gaza Strip,
an Islamist leader broached the topic of healing the Palestinian divide
without mentioning Mahmoud Abbas by name.
At
a press conference the following day convened by Abu Ubaida, the
spokesperson of the Martyr Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades, the Hamas
military wing, the movement went one step further. “The Resistance”,
Abu Ubaida intoned, “is the legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people”. Full Story>>
Three
weeks after the war on Gaza, Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire
but refused to terminate its so-called defensive operations. In response,
Hamas declared a ceasefire for one week, until the withdrawal of
Israeli troops has been completed. For many in the West, the ceasefire
might seem like an occasion to celebrate, for the cessation of military
hostilities on both sides will perhaps renew the peace process. But
there are reasons to be critical of this ceasefire, since it continues
the situation in which Israel acts unilaterally. What we are actually
witnessing is a new phase of the catastrophe in Gaza. While the characteristics
of this phase are not yet known, Israel's violence has become ever
more evident. And perhaps this is why Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
did not mention the word "peace" once in the speech he gave
to announce the ceasefire. The "peace process" might soon
be revealed as the other side of the coin to war -- its continuation
by other means -- that simultaneously feeds it. Full Story>>
Bob
Woodward’s four books chronicling the wars of President
George W. Bush are sensitive barometers of conventional wisdom in Washington.
Whereas the first volume, published in 2002 at the height of the self-righteous
nationalism gripping the capital after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
hailed Bush’s self-confidence in acting to protect the homeland,
the 2008 installment depicts the same man as cocksure and incurious.
This much is not news. More educational are Woodward’s hints
about the worldviews that will outlast this unpopular administration,
embedded in the organs of the national security state. Full
Story>>
The
Egyptian regime has once again succeeded in stifling freedom of speech,
this time not in Egypt, but in the US. Earlier this month, an Egyptian
court convicted a prominent Egyptian-American activist for his outspoken
criticism of the regime’s poor human
rights record in American public fora. The court accused Saad Eddin
Ibrahim, of "tarnishing Egypt's image" abroad. The conviction
referred primarily to writings he published in the foreign press; most
notably among them an August 2007 op-ed in the Washington Post in which
he criticized Egypt's human rights record and questioned the reasons
behind US aid to Egypt. Full
Story>>
Militant
Islam is under global scrutiny for clues to conditions that foster
its rise, and to strategies for reversing that growth. But the key
is not in Islamic doctrine, US foreign policy or formal ties to various
nations, as many analysts have asserted. It lies at the community
level, with clan and local leaders. Full
Story>>
Kurdish
parties have become kingmakers in Baghdad , and they know it. As
no federal government can work without them, they are pulling every
available political lever to expand the territory and resources they
control, trying to build the foundation of an independent Kurdish state.
But even more than territory, they need security. If everyone acts
quickly and wisely, that understanding could help resolve one of the
Iraq war’s thorniest issues. Full
Story>>
The
debate over the war in Iraq follows a yellowing script: The minute
someone suggests that the US move to withdraw its troops, war supporters
cry “Havoc!”
True to form, when no less a figure than Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki stated he wants a timeline for a US pullout, John McCain
summoned the specter of dire consequences. “I’ve always
said we’ll come home with honor and with victory and not through
a set timetable,” McCain said. In his major foreign policy speech
on July 15, Barack Obama affirmed his support for a withdrawal timetable,
adding that the US must “get out as carefully as we were careless
getting in.” Obama’s position is the correct one, but he,
like many other war critics, has done too little to counter the refrain
that withdrawal is simply
“cutting and running,” a recipe for disaster. Full
Story>>
