The
Brothers and the Wars
Joshua
Stacher
(Joshua Stacher is assistant professor of political
science at Kent State University. He was in Cairo
during January.)
Deputy
Guide Muhammad Habib. (Tara Todras-Whitehill/Reuters/Landov) |
The
shoes thrown by Muntadhar al-Zaydi at George
W. Bush during the former president’s farewell
tour of Iraq have added an icon to the international
culture of protest. During Israel’s wintertime
war on Gaza, which, according to the Palestinian
Authority Ministry of Health, killed more than
1,300 Palestinians and left over 5,300 injured
and maimed, demonstrators in London threw shoes
at 10 Downing Street. In February, a heckler
in Sweden hurled footwear at the Israeli ambassador.
Popular frustration at Operation Cast Lead was,
of course, even more intense the closer one got
to Gaza.
In
Egypt, where President Husni Mubarak was exposed
yet again as local enforcer of the long-standing
international blockade of Gaza, nationwide protests
spanning the political spectrum called the state
to action. On January 9, al-Jazeera reported
that nearly 100,000 people took to the streets
of Alexandria for a “day of rage.” The same day,
according to the independent newspaper al-Masri
al-Yawm, some 200,000 Muslim Brothers staged
over 90 demonstrations after Friday prayers.[1] The most frequent demands were that the government abide by
two Egyptian court rulings that natural gas exports
to Israel be halted, open the border crossing
at Rafah for humanitarian relief, and expel the
Israeli envoy in Cairo. The Mubarak regime met
these demands with silence, but not with stillness.
To
preempt huge demonstrations in the capital, the
regime pulled the bulk of its security forces
into Cairo. After Friday prayers every week throughout
the Israeli assault, police were stationed at
the entrances of Metro stations near major mosques
like al-Fath in Cairo’s central Ramsis Square.
The mosques themselves were blanketed with security
personnel. In the rest of the country, the regime
allowed the demonstrations, but then carried
out mass arrests of the participants. No group
felt the regime’s hammer blow as acutely as the
Society of Muslim Brothers. According to the
group’s official website, nearly 1,700 Brothers
were arrested for their Gaza-related activism.
Yet it was another shoe throwing incident that
truly defined the political moment.
“Are
You Muslims?”
In
Parliament, deputies of the ruling National Democratic
Party (NDP) defended the regime’s stance against
the seething anger of the opposition, including
the 86 affiliates of the Muslim Brothers who
have served in the legislature since 2005. The
kettle boiled over when, in open session on January 10,
NDP MP Hasan Nash’at suggested that the Brothers’
bloc was working on behalf of Egypt’s enemies—meaning
Hamas. Members of the Brothers’ delegation shouted
back. Nash’at escalated the attack: “You are
traitors!” For Ashraf Badr al-Din, who represents
Ashmoun district in the Minufiyya governorate,
this was too much. He removed his shoe and launched
it at Nash’at. A skirmish ensued, and the Brothers
trooped out of the hall yelling that NDP members
were the traitors because they had closed the
Rafah border and continued to export gas to Israel.
The group demanded an apology from the speaker
of Parliament, Mubarak loyalist Fathi Surour.
It was not forthcoming. Other verbal battles
broke out throughout the day. On the Foreign
Relations Committee, Brother MP Sayyid ‘Askar
argued, “Islam comes before Egypt,” to which
the NDP’s Mustafa al-Fiqqi, who owes his Damanhour
seat to egregious rigging,[2] replied,
“No, Egypt comes first.”
Nearly
all the opposition and independent papers led
with a picture of Badr al-Din readying his projectile.
It was a public relations coup for the Brothers,
the photograph capturing the feelings of the
overwhelming majority of Egyptians about the
government’s position. The regime struck back,
referring Badr al-Din to the Ethics Committee
the following day, where he and his colleagues
heard a torturously ironic lecture on civilized
parliamentary behavior. Surour concluded by rhetorically
asking the Brothers, “Are you Muslims?” A decent
Muslim, he implied, would not have shamed the
assembly in such a fashion. On February 11,
Badr al-Din was suspended from Parliament until
November, though deputies resisted calls to divest
him of his seat.
The
disagreement between the state and the Brothers
is not about whether Egypt or Islam comes first—though
it serves the interests of both sides to frame
their dispute in this way. Rather, the bone of
contention is the regime’s subservience to Washington,
in the teeth of the opposition of the Egyptian
people, to whom the Brothers faithfully try to
appeal. Not that any Egyptian needed reminding,
but the Brothers worked assiduously to keep Gaza
visible during the fighting. Al-Jazeera played
on muted flat-screen televisions during meetings
with senior leaders. Signs displaying bloodied
Palestinians hung in the hallways and off the
facades of their office buildings. At the door
of the Doctors’ Syndicate, controlled by the
Brothers, a large paper Israeli flag covered
the floor, making it impossible for those entering
the building not to step on the symbol of Jewish
state.
There
are at least three wars raging simultaneously
around Egypt’s Muslim Brothers—the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the state’s battle with the Brothers
and, most importantly, the contention for leadership
within the group. All these struggles have deepened
the conservatism that, for the time being, is
winning out within the Islamists’ leadership.
“Goodbye
Kiss”
A
policewoman arrests a Muslim Brotherhood
activist during a rally in support of
Palestinians in Gaza in downtown Cairo,
January 21, 2009. (Mohamed Ahmed/AP) |
While
the Brothers are focused on Egypt, they are deeply
concerned with one regional issue—the question
of Palestine. As a minority bloc in Parliament,
the Brothers can make only symbolic efforts at
steering a course independent of the regime.
During the Gaza war, as previously, the group
and its charity arms attempted to ship medical
and food aid to the Palestinians, only to be
blocked by the Egyptian military.
In
response, some prominent Brothers make the case
that the group should eschew potential engagement
with the United States, chief patron of the Mubarak
regime. As Muhammad Mursi, a member of the Brothers’
Guidance Office, emotionally puts it, “We don’t
‘invade’ people. We choose to use ideas to win
support. The American taxpayers are buying the
hatred of other people. We will never forget
in the future how to hate America because of
all this running blood. Yes, the Zionists are
doing it, but with the diplomatic support of
the US. As long as they are doing this, the resistance
will never stop. You can be strong and militarily
superior but no one will listen if you’re doing
inhumane things.”[3]
If
Muntadhar al-Zaydi called his flying shoes a
“goodbye kiss from the Iraqi people” to Bush,
many Middle Easterners considered Bush’s unflagging
support for Operation Cast Lead to be a similar
parting shot at them. The former president unquestionably
rendered the region more polarized than when
he arrived in office. From the regime change
that fragmented Iraq, to the carte blanche given
the Israeli military, to the contradiction between
his “freedom agenda” and unmitigated support
for dictators like Mubarak, Bush left behind
a Middle East that is less democratic, less tolerant
and less hopeful than it was in 2001. The anti-Americanism
in Mursi’s commentary is part of the wave of
reactionary sentiment that Bush’s policies encouraged.
The
Gaza war was an enabler of the anti-engagement
trend among the Brothers. It bolstered the credibility
of the group’s more conservative leaders when
they lobby the base that the pragmatic wing’s
participatory spirit has led the Brothers to
a dead end, where they are just as powerless
to affect Egyptian foreign policy as they were
when underground. Instead of contesting the regime
in the widest domain possible, the conservatives
argue that the Brothers should prioritize peaceful
“resistance” to the US-Israeli military order,
in solidarity with those who have taken up arms
against it.
Stormed
by the Castle
Since
winning an unprecedented number of seats in the
2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brothers
have been subject to unrelenting pressure from
the state to block their effective participation
in governance. The linchpin of the state’s strategy
has been to tighten the legal screws on the Islamists.
With the March 2007 amendments to the constitution,
the status of the group was downgraded from legally
banned (as it had been since 1954) to constitutionally
prohibited. Article 5 of the constitution now
explicitly states that no group or political
activity based on religion is permitted.
Essam
al-Erian, spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood. (Nasser
Nuri/Reuters/Landov) |
While
this measure all but ensures that the Brothers
will never be able to compete for the country’s
highest office, it also expands the state’s security
rationale for extirpating the Brothers from national
political life. While it may seem like semantics,
the results of this policy shift are apparent
on the ground in two cases that are suggestive
of what 2010 parliamentary elections portend.
According to Deputy Guide Muhammad Habib, the
past is prologue.[4]
In
elections for the upper house of Parliament during
June 2007, the Brothers lost all 19 of their
races in rigged balloting. Yet the regime’s manipulations
on this occasion pale in comparison to those
during the postponed municipal elections in April 2008.
In those contests, the organization claims it
wished to field 10,000 candidates for the 52,000
positions on offer.[5] Over 6,000 Brothers filed the requisite paperwork,
and 2,664 of those obtained court orders affirming
their right to compete after being excluded by
the security-bureaucratic machinery. The authorities
ignored the judicial decisions. Only 20 of the
Brothers made it onto the ballot. All lost as
hundreds of the Brothers’ candidates and campaign
workers were imprisoned.
The
leadup to these elections reveals the internal
strain the state placed on the Brothers. The
candidates initially vowed to contest the elections
from prison.[6] Essam al-Erian, a key reformist voice, wrote,
“We decided to run for office in order to continue
struggling for peaceful reform, to mobilize the
streets against desperation and to encourage
more people to join the struggle for freedom
and democracy instead of losing hope and resorting
to violence.”[7] Running from jail, the reformists said, would
put the regime on the defensive. But a day before
ballots were cast, the Brothers announced their
decision to boycott, at the behest of the more
conservative faction.
The
boycott is not the faction’s only victory as
a result of state interference. A revolving door
of detentions of the rank and file and more methodical
targeting of leading Brothers has also fomented
discord, to the conservatives’ benefit.
The
single most important development in state-Brother
relations is the December 2006 arrest—and
eventual imprisonment—of Khayrat al-Shatir. A
prominent businessman, al-Shatir was the organization’s
liaison with state security and a staunch proponent
of engaging Western governments. His op-ed during
the 2005 elections exemplifies the pragmatic
political thought he advocated at the Guidance
Office at that time.[8] Al-Shatir
was also responsible for mobilizing the youth
of the Brothers into trained units—attracting
the regime’s attention. As one young Brother
commented, “He breathed life into the youth….
That is why he and his son-in-law were arrested
and tried in front of a military tribunal but
the head of the student department was left alone.
A lot of people talk about his money, but it
was because he is a man of organization.”[9]
In
the week after the fixed 2008 local elections,
the military tribunal convened by Mubarak in
2007 finally sentenced al-Shatir to seven years
in jail. With his arrest, the Brothers lost an
important balancing figure at the Guidance Office.
It is hard to separate al-Shatir’s personal influence
from that of the larger arrest campaign, but
the result has been that conservative elements
have asserted themselves. The more conservative
Brothers wish to retrench in a bunker of relative
safety, drawing down the extent of their vocal
participation in formal politics, ceasing negotiations
with the regime and resuming a focus on evangelism
(da‘wa). According to one younger Brother
not in the leadership structure, “[Conservatives]
have different thoughts about politics and about
society than many of us. They focus only on preserving
the group.”[10]
The
2005 elections and the Brothers’ exciting first
year in Parliament may prove to be the apex of
the pragmatists’ internal clout.
The
War Within
The
influential scholar Khalil al-‘Anani argues that
there are four key generations within the Society
of Muslim Brothers.[11] The
oldest generation, including General Guide Mahdi
‘Akif and Guidance Office members Mahmoud Ghazlan,
Mahmoud ‘Izzat and Lashin Abu Shanab, is the
most conservative religiously and politically
because of the repression and state-sanctioned
torture of the Nasser years. The elders’ prominence,
in turn, boosts the fortunes of the more conservative
elements in the 1970s generation. This group
al-‘Anani describes as politically pragmatic
but religiously conservative, pointing to such
figures as Muhammad Habib, Muhammad Mursi and
al-Shatir. The 1970s generation also encompasses
such reform-minded Brothers as ‘Abd al-Mun‘im
Abu al-Futouh and Gamal Hishmat. The third generation,
centered in the provinces, is not well known,
but is seen as more categorically conservative
due to its rural roots and Mubarak’s harsh treatment
of Islamists in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Lastly,
there is what al-‘Anani calls the “technological
generation,”[12] featuring such names as Ibrahim al-Hudaybi
(the grandson and great-grandson of past General
Guides), Society website editor Khalid Hamza
and blogger-journalist ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mahmoud.
This faction seeks to modernize the Brothers’
political and religious discourse, as well as
to democratize the group’s structure. According
to al-‘Anani, “They want a political party, accept
democratic values such as freedom of expression,
are interested in coalition building with other
trends, and understand the complexity of international
conflicts and the need to cut deals with the
US.”[13] While
he concedes that the young Brothers do not hold
central positions, he insists that such thinking
matters.
Throughout
the Society’s 81 years of existence, disenfranchised
groups have split off to the right and the left.
While splinter groups that employ violence such
as al-Jihad or al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyya receive
more attention, the technologically savvy Brothers
resemble the precedent of Hizb al-Wasat, which,
under the leadership of Abu al-‘Ila al-Madi,
broke with the Brothers in January 1996
but has since failed to cohere. Rather than repeat
al-Madi’s mistake, today’s youthful cadre wishes
to remain a part of the Society and reform it
from within.
This
type of thinking about the Brothers is seductive,
evoking as it does archetypes of authoritarian
elders out of touch with a changing world and
young democrats pounding on the door. A Los
Angeles Times journalist has waxed eloquent
about young Brother blogger Mustafa al-Naggar’s
democratizing desires.[14] Other
articles exploring the same theme and the same
set of Brother bloggers have also appeared, including
in this magazine.[15] The
generational argument is being adopted as the
explanation for political proclivities, with
the old said to be more conservative, the younger
more liberal and those in the middle the gatekeepers
who will slow the pace of change. Al-‘Anani,
for his part, says the young generation’s pitfall
will be that they lack the backing of the 1970s
generation.
The
Brothers’ leadership, naturally, resists the
notion that significant divides exist within
the rank and file. Deputy Guide Habib contends,
“There is a mixing [of trends] but no struggle
inside the group.”[16] Muhammad
Mursi argues similarly: “Ideologically, there
is one stream with a few eddies.”[17] But
Brothers of all trends concur that such disagreements
as do exist do not track neatly with generation.
As one Brother observes, “Generationally, we
are in all places. People can be in the same
generation but think about politics, da‘wa and
society differently. People like Saad Husayni
and Muhammad Mursi are completely different from
Khayrat [al-Shatir]. They want different things.”[18]
It
is more instructive to categorize the Brothers
by political orientation. Young Brother ‘Abd
al-Mun‘im Mahmoud says, “There are the pragmatists
and conservatives. But there are also those wanting
to follow the apolitical ‘Amr Khalid-type of
Islam, as well as a core of salafis who have
strict interpretations of Islam. In addition
to those are people that use technology and are
open-minded about the world. I am with the last
group, but we are a minority. The problem with
those [analysts] attracted to our language is
that they fell in love and started running behind
us. That is not the Brothers.”[19] One could add to this list a small group of liberals.
This
plurality of trends makes the debates within
the group heated and healthy, and is one secret
to the Brothers’ longevity and predictable responsibility.
Yet the persistence of factions is also an Achilles’
heel, as seen in the chaotic launch of a party
platform in 2007 or the perennial waffling about
street politics.
It
is best, moreover, to conceive of Mahdi ‘Akif
as a chief executive officer rather than an eminence
grise exerting the largest influence on the
organization’s policy. The elders are respected
for their seniority and their suffering, but
the real political struggle is happening at the
levels below them. The multiplicity of competing
trends ends up pitting those who lobby for open,
pragmatic participation against those focused
on the Society’s survival as the ultimate concern.
The principles are the same, but the interpretation
of those principles determines whether politics
drives the da‘wa or the da‘wa produces
the political approach.
The
pragmatists are more willing to negotiate with
the Egyptian state, so as to be ready to take
advantage of cracks in the authoritarian order.
It is this group of activists who commanded student
union elections in the 1970s, engineered the
takeover of most of the professional syndicates
and served in parliamentary coalitions with the
Wafd and Labor Parties during the 1980s. The
core of this grouping was also sent to prison
by the military tribunals of 1995. While describing
their worldview as Western is inaccurate, they
are ideologically flexible and open to compromise.
As the head of the political department, Essam
al-Erian, argues, “All [of us] are interested
in da‘wa, but there are some that are
open to the world and those that are closed.”[20] Proponents of this trend focus on finding
fellow travelers. They frame their positions
on the basis of political and civil rights; notions
of rule of law, rather than moral or religious
rectitude, drive their thinking and strategy.
Indicative is Muhammad Habib’s analysis of the
political scene: “Since the results of the [2005]
elections, there have been focused attacks that
leave no role for a political life. The system
is using military courts and freezing financial
assets. It is a system that does not follow the
law or constitution or judicial rulings…. There
are no real freedoms as a narrow slice is ruling
and enforcing politics [on society].”[21] There
is nothing particularly Islamist about this analysis;
it could easily come from the mouth of a secular
opposition leader.
The
pragmatist faction’s members can be found on
the group’s two most important bodies: the 90-person
Shura Council and 12-member Guidance Office.
A number of pragmatist figures also help to oversee
the approximately 30 departments dealing with
civic, political and social life.
The
other leading trend—more ideologically rigid—also
has membership in the various departments, and
on the Shura Council and Guidance Office. They
tend to view politics as a byproduct of the outreach
mission, which one performs by being a consummate
Muslim to convert citizens to an Islamic lifestyle.
Muhammad Mursi reveals this outlook when discussing
the process of preparing candidates for 2010
parliamentary elections. “We believe that a candidate
is serving God by serving society. Preparing
him means [for him] to become a really good Muslim.
It requires that you live and work in your constituency.
You raise your family there. It means you attend
the weddings and funerals of your neighbors.
People see you in the mosque—not the bar.”[22] Though
the conservatives care about political and civil
rights, what informs their political positions
is an adherence to centrist interpretations of
Islam.
One
Brotherhood member resolutely dismissed the idea
that social class is indicative of an individual’s
political orientation. “I personally know the
sons of millionaires in the Brothers. And most
of them are conservative. Whether one is open-minded
or close-minded is because of the differences
between the countryside and the cities. People
in the countryside have different values and
perspectives. When you migrate from the country
to the city, your mind opens.”[23] To others, such as Mursi, this analysis is
ludicrous. As he laughingly says, “This is Egypt.
Everyone is from the countryside.”[24] Indeed, it is highly debatable that urban or rural origins
predict whether a Brother will be pragmatist
or conservative.
Peasants
vs. City Slickers
In
May 2008, the Shura Council conducted a
secret election to elevate five new men to the
Guidance Office. The Guidance Office is the highest
policy body and oversees the group’s operations
in the governorates. Needing to fill three vacated
slots (including that of the jailed al-Shatir),
the group decided to elect an additional two
people as backups in the event of deaths or more
arrests. The election turned into a referendum
on the Society’s future trajectory. The result
produced a noticeable shift toward the more conservative
faction.
Parliamentary
bloc leader Muhammad Saad al-Kitatni and Muhi
al-Din Hamid filled the first two positions.
Al-Kitatni sits closer to the conservatives than
the pragmatists, while Hamid is a close ally
of Secretary-General Mahmoud ‘Izzat—a leading
conservative. The backup positions were split
evenly, with Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman representing
the conservatives and Usama Nasr, a close associate
of al-Shatir, aligned with the pragmatists.
The
last Guidance Office race came down to a choice
between Essam al-Erian and the Brothers’ MP from
Mahalla al-Kubra, Saad Husayni, a confidante
of Muhammad Mursi. According to one Brother familiar
with the vote, al-Erian amassed 36 votes but
Husayni cruised to victory. Al-Erian declined
to go into particulars as he recalled the vote.
“What do you want to know? It was a security
vote. It was democratic but the pressure influenced
the outcome. It is better for the conservatives.
Tough conditions empower the hardliners.” Al-Erian
would not define a conservative precisely but
hinted at issues of transparency. “They like
closed meetings,” he said.[25] Asked
what his 36 votes say about the group’s orientation,
al-Erian feigned a smile and replied, “I do not
know how many votes I got. All I know is who
won. The composition of the Shura Council gives
the countryside the advantage.”[26]
Taking
into account al-Erian’s defeat, four of the five
positions went to the less ideologically flexible.
As al-‘Anani argues, “The chief beneficiary of
these elections is the regime itself, as it has
thrown the group into the lap of conservatives
and has dashed the hopes of reformists to steer
the group toward change.”[27] Seven of the remaining nine
Guidance Office members lean more to the right
than the center.
In
keeping with al-Erian’s implication, Husam Tammam,
author of a recent book on the Brothers,[28] penned an op-ed arguing that
the group should no longer be considered an urban
movement. As he notes, most newcomers to the
Guidance Office in the past decade have come
from the provinces rather than cities. They have
brought with them the stereotypical villager’s
shortcomings—“traditional” values, suspicion
of the new, unquestioning loyalty to leadership
and lack of critical thinking skills. The Westernization
process in cities, he adds, leaves people seeking
comfort in the familiarity of an authentic Egypt.
“The Muslim Brotherhood can run effective campaigns
and even win elections in many areas in Egypt’s
countryside. Yet it is my belief that the countryside
is affecting the Muslim Brotherhood more than
the Muslim Brotherhood is affecting it…. The
new breed of Muslim Brotherhood leaders is rural
in its ways.”[29] The internal elections for national positions
would initially suggest that conservative leaders
do benefit from rural bases of support.
And
yet, it seems a leap to conclude that rural ways
are the engine of the increased conservatism.
One can assume that candidates draw their chief
support from the places where they reside. As
has been noted, parliamentary candidates live
and work amidst their constituencies. It is these
grassroots ties that enable them to defeat other
parties when elections are relatively free of
state security interference. Just as protests
are blocked in the capital but allowed in the
periphery, so the security forces are less worried
about manipulating electoral exercises outside
Cairo. Though regime shenanigans in the capital
stack Cairo and Giza governorates with regime
loyalists, the Brothers do comparatively better
in rural governorates, and are most successful
in the Delta.
By
unintentionally privileging the Brothers in rural
areas, the regime allows power bases to develop
that can rival the group’s constantly policed
urban centers. The power centers that emerge
each guard their turf. The divide within the
Society, therefore, should not be attributed
to an essentialized or imagined rural culture.
Just as the establishment of the Society, as
Sami Zubaida reminds us, was not a simple “return”
to classical Islamic heritage,[30] so today’s struggles within the group are
a product of contemporary history—in particular,
the Brothers’ institutional memory, heightened
state repression and the polarizing impact of
US policies.
Shoe
Bombs
Leading
Brothers shun the concept of classifying the
Brothers into groups. As Habib scoffs, “This
is an academic theory. We work on an institutional
basis, and there is no internal struggle.”[31] But
there is no disputing that the current balance
of power within the Shura Council and Guidance
Office favors Brothers from the rural Delta governorates.
This structural bias has produced a platform
from which to vie with other factions for control
over the group’s institutions.
Just
because the pragmatists do not pull the levers
of power within the Muslim Brothers does not
mean they will vanish. The struggle for the Society’s
soul continues.
But,
in the short term, concerns for group preservation
will trump ideological flexibility and openness.
The Brothers will withdraw from politics as they
continue to proselytize Egyptian society. They
intend to run in the 2010 elections, but it is
unlikely that they will compete for a third of
the assembly’s seats as they did in 2005. The
pending release of an updated party platform
promises to reveal disappointingly limited advances
in the Brothers’ official positions on religious
minorities, women’s representation and the establishment
of an ambiguously explained Higher ‘Ulama Council.
The Brothers will certainly not challenge the
presidential succession should Gamal Mubarak
take over his father’s office, as is widely expected.
As one young Brother says, “The system benefits
from the conservatives [because] it is impossible
for them to bargain with the regime. The Brothers
will not move at the moment of change [in power].
The Brothers will be silent.”[32]
Hidebound,
corrupt and hopelessly compromised by its dependency
upon Washington, the Egyptian regime does not
have the option to open up political competition.
Its chief political organ, the NDP, cannot defeat
the Brothers in parliamentary deliberations,
on election ballots or in the realm of public
opinion. The state, then, is forced to solve
its political problems using violence and intimidation.
In such a climate, the urge to disengage from
politics flourishes.
It
is hence unlikely, for the time being, that the
Brothers will cause political explosions larger
than the throwing of shoes. No mere ineffectual
protest, it is a moral claim, a classic weapon
of the weak to be deployed when the channels
of responsible political participation remain
closed. As ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mahmoud remarks, “It
isn’t funny at all. George Bush bombs us with
real bombs and we can only reply with shoes.”
Endnotes
[1] Al-Masri
al-Yawm, January 10, 2009.
[2] Joshua
Stacher, “Damanhour by Hook and by Crook,” Middle
East Report 238 (Spring 2006).
[3] Interview
with Muhammad Mursi, Cairo, January 12,
2009.
[4] Interview
with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, January 8, 2009.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Reuters,
March 5, 2008.
[7] Essam
al-Erian, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Belongs
on the Ballot, Not Behind Bars,” Forward,
April 3, 2008.
[8] Khayrat
al-Shatir, “No Need To Be Afraid of Us,” Guardian,
November 23, 2005.
[9] Interview,
Cairo, January 11, 2009.
[10] Interview,
Cairo, January 11, 2009.
[11] Khalil
al-‘Anani, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Misr:
shaykhukha tusari‘ al-zaman (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq
al-Dawliyya, 2007).
[12] Interview
with Khalil al-‘Anani, Cairo, January 11,
2009.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Jeffrey
Fleishman, “Egypt’s Opposition Faces Internal
Dissent,” Los Angeles Times, October 3,
2008.
[15] See
Marc Lynch, “Young Brothers in Cyberspace,” Middle
East Report 245 (Winter 2007); Joseph Mayton,
“Muslim Brotherhood Bloggers Could Be Washington’s
Hope,” Middle East Times, December 9,
2008; and Samantha Shapiro, “Revolution, Facebook-Style,” New
York Times Magazine, January 25, 2009.
[16] Interview
with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, January 8, 2009.
[17] Interview
with Muhammad Mursi, Cairo, January 12,
2009.
[18] Interview,
Cairo, January 11, 2009.
[19] Interview
with ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mahmoud, Cairo, January 11,
2009.
[20] Interview
with Essam al-Erian, Cairo, January 12,
2009.
[21] Interview
with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, January 8, 2009.
[22] Interview
with Muhammad Mursi, Cairo, January 12,
2009.
[23] Interview
with ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mahmoud, Cairo, January 11,
2009.
[24] Interview
with Muhammad Mursi, Cairo, January 12,
2009.
[25] Interview
with Essam al-Erian, Cairo, January 12,
2009.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Khalil
al-‘Anani, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal
Elections,” Brookings Opinions, June 3,
2008, accessible online at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0603_muslim_brotherhood_alanani.aspx.
[28] Husam
Tammam, Tahawwulat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo:
Madbouli, 2006).
[29] Husam
Tammam, “MB Goes Rural,” Al-Ahram Weekly,
October 23–29, 2008.
[30] Sami
Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State (London:
I. B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 40–41.
[31] Interview
with Muhammad Habib, Cairo, January 8, 2009.
[32] Interview,
Cairo, January 11, 2009
