Comrades
and Brothers
Hossam
El-Hamalawy
Hossam El-Hamalawy is a Cairo-based journalist and
blogger.
A
joint Muslim Brotherhood and Revolutionary
Socialist protest against the Egyptian regime,
August 14, 2005. (Nora Younis) |
Emad
Mubarak is a busy man. Director of the Association
for Freedom of Thought and Expression, and a
lawyer with the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, the
leftist Mubarak cannot hold a meeting without
being interrupted by the ring of his cell phone.
The calls these days come from student members
of the Muslim Brotherhood, the officially outlawed
Islamist group that is Egypt’s largest political
movement. The students call to report security
service abuses against them on campuses, or to
request his legal counsel while they undergo
interrogation by university administrators.
“Each
time I receive a call, I can’t help but remember
the old days and what it was like being on campus
with the Brothers,” Mubarak giggles. In March
1999, he spent 22 days in Tura prison south of
Cairo after Muslim Brotherhood students assaulted
him and eight of his fellow socialists on campus,
turning them over to the police. “Today, things
are different. Leftists and Islamists can sit
down and talk. Most of my clients are Muslim
Brothers,” Mubarak said. “I tell them, ‘I’m a
communist,’ and they are fine with that.”
From
campus fistfights in the 1990s to joint demonstrations
in 2005–2006, relations between the Muslim Brothers
and the radical left in Egypt have come a long
way. In settings where the two tendencies operate
side by side, like student unions and professional
syndicates, overt hostility has vanished, and
there is even a small amount of coordination
around tactics. Still, the cooperation remains
symbolic, and leftists and Islamists have yet
to join forces to undertake sustained mass actions
against their common foe, the regime of President
Husni Mubarak.
A
New Kind of Leftist
The
improvement of leftist-Islamist relations can
largely be traced to two factors. First is the
evolution of a new left in Egypt whose two main
pillars are the Revolutionary Socialist Organization
and a growing left-leaning human rights community.
This new left has different attitudes toward
Islamism than those held by the previous “communist
waves.”[1] Second is the generational change within both
the left and the Brotherhood cadres spurred by
the revival of Egyptian street politics, thanks
to the second Palestinian intifada.
Bad
blood between the Egyptian left and the Brothers
has a long history, from the Islamists’ coordination
with King Farouq in breaking strikes in the 1940s
to President Anwar al‑Sadat’s encouragement of
violent Islamist assaults on leftist university
students in the 1970s. Most independent leftist
organizations in the 1980s and 1990s hewed to
a line on political Islam similar to that of
the Egyptian Communist Party—the dominant faction
inside the “legal left” Tagammu‘ Party—equating
Islamist organizations, reformist or radical,
with fascism.The only modest exception was Ahmad
Nabil al‑Hilali’s People’s Socialist Party, which
briefly flirted in the late 1980s with theidea
that militant Islam was a “movement for the poor”
deserving of support. The majority attitude on
the traditional Stalinist left translated into
an alliance, sometimes overt and occasionally
tacit, with the Egyptian secular intelligentsia—and
with Mubarak’s regime. Needless to say, joint
political action with the Brothers was never
on the table. A few independent leftist lawyers
like al‑Hilali and Hisham Mubarak were involved
in defending Islamist detainees, but these were
individual initiatives. As might be expected,
the Muslim Brothers did not appreciate the “fascist”
label, and they regarded the left with great
distrust.
Starting
in the late 1980s, small circles of Egyptian
students, influenced by Trotskyism, gathered
to study, eventually evolving in April 1995
into an organization named the Revolutionary
Socialists’ Tendency. In contradistinction to
the Stalinist left, these activists put forward
the slogan “Sometimes with the Islamists, never
with the state” in the literature they distributed
on university campuses and elsewhere.[2] In practice, this slogan translated into taking
up the cause of Muslim Brotherhood students on
campus when it came to “democratic” issues, as
when state security banned Islamist candidates
from running in student union elections or expelled
Islamist students from school. The “galleries”
(ma‘arid)—impromptu broadsheets written
on cloth or cardboard and laid out in campus
squares—of Revolutionary Socialist students at
Cairo and ‘Ayn Shams Universities regularly carried
denunciations of military tribunals’ sentences
handed down to Muslim Brothers. At the same time,
the Trotskyist students confronted the Muslim
Brothers on issues such as freedom of expression
and the rights of women and Coptic Christians.
Whenever they felt the Brothers wanted to impose
sex segregation in the classroom, or clamp down
on campus theater and art, or whenever the Brotherhood’s
Supreme Guide made sectarian comments about the
Copts, the socialists’ “galleries” would carry
vehement denunciations.
As
a Revolutionary Socialist member who was active
in the 1990s recalls: “We were a kind of leftist
the Muslim Brothers hadn’t met before. They couldn’t
quite figure us out at the beginning. Anyway,
we were still too marginal for them to bother
with. We were only a few individuals.” This began
to change in 1999. On a few occasions in that
year, as one socialist remembers, the Muslim
Brotherhood students at Cairo University allowed
the Revolutionary Socialist students to speak
at rallies held on campus against the US airstrikes
on Iraq. The socialist students took this unprecedented
opportunity as a sign of the Muslim Brothers’
recognition that they were a force that had to
be given a place on the political stage. It was
a step in a long, slow process of building trust.
From
a handful of members in 1995, the Revolutionary
Socialists grew to a couple hundred activists
on the eve of the second Palestinian intifada.
Their ranks then swelled thanks to their role
in the Egyptian movement of solidarity with the
Palestinians, at a time when the Muslim Brothers
largely abstained from street action. The radicalizing
influence of the intifada among youth
helped to reawaken the Egyptian tradition of
street politics, which had been virtually smothered
by the Mubarak regime’s fearsome security services.
Cairo and several provinces witnessed their largest
and most boisterous demonstrations since the
1977 uprising following President Anwar al‑Sadat’s
attempt to remove state subsidies for bread and
other staples. Despite the opportunities presented
by the ferment on the streets, the Muslim Brotherhood
pursued the policy of non-confrontation with
the regime it had abided by since the 1995 crackdown
on its rank and file, culminating in a series
of infamous military tribunals. Not only did
Brotherhood students refuse to mobilize on the
street, but they also sought on several occasions
to curb the militancy of demonstrations. [3] In October 2000, for instance, after the socialists
clashed with state security and burned police
vans at pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the Brothers
emerged to denounce “socialist sabotage.” At
other times, Islamist students tried to physically
restrain students from marching outside campus
gates.
The
increasingly radicalized political scene created
a space for the left to intervene, but also generated
pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership
from the organization’s cadre. Leftist activists
then at universities recall “naming and shaming”
campus Brotherhood activists for their lack of
participation in the mass protests. In early
April 2002, precisely following the outbreak
of the leftist-led, pro-Palestinian riots at
Cairo University, members of the Muslim Brothers
began turning out for events organized by the
Egyptian Popular Committee for the Solidarity
with the Palestinian intifada. “Muslim
Brotherhood representatives from the syndicates
starting showing up to our meetings,” says Ahmad
Sayf, the director of the Hisham Mubarak Law
Center, who has been hosting the committee’s
meetings. “They didn’t have much choice, as they
would have lost credibility in their constituencies
if they hadn’t turned out. Still, they only sent
representatives [usually, ‘Isam al‑‘Iryan or
‘Abd al‑Mun‘im Abu al‑Futouh, the two most popular
party elders with Islamist youth] and avoided
mass mobilization.” More importantly, Sayf continues,
“the Brotherhood was bowing to pressure from
its youth, who were not happy with a complacent
stand vis-à-vis the authorities.” On April 5,
2002, a group of young Muslim Brothers published
an open letter to Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhour
in the London-based daily al‑Hayat, questioning
the group’s acquiescence in security crackdowns
and demanding more involvement in the Palestinian
solidarity movement. Sayf concludes: “The alternative
was approaching the radicals in the opposition,
as the ‘legal’ opposition, namely Tagammu‘, Wafd
and the Nasserists, were too hostile. The radicals
in the opposition, on the other hand, were happy
to get whatever help the Brothers were willing
to contribute.”
The
Muslim Brothers initially approached Revolutionary
Socialist members, regarding them as the “least
hostile” among the leftist factions, to suggest
that Islamists collaborate with the left in the
pro-intifada and anti-war movements. The
move triggered a debate among leftist circles.
Sympathizers of the Egyptian Communist Party,
the People’s Socialist Party, members of the
Tagammu‘ bureaucracy and a faction from the human
rights organizations refused any form of coordination
with Islamists, though they made an exception
for Magdi Hussein’s Labor Party, whose brand
of Islamism is regarded as somehow “left-leaning.”
The usual scene at such demonstrations was that
the crowd would split into two circles, one led
by leftists and Nasserists chanting leftist slogans,
and another led by the Labor Party supporters
chanting Islamic slogans. The Revolutionary Socialists,
on the other hand, pushed for close coordination,
supported by left-wing human rights activists
such as members of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center
and the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation
of Victims of Violence.
“Brotherly
Spirit”
In
2003 and 2004, the Muslim Brotherhood stuck to
its non-confrontational policy. While the Brothers
kept on sending representatives to pro-Palestinian
and anti-war demonstrations, the main concern
of the organization was charity work, and demonstrating
within the boundaries set by the regime, in complete
coordination with the security services. The
regime used the group as a safety valve for dissent
during the early stage of the ongoing war in
Iraq, allowing the Brothers to take part in government-sponsored
rallies in Cairo Stadium, as well as in the provinces.
Meanwhile, the left-leaning Palestine solidarity
committee evolved into an anti-war movement,
convening small street actions, which exploded
into running clashes with the police in downtown
Cairo on March 19 and 20, 2003. The next summer,
a middle-ranking Muslim Brothers activist spoke
of the increasing frustration among the group’s
cadre at the leadership’s “leaving the street
empty for the leftists. When Kifaya came onto
the scene, some Brotherhood youth wanted to follow
suit.”
The
anti-war movement, successor of the pro-intifada movement,
evolved again by the end of 2004 into an anti-Mubarak
movement, composed of two organizations. One
was Kifaya (the Egyptian Movement for Change),
a coalition made up primarily of members of the
breakaway Nasserist faction Karama, individuals
from the liberal al‑Ghad Party, figures from
the Egyptian Communist Party and veterans of
the 1970s student movement. The other wing was
the Popular Campaign for Change, which was more
Marxist in composition, and included the Revolutionary
Socialists, left-wing human rights activists
and independent leftists. The two organizations
more or less fused together in the months to
follow. Kifaya’s sometimes quixotic and theatrical
street actions attracted public attention, and
helped to break taboos in Egypt’s political life
by issuing direct challenges—without euphemisms—to
the president and his family.
Shortly
after a series of Kifaya demonstrations, a group
of Muslim Brotherhood activists, notably ‘Ali
‘Abd al‑Fattah of Alexandria, held talks with
Revolutionary Socialists and independent leftists,
resulting in the launching of the National Alliance
for Change in June 2005. The alliance was
tactical, and revolved around an anti-Mubarak
platform, with emphasis on vigilance against
the prospect of vote rigging in that year’s presidential
and parliamentary elections. The fruits of this
alliance did not radically alter the political
scene on the ground. After announcing their intention
to hold a joint demonstration with the left in
‘Abdin Square in July 2005, the Muslim Brothers
failed to show up, citing security pressures.
Two more joint demonstrations were organized
in front of the Lawyers’ Syndicate. The first
was chaotic, and the second was better organized,
with consensus on slogans and banners. Since
the winter 2005 parliamentary elections, the
alliance has stayed out of the streets, but it
remains in place as a coordination and problem-solving
mechanism whenever friction arises in workplaces.
The
rapprochement between Islamists and the left
continued when students from the Revolutionary
Socialists’ Tendency, Muslim Brothers and some
independents formed the Free Student Union (FSU)
in November 2005, with the aim of acting
as a parallel organization to the government-dominated
student unions. The FSU was centered in Helwan
and Cairo Universities, with tiny presences at
a few other universities, including ‘Ayn Shams.
Following the rigging of the October 2006
student union elections, the Brotherhood threw
its weight behind the FSU, sanctioning new branches
at universities such as al‑Azhar, Mansoura and
Alexandria. Though the FSU is far from achieving
the ambition of its organizers—nothing less than
a national grassroots student union—the places
where the FSU operates have witnessed another
great improvement in relations between the Brothers
and the radical left. Mustafa Muhi al‑Din, a
socialist activist from Helwan University, describes
relations with the Brothers on campus as friendly.
“They invite us to their events, and they show
interest in our activities. Maybe the union here
is still not strong, but there’s space for activities.
We can be active and spread our message, worrying
about state security, but not about hassles from
the Brotherhood, and sometimes they give us a
hand. We do the same. This makes things easier.”
‘Abd al‑‘Aziz Mugahid, a Brotherhood activist
and president of FSU at Helwan University, speaks
enthusiastically of the “brotherly spirit” on
campus. “The socialists intervened to help us
out in solidarity demonstrations with our sisters
who were expelled from the dormitories because
they wore the niqab, and they stood by
us when the administration expelled more than
400 students for security reasons. These joint
activities were not frequent before.”
Generational
Change
The
backbone of the solidarity actions with the Palestinian intifada has
been students in their late teens or early twenties.
As political virgins, they do not carry the baggage
of the historical fighting between the leftists
and Islamists, and among leftist factions.[4]
Meanwhile,
the profile of the average young Muslim Brotherhood
activist has undergone its own transformation,
rendering a considerable number of the Brotherhood
youth open for coordination with secular groups.
“The Brotherhood cadre has changed,” says Husam
Tammam, author of a recent book on the organization.[5] “They
have become socially assimilated. They are not
necessarily the sons of the poverty belts and
the marginalized nowadays.” The Brotherhood’s
decisive entry into electoral politics “came
at the expense of their identity, forcing them
to be more pragmatic,” Tammam adds. “So forget
about the Islamic state, the caliphate, and so
on. The more the Brothers get dragged into the
political arena, the more they are integrated,
and the more they try to operate according to
the rules of the arena.” Tammam continues: “The
Brothers have changed in their relation to art,
society and vision. You can see that well among
the [Brothers’] youth. The youth voted for [Ghad
candidate] Ayman Nour. This wasn’t a central
order from the group’s leadership. When the youth
are left without orders, they don’t necessarily
follow the group’s traditional line. In my view,
the last remarkable event held by the Brothers,
before they took to the streets, was an event
organized by the Brotherhood students called
Muhammad Day that took place on Valentine’s Day.
The Islamist youth thought, ‘How can we love,
but in a “good” way?’ If you compare this to
the behavior of the Islamist youth in 1985, it
is completely different. Back then all they could
think about was how to establish the Islamic
state [and] revive the caliphate. They would
have looked at Valentine’s Day as a waste of
time. The youth today, however, do not take the
same aggressive approach.”
Tammam’s
observations are echoed by leftists who shared
jail cells with young Brothers during the spring
2006 crackdown on the movement in solidarity
with Egyptian judges exposing fraud and voter
intimidation in the 2005 elections. Blogging
about his encounter with Muslim Brotherhood detainees,
independent secular leftist ‘Ala’ Sayf wrote:
“They were from this new breed of Islamist that
reads blogs, watches al‑Jazeera, sings sha‘bi (popular)
songs, talks about intense love stories and chants
‘down with Mubarak.’ And being young, most of
them did not have any experience with prison
before. Waiting to know whether they’ll get 15
or 45 days’ detention for starters, waiting to
know whether they’ll be sent to one of the just-horrible
prisons or one of the too-horrible prisons, and
in the middle of it all we got the news that
I would be released the next day.” And with the
news of his release, “All of a sudden, they transformed
from just Brothers into comrades! They hugged
me, they clapped, they shook my hand, they laughed
and they were genuinely happy for my release.…
When you speak of the 22 who were released this
week, don’t say 22 out of 30 were released, say
22 out of 600…facing the same charges and fighting
the same tyrants.” The Muslim Brothers’ official
website invited ‘Ala’ Sayf to write a message
to the Brotherhood youth. On July 24, he
wrote them, calling on them to be “more adventurous,”
and advocating more militant street action.
Today,
the majority of factions on the left still stand
opposed to (or express caution about) joint actions
with the Islamists, most notably the newly evolving
Democratic Left (a reformist tendency centered
around al‑Busla magazine), the Egyptian
Communist Party, the People’s Socialist Party
and a faction of the human rights community.
But the Brothers and those comrades who will
work with them remain engaged in mutual confidence
building. The Muslim Brothers’ leadership is
staunchly gradualist, and always on the lookout
for compromises with the Egyptian regime. That
stance will likely impede a further rapprochement
with the radical left, unless the Brotherhood’s
base of youth attains a greater say in when,
and how, their powerful organization bestirs
itself.
Endnotes
[1] Leftist
historians divide the history of Egyptian communism
into “waves.” The first wave began in 1919 with
the founding of the Egyptian Socialist Party,
which later became the Egyptian Communist Party,
only to be destroyed by the Wafd government’s
crackdowns in 1924. The second wave started in
the late 1930s with the formation of communist
study circles that evolved into several organizations
and factions, with brief periods of unity; it
ended with the dissolution of the Egyptian Communist
Party in 1965. The third wave commenced in 1968
with the revival of the student and worker movements,
received a crushing defeat in 1977 and officially
died with the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. The (current) fourth wave started in 1995,
with the launching of the Revolutionary Socialist
Tendency.
[2] The slogan was coined by Chris Harman, an International
Socialist Tendency theoretician based in Britain,
in his book, The Prophet and the Proletariat,
accessible online at http://www.marxists.de/religion/harman/index.htm.
The book was translated into Arabic, and distributed
widely by the Revolutionary Socialists in 1997.
[3] See Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Street Politics,” Cairo
Times, September 26, 2002; and Hossam
el-Hamalawy, “Post-War Middle East,” Islam
Online, April 30, 2003.
[4] El-Hamalawy, “Street Politics.”
[5] 5 Husam Tammam, Tahawwulat al‑Ikhwan
al‑Muslimin (Cairo: Madbouli, 2005).
