Syria’s
Curious Dilemma
Bassam
Haddad
(Bassam
Haddad teaches political science at St. Joseph’s
University in Philadelphia.)
| 
Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad stands with then
Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass (right) and
Hasan al-Turkmani, chief of staff, as they
visit the tomb of the unknown soldier in Damascus,
October 6, 2002. (Reuters/SANA/Landov) |
Seasoned
observers of Syria have learned not to make much
of apparent political changes in the country. This
lesson holds true today, but with a twist.
Five
years after the death of Hafiz al-Asad, who ruled
Syria for 30 years, a series of “springs” have come
and gone without substantially opening up the political
system. The country’s political institutions are
stable, but stagnant, including the governing Baath
Party, which continues to rule by periodically reshuffling
elites. Syria’s economy continues to sputter, its
small oil reserves continue to dwindle and its work
force continues tolag in acquiring the skills needed
in today’s global economy. Perhaps the most troubling
part of Syria’s predicament is an invisible but
rising wave of poverty unprecedented in recent history.
For
Syria’s political elite, this precarious state of
affairs is not unusual. Nor is it beyond the wherewithal
of the awkward, yet maturing new leadership around
President Bashar al-Asad to deal with adversity.
What has changed rather decisively is the world
around Syria’s cocoon. Coupled with domestic woes,
this change does challenge the abilities of the
regime. Violent regime change in Iraq, the humiliating
loss of Syrian control in Lebanon and a strident
Israel emboldened by a duplicitous “war on terror”
have combined to isolate Syria and to diminish its
regional influence. The results of negotiations
with the European Union to bring Syria into a “partnership
agreement,” as part of the EU’s “Barcelona process”
of Euro-Mediterranean economic integration, have
been disappointing. To make things worse, the Bush
administration, backed by Congress, persists in
pursuing an unprincipled anti-Syria campaign whose
endgame remains difficult to divine.
In
2005, Syria finds itself bereft of foreign policy
tools whose advantages it enjoyed for over 30 years.
Between 1970 and 1990, the Syrian regime benefited
from the superpower competition of the Cold War.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990,
Damascus relied on playing a regional role, beginning
with its participation in the US-led coalition to
expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1990. Now, the
international and regional fronts are both closed,
and the Syrian regime is left with a lone front
on which to fight for its viability: at home. The
domestic front is where the regime has historically
been most vulnerable.
Barring
unforeseen developments, the Syrian regime faces
what, by its lights, is a curious dilemma: either
it acquiesces to the demands of external forces
in order to preserve itself or it compromises its
domestic position by allowing the diffusion and
decentralization of power. Does the Syrian regime
have the skill and the willpower to escape from
this hornet’s nest? Can the regime manage today’s
domestic, regional and international crises all
at the same time? Judging by the outcome of the
Baath Party’s recent Tenth Regional Conference,
one should not hold one’s breath.
Back
to Basics
| 
Aleppo
from above. (Issa Touma) |
The
Tenth Regional Conference, held in early June 2005,
was a bit of housekeeping in preparation for an
entrenchment. It saw the apparent consolidation
of Bashar al-Asad’s rule at a time when significant
external and internal tensions and threats are coinciding
for the first time since the 1960s. According to
Ibrahim Hamidi, perhaps the most informed and incisive
journalist in Syria today, “The message that the
Regional Baath Conference wanted to send at the
end of the conference to public opinion, the opposition
and foreign actors—especially America—is
that the Baath Party will remain the ruling party
in Syria.”[1]
Very
little was said at the conference about foreign
policy, beyond affirmation that peace will remain
Syria’s “strategic choice” and that the regime will
work to enhance its bargaining position vis-à-vis
Israel. Indicating the regime’s domestic focus,
Bashar emphasized that “any decisions or recommendations
made during the conference should express our internal
needs only, in isolation from any other considerations
aimed at pushing us in directions that contradict
our national interest or threaten our stability.”[2]
The
conference was not without positive developments,
though these were hardly far-reaching reforms. Expanding
space for political participation was a recurring
theme. For the first time, there were serious recommendations
that the state should review the Emergency Law in
place since 1963, with an eye toward “narrowing
the scope of state security matters.”[3] A new “political parties law” is likely to take
effect soon,[4] though Article 8 of the constitution, designating
the Baath Party as the “leader of state and society,”
will remain untouched. Reiterating a stock line,
a high-level official told the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat
that modification of Article 8 is an “external request”
made by non-Syrian interests. This statement is
related to various proclamations during the conference
regarding the need to “lay bare” the intentions
of the expatriate opposition, particularly the Muslim
Brotherhood leadership in exile in Paris, on the
grounds that they are not true “nationalists” and
are being supported by actors hostile to Syria.[5] Another likely subject of this
denunciation is the Reform Party of Syria led by
Washington-area dentist Farid Ghadry, a would-be
Syrian Ahmad Chalabi who is being promoted by the
neo-conservative think tank, the Foundation for
the Defense of Democracies.
In
various interactions, formal and otherwise, Bashar
emphasized that “the party does not own the state.”[6]
It is necessary, he said, “to redefine the relationship
of the party to political power, and not to be enmeshed
in daily politics, and to move away from office
work and focus on interacting with the masses.”[7]
Henceforth, the Baath’s share of cabinet posts will
be limited to ten.[8]
Nonetheless, it was stipulated toward the end of
the conference that the prime minister and the speaker
of parliament must be members of the Baath’s ruling
body, the Regional Command, creating an obvious
contradiction between proclamations and practice,
and eliminating the possibility that a high-level
executive such as the prime minister may be an independent.
It
was also suggested that the Regional Command of
the party be dissolved and replaced by the “Party
Command.” Hence, President al-Asad would become
the secretary-general of the Baath Party, not the
regional secretary. This move would facilitate the
dissolution of the National Command of the party
in the near future.[9]
Although the party did not act on this suggestion
at the conference, it is likely to do so in the
future. In any event, the number of members in the
Regional Command was dropped from 21 to 14. It is
also significant that there were forces calling
for replacing the slogan “unity, freedom, socialism”
with “democracy and social justice,” and the name
Arab Socialist Baath Party with simply the Baath
Party, thereby toning down the socialist identity
of the party and introducing the magic word “democracy.”[10] These changes did not occur,
but talk of them provides clues to the regime’s
longer-term thinking.
The
Nitty Gritty
| 
Bashar
al-Asad shakes hands with party members during
the opening of the Baath Party Regional Congress
in Damascus, June 6, 2005. ‘Abd al-Halim
Khaddam, then still vice president, is seen
smiling next to Asad. (Ramzi Haidar/AFP) |
It
is no secret that Syria’s real strongmen sit at
the helms of General Security, Military Security
and the Republican Guard. Changes and replacements
at that level tell a more direct story about the
regime’s internal power dynamics than hundreds of
pages of party declarations and memoranda. One week
after the conference, Bashar’s brother-in-law Asef
Shawkat was confirmed as the head of military intelligence,
perhaps one of the most sensitive and powerful positions
in Syria today. Manaf Tlass, son of former Defense
Minister Mustafa Tlass, and Bashar’s brother Mahir
are the effective heads of the Republican Guard,
perhaps the most potent fighting force in Syria.
The implications here might appear clearer than
they are, for family ties to Bashar do not guarantee
loyalty, as the history of struggle for power in
Syria instructs.
More
important is the evident “clearing of the way” that
has taken place within the predominant institutions
of coercion in the country since Hafiz al-Asad’s
death. Over the past five years, strongmen who are
either opposed to Bashar or are not part of his
“team” have been gradually either replaced or “retired.”
They include former Chief of Staff ‘Ali Aslan and
his deputies ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sayyad, Faruq Ibrahim
‘Isa, Ibrahim al-Safi, Shafiq Fayyad and Ahmad ‘Abd
al-Nabi, the head of the political security branch
of General Security, ‘Adnan Badr Hasan, and Hasan
al-Khalil, Shawkat’s predecessor as head of military
intelligence.
Perhaps
the most visible development at the Regional Baath
Conference was the replacement within the Regional
Command of what remains of the “ old guard” that
surrounded Bashar’s father[11]
with a “new” team.[12] A charter member of the old guard, ‘Abd al-Halim
Khaddam, “resigned” as vice president and as a member
of the Regional and National Command Councils after
sensing the isolation of the “older” Baathists.
As Khaddam is perhaps the second most visible icon
of the Baath regime after Hafiz al-Asad, the nature
of his exit—which was not “honorable”—bespeaks
the end of an era. The circumstances surrounding
his exit lend credence to the little-discussed story
that Khaddam and others among the old guard formed
an informal alliance aimed at “saving” the regime
from what they perceive to be the current leadership’s
blunders in Iraq and Lebanon.[13]
Khaddam’s
departure completes the process of paving the way
for Bashar that started in June 2000. The new team
is made up of both older and younger Baathists who
are distinguished by their proximity to the current
leadership, and not necessarily by their skill or
experience. It is said that this team is important
not for what it will do for Syria, but for what
it will not do: obstruct decisions made by the top
leadership. For the regime, the new team is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, its unquestioning loyalty
will make for a less erratic policy. On the other
hand, the new Command leadership lacks vision and,
many say, competence. It remains to be seen which
edge of the sword will strike. If the new team is
a short-term fix to rid the leadership of troublemakers,
then it could enable a smoother and surer decision-making
process in the future. However, if the desired end
is to surround the leadership with complacent figures
in perpetuity, then it is probable that Syria will
return to square one, with the leadership approaching
a stifling absolutism of sorts. In any event, Syria’s
principal dilemma leaves little room for the long-term
sustainability of such a formula.
Institutionally
speaking, Bashar and his closest allies have played
a delicate game to consolidate their control. On
the one hand, they needed to preserve the structure
of executive authority by strengthening the party
and government institutions; on the other hand,
they had to manipulate the same authority structure
and institutions that would allow them to limit
the personal power of potential adversaries in the
long run. This was not a choice of one strategy
among many on offer: Bashar needed, and needs, the
Baath Party. Since he lacks his father’s charisma,
and with the multiplication of power centers around
certain personalities within the regime, selective
reinvigoration of the roles of the party was the
only rational choice.
Another
change is increasing reliance on the security services,
as indicated by the shifting membership in the Regional
Command. Historically, the Command included the
chief of staff and the defense minister. After the
June conference, two members of the security services
took the spots of these officials in the Command.
It is unmistakable that the security services are
continuing to gain authority in circles that they
began to infiltrate in the early 1970s. Finally,
the institutional army's clout has been eroded,
particularly after the pullout from Lebanon.
The
Balance Sheet
| 
Fraying
poster of Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus, 2004.
(Thomas Kern/Lookatonline) |
The
transition of regime from Asad senior to Asad junior
that began in 2000 (and perhaps earlier) is now
complete. Though the new regime is not impregnable,
the intra-party tension and the rocky decision-making
processes that characterized Bashar’s first five
years in power are unlikely to reappear for some
time. The evident winners are Bashar and his team,
including the Asad family and their innermost circle.
The evident losers are the old guard, or those who
opposed Bashar’s ascendancy, beginning with formerly
powerful Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi, who “retired”
in 1998 after he made public his distaste for the
prospect of Bashar ruling Syria, and ending with
Khaddam—with a flurry of others in between.
Digging
a little deeper, one finds that the decisive break
was made not only with the old guard, but with the
regime of Hafiz al-Asad, a development that cannot
be translated publicly into words in Syria’s political
climate today. Bashar was indeed his father’s choice
of successor, following the death of his oldest
son Basil in a 1994 car crash, but it is questionable
whether Asad senior wanted Bashar to change the
regime itself. This is not an academic point, for
with the changes to the regime came changes in the
regime’s style and approach whose contours are still
emerging.
In
its handling of the US invasion of Iraq and the
aftermath, the “Lebanon file” after the May 2000
Israeli withdrawal and the US “war on terror” that
linked Syria with “terrorist” groups within Syria
and in Lebanon, the current Syrian regime has contributed
to its own isolation. This isolation is exacerbated
by the Bush administration’s hostile posture. Hafiz
al-Asad’s regime boxed itself in domestically, but
was always able to compensate for problems caused
by its centralization of domestic political power
by adopting an uncompromising stance on regional
issues—particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Bashar’s regime has been steadily losing this ability.
In the past, Palestinian and Lebanese resistance
movements were used from a distance to prop up the
legitimacy of the Syrian regime. Today, the regime
has absorbed these tools as part and parcel of its
legitimacy, thereby compromising its independence
and allowing itself to be more liable for the Palestinians
and Lebanese groups’ possible missteps. In the post-September
11 international climate, where the US, Europe and
Israel require no hard evidence to condemn Syria
for any number of alleged infractions, such a loss
of autonomy could subject Syria to many unneeded
blows. One should caution against accepting the
common view in Syria that Asad senior would never
have brought the country to such a point. The Syrian
regime has been, and still is, willing to pay nearly
any price to maintain its own security, and the
dead end was always in sight. Asad senior was likely,
however, to have delayed the inevitable a little
longer.
The
breathing space that the regime afforded itself
by clearing the way for a less conflict-ridden decision-making
process is an opportunity to embark on irreversible
domestic decentralization that would herald an era
of putting development ahead of both regime security
and external demands. Independent, opposition and
regime-friendly observers in Syria will not bet
on this scenario. In view of the Bush administration’s
aggressive policy orientation, the smart money is
on a strategy of gradual submission to external
demands that may hurt the wellbeing of the Syrian
people, but will keep the regime's security intact.
The same scenario is likely to unfold in the case
of the country’s political economy.
State
of the Economy
The
state of the Syrian economy remains dismal. It is
unclear whether the deliberations at the recent
Baath Regional Command Conference reflect the sophistication
that is required to deal with the crisis.[14]
Optimists continue to debate whether this or that
liberalization measure is likely to improve the
economy as though the missing link is a “good plan.”
The announcement by the chief of the State Planning
Commission in 2004 that Syria will adopt the principles
of a market economy by 2010 brought relief to optimists.[15] So did the announcement at the Baath Regional Conference that
Syria will adopt a “social market economy.”[16]
But what about the elephants in the room?
Syria’s
economy stagnated between 1996 and 2004, with an
estimated average growth rate of 2.4 percent.[17]
Meanwhile, the population is growing at a rate of
2.7 percent,[18]
spelling disaster for development. Economic growth
reached 3.4 percent in 2003, but that unusually
high rate reflected the sale of Iraqi oil through
Syria and then the rise of oil prices as a result
of the Iraq war. In 2004, economic growth dropped
to 1.7 percent, showing the danger of depending
on oil rents.[19] Oil production reached 591,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1995
but declined to 450,000 bpd in 2005. According to
one estimate, Syria will become a net importer of
oil for the first time in 30 years by 2012.[20]
The good news for the Syrian regime is that the
rise in natural gas production is likely to compensate
for a substantial part of the decrease in oil production.
Gas reserves are estimated at 240 billion cubic
meters.[21]
Much depends on the transit revenues that Syria
will receive from the Arab Gas Pipeline linking
Egypt with Turkey and eastern Europe.[22]
Ultimately, rent income from oil or gas will only
buy time. Meanwhile, unemployment, poverty, investment
and dilapidated public-sector firms require immediate
attention.
Syrians
are suffering from an alarming decrease in their
standard of living. In 2003-2004, 5.1 million people
(or 30.1 percent of the population) were living
below the poverty line, with 2 million Syrians unable
to meet their basic needs.[23]
By most estimates, there is 20 percent unemployment
in the country, with at least 300,000 new workers
entering the job market each year.[24]
According to former State Planning Commission chief
and current Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs
‘Abdallah al-Dardari, an average annual growth rate
of 7 percent will be necessary to provide employment
for job seekers. Where will this growth come from?
With
oil income tapering off, Syria’s public and private
sectors must do the heavy lifting. To generate growth
in those sectors, the regime appears to be counting
on the trade benefits of a partnership agreement
with the EU. After some hesitation, and presumably
to break the Syrian isolation imposed by the US,
in 2004 Bashar created a new team to speed up the
signing of an agreement. As a precondition, the
EU pressed for a rapid transition from a public-
to a private-sector economy, and, according to former
Industry Minister ‘Isam al-Za‘im, the regime soon
found itself moving faster and conceding more than
it wanted to. By the end of 2004, the EU had added
new preconditions, including a call upon Syria to
lead the way in eliminating weapons of mass destruction
from the region. Nevertheless, the Syrian team included
“services” in the list of sectors to be liberalized,
and at a faster pace, as a way to hasten the signing.
This concession was not made public. In the end,
after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the EU withdrew its promises
of an expedited agreement.
Should
the negotiations restart, the public sector would
have to be overhauled, a political nightmare for
a regime such as Syria’s, where that sector takes
on a number of necessary political and social functions.
Privatization according to a plan of eliminating
failing public-sector firms and refurbishing struggling
ones might work only if the top leadership is willing
to compromise the non-economic functions that the
sector serves. More importantly, the plan would
fall to pieces in the absence of a private sector
capable of employing at least half of the new job
seekers each year (150,000-200,000 people), a figure
that is well beyond the capacity of Syria’s mostly
small private firms.[25]
The
growth of the private sector in Syria was erratic
in the 1990s.[26] Since 2000, private investment grew slightly
only because of the dramatic drop in such investment
between 1996 and 2000. The most recent figures place
the private sector’s contribution to capital accumulation
at only 34 percent, after years of supposed support
and promotion of private sector growth.[27] Obstacles to private-sector
growth remain both political and structural, having
to do with the political role that the public sector
plays in servicing the regime’s economic power and
social legitimacy. Another part of the problem has
been the failure of existing public and new private
banks in financing the growth of the private sector.[28]
As a result, new entrants into the private sector
remain few. By contrast, the already existing private
businessmen and the public-private networks to which
they belong are expanding at a steady pace as they
are faced with little or no competition from potential
entrants who lack financing. These big business
groups worry not about liberalization or lack thereof
at this point; they are mostly concerned to keep
the formula within which they are accustomed to
work. One might have to wait for a vigorous economy
until these individuals and networks discover a
contradiction between further capital accumulation
and the existing formula. For the time being, the
idea that a partnership agreement with the EU can
provide the cure for Syria’s economic ills is incommensurate
with the political and institutional requirements
of such an agreement.
Moment
of Decision
According
to Nabil Sukkar, a seasoned economist and business
consultant, “There is a need for a ‘Great Leap Forward,’
not an incremental progression.”[29] Syria’s economy remains captive to the country’s
brand of centralized politics. Economic rationality
remains severely fettered by a political logic that
prevents the very idea of a comprehensive reform
plan, without which incremental measures are ineffective
at worst and reversible at best. Problems of low
investment, an inhospitable environment, a weak
judiciary and idiosyncratic state intervention are
not economic, but political through and through.
According to Za‘im, these problems have existed
since 1991 when Syria embarked on “economic pluralism.”
Beyond the lack of political will needed to overhaul
the Syrian economy, there are three equally large
obstacles: the network of state officials, military
officers, their offspring and relatives, and powerful
businessmen who benefit from the current arrangements;
a decrepit administrative and bureaucratic system;
and an insufficiently skilled labor force. Only
10 percent of Syrian workers have a college degree,
for instance.[30] It is impossible to treat these
problems in isolation, requiring once again the
kind of political will that would put Syria’s development
before regime security.
The
official line is that Syria is prevented from taking
certain reform measures because they correspond
to external demands. This is a false binary opposition.
It is true that Syria is facing a hostile international
environment and an unprincipled political campaign
against it, but that has been the case since the
early twentieth century. The hostility is unlikely
to subside, whatever the stance of the United States.
Proper development for state and society in Syria
does not conflict with warding off external enemies.
On the contrary, it is the most efficient weapon
against them.
For
better or for worse, and unless Baathist infighting
resurfaces, the Syrian regime is left to its own
devices on the domestic front as it attempts to
resolve its curious dilemma. Proper development
does conflict with the guaranteed security of the
Syrian regime as it stands today. The Syrian regime
is quickly approaching the point where it will have
to choose between compromising with the outside
forces it cautions against, thereby preserving itself
in its current form, or compromising with the Syrian
people, thereby voluntarily reducing its own power.
Much anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist rhetoric
notwithstanding, this choice is not in the end such
a big puzzle.
