Iran,
the Vatican of Shi‘ism?
Roschanack
Shaery-Eisenlohr
(Roschanack
Shaery-Eisenlohr is a doctoral candidate in the Department of
Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of
Chicago.)
| 
An
image of Ayatollah Khomeini hovers over a street in Beirut.
(Ed Kashi/IPN) |
The
Iranian state, controlled de facto by the conservatives in the
government, promotes the idea that Iran is the center of Shi‘ism.
It bases its argument on the fact that Iran is a Shi‘i-run state,
whereas Shi‘i Muslims in other parts of the world live in states
that are dominated by Sunnis, and so Iran is free to pay near
exclusive attention to Shi‘i concerns.
Much Western
attention has centered on the Iranian government’s ideological,
military and economic support of one Shi‘i faction outside Iran,
Hizballah in Lebanon. Since the 1980s, many observers have seen
the creation of Hizballah as a result of the desire of the post-revolutionary
Iranian government to “export the Islamic revolution.” Hizballah,
therefore, is seen as an extension of Iranian interests, which
are defined as expansionist and implacably hostile to the West.
This point of view underpins statements like the one attributed
to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in 2002 that Hizballah
is the “A-Team of terrorists” with “global reach.” As evidence
for the Lebanese party’s organic ties to hardliners in Tehran,
such observers cite Hizballah’s stated allegiance to Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, successor to Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader
of the Islamic Revolution and a key conservative power broker
in Iran’s domestic turmoil.
Hizballah
does regard Khamenei as its marja‘, the “source of emulation”
whose pronouncements, under the hierarchical system within Shi‘i
Islam, are the main signposts offering guidance to pious Shi‘i
Muslims. These religious ties to Iran can set Hizballah apart
from other Lebanese Shi‘i parties. In 1994, for example, Khamenei
issued a fatwa enjoining Shi‘a to refrain from the practice
of hitting haydar, that is, striking one’s head until
it bleeds severely, during ‘Ashura, the annual commemoration
of the death of the Prophet’s grandson Hussein in the battle
of Karbala’. As Hizballah acknowledges Khamenei as marja‘,
its followers stopped the practice. Sympathizers of Amal, the
other major Shi‘i party in Lebanon, have continued it (as have
Iraqi Shi‘a), signaling that they do not recognize the hierarchy
that the Iranian government would like to impose on them.
Yet Hizballah
cannot simply be called an agent of Iranian influence in the
Arab world. After the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990,
the party has unmistakably developed a political agency of its
own. Not only is the party hailed in Lebanon and the Arab world
as the prime mover behind Israel’s decision to withdraw from
southern Lebanon in 2000, it also has built a popular base in
the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa region and the south
that has voted party cadres into the Lebanese parliament. Hizballah’s
network of social services, meanwhile, has earned it a major
role as an advocate for the disadvantaged Shi‘i population.
These successes have deepened Hizballah’s self-identification
as an actor in the interest of Arab nationalism, an ideology
that does not necessarily comport with the type of pan-Shi‘i
solidarity propagated by Iran. Pan-Shi‘i solidarities cannot
be viewed independently from the national standpoints from which
they are articulated.
Seeking to justify their
involvement in Lebanese Shi‘i affairs, the Iranian government
highlights what it sees as the central role of Iran and Shi‘ism
in Islamic civilization in general. This strategy counters the
Arab nationalist argument according to which ethnic solidarity
among people defined as Arabs, regardless of sectarian affiliation,
should take precedence over religious ties with non-Arabs. Yet
by pointing to the central position of Iran in Islamic civilization,
the Iranian government also tacitly draws on nationalist ideologies
of its own. The way Iran is portrayed by institutions of the
Iranian government working abroad frequently exhibits mainstream
nationalist thinking about the splendor and impact of the Persian
language and Iranian traditions. Conservative-controlled organs
of the Iranian state make use of an elaborate cultural politics—language,
films and the like—that they themselves
had labeled as secular until recently. Ironically, these
proponents of pan-Shi‘i solidarity draw on an Iranian religious
nationalism in order to justify their position among Shi‘i Arabs
in Lebanon.
Iran’s
Cultural Politics in Lebanon
Consider,
for example, the activities of the Cultural Center of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Beirut (ICC). Until 1987, the cultural section
of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut coordinated activities considered
“cultural” (barnameha-yi farhangi). The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Tehran monitored these programs, just like other
activities of the Iranian Embassy. By 1987, the Iranian government
felt the need to separate the cultural section from some Iranian
embassies, and as the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance
had been responsible for the cultural activities in Iran and
abroad, the ICC opened a branch in Beirut under the umbrella
of this ministry. A total of 23 employees currently work at
the ICC, 17 of them of Lebanese origin, and the rest ministry
employees sent from Iran. Until 1990, the Lebanese civil war
limited the center’s activities, but after the war ended the
ICC assumed its charge in earnest. The official goals of the
ICC are to “deepen cultural, scientific and intellectual” relations,
as well as “academic relations.” The ICC pursues these goals
by “introducing Iran to the Lebanese public,” teaching Persian
and supporting other Persian language teaching in Lebanon, sponsoring
seminars and conferences on Islamic thought and history, and
publishing the proceedings as well as other books.
A central,
if unacknowledged goal of these cultural appreciation activities
is to counter the ideology of Lebanese Islamists, Sunni and
Shi‘i alike, who emphasize the special relationship between
Arabs and the landmark accomplishments of Islamic history. By
contrast, the Iranian government seeks to shift attention to
the contributions of Iranians to Islamic civilization, while
downplaying linguistic and ethnic differences between Arabs
and Iranians.
The ICC’s
most direct method of “introducing Iran to the Lebanese” has
been to send a select group of 13-15 Lebanese to Iran every
year to take part in the extensive ceremonies held to commemorate
the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. These delegations,
made up of intellectuals, religious scholars and leaders of
Shi‘i political parties, also travel throughout Iran and visit
cultural and research centers. Although most members of the
delegation are Muslims, every year a few Christians are invited
on the trip as well. In 2002, the Lebanese sent to Iran included
two members of the Amal movement, two Sunnis associated with
the party al-Tawhid al-Islami, the Christian poet Joseph ‘Aoun,
a journalist from the al-Safir newspaper, and a judge
from the Ministry of Justice. Mohamamad Hossein Hashemi, the
Iranian cultural attaché to Lebanon, characterized the project
“as a way to correct the image of Iran in the mind of many Lebanese
as Iran had come to be associated wrongly with terrorism.” He
pointed to the surprise the travelers felt upon their arrival
in Iran:
Many had
imagined Tehran to be a larger version of al-Dahiya [the
poor southern suburbs of Beirut mainly inhabited by Shi‘a],
because of the connection they imagine between Iran and Hizballah.
But once they visited the country, they realized, “Wow,
what a culture! What a civilization!” Many of those who returned
told us, “Why take a vacation in Europe? We’d rather go to Iran
on vacation.”[1]
The emphasis
on Iranian contributions to Islamic civilization becomes most
visible when Hashemi urges students to learn Persian. On the
first day of Persian classes at the ICC in 2002, he declared
that “if Arabic was the language of the Qur’an, which we in
Iran consider the gate to our knowledge of Islam and its eminent
teachings, then Persian is the language of the Islamic Revolution.
It is also the language of high culture (adab), poetry
and a language of interaction between religions and civilizations
for all of history.” Here Hashemi places almost the same emphasis
on the revolution as on the rise of Islam as an event. He continued
that “many of the great scholars well-known in the Arab world
were from Iran, such as al-Razi, al-Farabi, al-Kharazmi, Ibn
Sina, Ibn al-Muqafa’ and many other scholarly personalities.”[2]
Later in the speech he mentioned that members of the Prophet
Muhammad’s family hailed from the region called Iran today.
In this way, Hashemi presents a picture of the past in which
those settled in the region called Iran today spoke Persian,
although they wrote in Arabic. He characterizes Islamic civilization
as not a solely Arab achievement, remapping the imagined territory
of that civilization so that present-day Iran sits squarely
in the middle.
Outreach
and Reception
The effects
of this Iranian “cultural outreach” do not always conform to
Hashemi’s script. One of the most successful activities of the
ICC—the screening of acclaimed Iranian films—has
little to do with Iran’s self-image as the center of global
Shi‘ism. The ICC began showing movies in Beirut during
the Lebanese civil war. The screening of Bashu: The Little
Stranger moved Lebanese viewers to such an extent that for
days the phone at the ICC was ringing with requests to order
the film and for information about others.
Produced
by the well-known filmmaker Bahram Bayzai in 1989, Bashu
is the story of a young boy from the southern part of Iran whose
family is killed during the Iran-Iraq war. He hides in the back
of a truck during the bombardment, only to wake up the next
day to find himself in northern Iran. The contrast between the
dry landscape of southern Iran and the lush green of the north,
and the fact that neither Bashu nor his newfound northern family
could speak standard Persian, underline the diversity of the
Iranian population. As Bashu is dark-skinned and speaks Arabic,
as compared to many northerners who are fair-skinned and speak
a northern Persian dialect, the film points to ethnic and linguistic
divisions within Iran as well.
Such films
probably succeed with Lebanese audiences, as they have internationally,
because of their artistic value and because many Lebanese clearly
distinguish between the Iranian filmmaking industry and the
aims of the conservative government. In addition, the success
of Iranian movies such as Bashu in Lebanon might be related
to the familiarity of both societies with the devastation wrought
by war. Yet the ICC prefers to present the films’ warm reception
primarily as the result of the Lebanese audience’s interest
in the Islamic Republic. It certainly does not call attention
to the political differences between prominent Iranian filmmakers
and the conservative wing represented in the Ministry of Guidance,
or the way in which many contemporary Iranian films have advanced
subtle critiques of the social strictures imposed by the Islamic
Republic.[3]
Contestation
Moreover,
the cultural politics of the Iranian government as mediated
through its emissaries in Beirut are not uncontested. One of
the fierce opponents of the Iranian government’s reconstruction
of a history where Iranians play a role in Islamic history that
is not secondary to the Arab role is the Shi‘i religious scholar
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Spiritual leader of Hizballah until
the mid-1990s, Fadlallah was born into a south Lebanese family
with a strong theological background in the Iraqi shrine city
of Najaf in 1936. He studied with Ayatollah ‘Abd al-Qasim Khu‘i,
head of the Najaf hawza now led by Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali
Sistani, and eventually joined the Da‘wa Party started by Ayatollah
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in the late 1950s. His experiences during
the Lebanese civil war with a Christian militia, who kidnapped
him and destroyed schools for orphans and husseinyyas
(prayer houses and community centers) under his supervision
coupled with the agitation of the new Islamic regime in Iran,
radicalized his views to the point that he suggested an Islamic
republic as the solution to Lebanon’s sectarian strife. Fadlallah
took part in the 1986 conference in Tehran to draft an Islamic
constitution for Lebanon but, in later years, he came to believe
that an Islamic republic in Lebanon was not a realistic goal.
Since 1996,
relations between Fadlallah and Iran have deteriorated due to
differences in opinion over theology and the extent of Iranian
influence over Lebanese Shi‘i affairs. Fadlallah has actively
built a reputation as an authentically Arab marja‘ in
recent years, claiming that Iranians dominate the institution
of the marja‘iyya and suggesting that Iranians indirectly
try to fill marja‘ positions on a “racial” basis. “The
Iranian theologians believe that Iran is the only Shi‘i Islamic
authority,” he has said, “because they consider Iran as the
headquarters of Shi‘i influence. The Iranians believe that all
decisions regarding Shi‘i Islam must come from Iran.”[4] Reversing the equation preferred by the ICC,
Fadlallah states bluntly that:
Arabism
is a human condition, just like Persian nationalism…. Islam
was able to give the Arabs their history…and [by this statement]
we don’t want to erase all [the pre-Islamic] history, but Islam
gave them their history, their culture and their movements and
connected them to the world, just as the Arabs gave Islam a
lot through their efforts. That is why nobody can criticize
the Islamists about their Arabism. We are intertwined with Arabic,
our Prophet was Arab, our language is Arabic, and for this reason
Islam has been able to expand…[and] many non-Arabs entered Arab
history.[5]
Hizballah
also resists Iran’s attempts to act as the Vatican of Shi‘ism,
albeit more subtly. Each year during the Islamic month of Muharram,
a group of 30-40 Iranian preachers (mubalighs) selected
by Iran’s Organization of Islamic Culture and Propaganda come
to preach at various Hizballah-dominated mosques and husseiniyyas
in Lebanon. The ICC takes care of their housing and transport
from and to the airport. These preachers are mainly ‘Ajamis,
Iraqis of Iranian descent who Saddam Hussein’s regime expelled
from Iraq in the 1970s and especially during the Iran-Iraq war.
They are fluent in the Iraqi dialect of Arabic, which is highly
regarded among Lebanese Shi‘a and considered the most “authentic”
dialect for performing the rites of ‘Ashura. The ICC also supervises
the activities of approximately ten mubalighs from Iran
who are permanently stationed in Lebanon (mubaligh-e sabit).
This group is comprised of native Arabic speakers of Lebanese
and Iraqi origin, as well as two native Persian-speaking Iranians.
These preachers are themselves the followers (muqalids)
of Ayatollah Khamenei, and as such preach and convey (tabligh)
his messages.
Hizballah
demands a decrease in the number of these mubalighs,
as they have trained their own preachers. Though the Iranian
Ministry of Guidance realizes its loss of hegemony over Hizballah,
in 2003 the same number of preachers were sent to Lebanon in
disregard of the Lebanese party’s wishes. On the first day of
Muharram, some of these preachers were not welcomed by Hizballah
officials and not admitted into the mosques.
Price
of Solidarity
Hizballah
has hardly spurned its Tehran patrons. However, the party has
grown adept at using marja‘ networks and their economic
backing to help Lebanese Shi‘a to strengthen their position
vis-à-vis the Lebanese state and to present themselves as a
key component of the Lebanese nation. For example, two Iranian
Islamic NGOs active in al-Dahiya, Jihad al-Bina’ (Struggle for
Construction) and al-Imdad (Support) have evolved over the years
from complete dependence on Iran to being de facto Lebanese
organizations.[6]
Even though each of these two NGOs still has close relations
with their Iranian founding organizations, and a portion of
their funding still comes from Iranian sources under the control
of Khamenei, they now generate most of their support locally.
They have also adapted the discourse of poverty and dispossession
prevalent in these NGOs in order to enable Lebanese Shi‘a to
voice their specific needs to the state. These NGOs work to
make Shi‘i refugees aware of the reasons behind their dispossession,
and as a result, many Shi‘a have declared refugee status, which
theoretically entitles them to compensation from the Lebanese
state. Iranian-created NGOs in Lebanon, originally based on
transnational Shi‘i networks, have been domesticated.
In short, the original
financial and logistical backing from Iranian sources and NGOs
has enabled Shi‘is to further integrate into Lebanese society
and politics. Hizballah has become a strong
and equal partner in its political relations with Iran, despite
its submission to the marja‘ Khamenei. Hizballah clearly
draws lines between what it considers the religious and political
spheres and resists the desire of Iranian conservatives to dominate
the party. Hizballah does not accept orders from Iranian leaders,
as is often imagined in the United States and Israel. The conservatives
dominating the Iranian government recognize that to cultivate
long-lasting ties to Hizballah and Lebanese Shi‘a, they need
to bankroll the continuous cultural politics of the ICC in Beirut.
