“We
Invite People to Think the Unthinkable”
An
Interview with Nizar Saghieh
Nizar
Saghieh is a lawyer and a charter member of Hurriyyat
Khassa (Private Liberties), a Lebanese human rights organization
founded on October 1, 2002. He has published widely in Arabic
on such topics as reform of the judicial system and the
memory of war. Sara Scalenghe, a doctoral candidate
in history at Georgetown University, conducted this conversation
with Saghieh by e-mail in February 2004.
| 
Activists
from Hurriyyat Khassa and others stage a "die-in"
in Beirut to protest the impending executions of three
men, January 2004. The executions were Lebanon's first
since 1998. (Joseph Barrak/AFP) |
What
prompted you to found Hurriyyat Khassa, and what are its
goals?
There
was no particular event that inspired our group’s formation.
It was Lebanese socio-political conditions as a whole. Despite
diverse backgrounds, all of our members agree that individuals
should have sovereignty over their private affairs, while
also having access to equal participation in public affairs.
This is called for by the public interest, as well as justice
and reason. However, Hurriyyat Khassa members have
found that the Lebanese regime often systematically aims
for the opposite—to interfere in private affairs while restricting
participation in public affairs. Confessional sentiments
and interests are always used to implement this policy.
(The elaborate system of political power sharing and social
interaction between Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims,
Druze, and other communities is known in Lebanon as the
confessional system.) Therefore, our members include in
the notion of private liberties the freedom of creed and
the freedom not to belong to any confession at all. Hurriyyat
members also lobby for a personal civil status law that
allows people to form bonds outside of confessional constraints.
Such a law would lead to the democratization of the family
and equality of the sexes, decriminalization of homosexuality,
and protection of the rights of sex workers and domestic
workers who are stuck in virtual or actual slavery. Hurriyyat
believes that the current official multi-confessional
lifestyle and political system that is imposed in Lebanon
actually encourages the persistence of sectarianism, threatens
the fulfillment of many individuals and alienates many from
participating in the public sphere. The idea is that advocating
for personal and private liberties—including those that
are in conflict with religious values—would empower dissidence
and weaken confessional affiliation and identity.
Why
would your type of advocacy necessarily lead to broader
political change?
Spinoza
argued that reason remains inefficient vis-à-vis emotions
unless it becomes emotion itself. We believe we can succeed
only by allowing reason to grant legitimacy to non-recognized
emotions, which may then become much stronger than the predominant
community feelings and interests. Our membership includes
independent lawyers, artists and journalists who previously
worked on various human rights issues. Others are leftist
activists belonging to the group Khatt Mubashir. A few identify
themselves as gay and are members of an ad hoc group called
HeLeM (“dream,” in Arabic). We use both reason and emotion
to lobby for various causes, including gay rights. We conduct
research and we hold conferences, but we also produce creative
short films and posters to capture the emotions behind the
issues. Activism and participation in demonstrations are
often as important to us as conferences and research. For
example, on January 16, 2004, Hurriyyat led a sit-in against
the death penalty in front of Parliament. Our researchers
and lawyers took part in an earlier “die-in” covered by
the Lebanese media. But our main focus has been to examine
amendments to the penal code, proposed in November 2002,
which conflict with human dignity. Three main points grabbed
our attention in this pseudo-reform of the penal code: privatization
of the public sphere, increasing interference in private
space and the marginalization of many segments of society.
We organized a very successful conference last May, and
continue to lobby with other NGOs to implement its published
recommendations.
How
is Hurriyyat Khassa involved in promoting the rights of
sexual minorities in Lebanon?
Although
some of our members identify as gays or lesbians and promote
community solidarity, Hurriyyat Khassa’s approach is less
concerned with founding communities upon sexual orientation
than with fighting against exclusion or marginalization.
We address sexuality issues through the wider scope of the
right to human dignity, the right to be different, the right
to decide freely about private affairs, the right to be
fully recognized as an individual and a citizen, and the
freedom of creed. The challenge for us is to put an end
to the social taboo related to homosexuality without being
marginalized or considered extremist. While pursuing this
objective, we always strive to create a forum for discussion
and, in particular, to find appropriate discourse that is
in harmony with the ambient culture. We have learned to
adopt the Trojan horse method—to introduce a socially unaccepted
idea under the umbrella of a socially accepted idea. During
last May’s forum on human dignity in the penal code, for
example, we showed the filmed testimony of a young gay man,
threatened with death by his own family, and claiming his
need for love. Also, we addressed homosexuality in a paper
for a session on marginalized identities that also included
war victims and the poor. Of course, our lawyers do not
hesitate to defend people for practicing homosexuality without
covering it up under another issue. However, it is rare
that we are solicited for such cases, as homosexual practices
are rarely prosecuted by themselves. They are generally
prosecuted when there is some other crime, or the homosexual
act involves a minor, or there are some other special circumstances.
One of the cases we have addressed involved Hizballah, whose
security forces arrested many young men for same-sex sexual
acts in 2003 and delivered them to the Lebanese police.
The men were charged under the current penal code, which
penalizes “unnatural” copulation with up to one year of
imprisonment. They were released shortly afterward and,
as yet, no hearing date has been set. The [May] conference’s
recommendations include the decriminalization of homosexuality
and were adopted by many other human rights organizations.
So we have succeeded in inscribing homosexual rights on
the Lebanese human rights agenda.
How
has the Lebanese government responded to Hurriyyat Khassa?
The
standard response of the government to civil society initiatives
is: no repression, no encouragement, distant monitoring,
no guaranteed rights. Our actual legal status is a “civil
partnership,” almost a research center, so we did not require
any government-issued authorization. Has there been any
attempt to intimidate us or to restrain our activities?
No, although we are openly raising controversial issues
and have many times strongly criticized the government’s
position. Is there, on the other hand, any cooperation or
encouragement? Not really. We have been invited to send
the recommendations of the penal code conference to the
parliamentary committee on human rights and we are expecting
more cooperation from other deputies and committees. We
are often invited by government bodies, such as those working
on children’s rights or AIDS, to attend meetings and so
on. At any rate, one may say that, at this stage of our
development, we are more enthusiastic about finding allies
within civil society, raising awareness in the public sphere,
finding the most convincing language and otherwise building
our capacities. It is too early to appreciate the government’s
willingness to cooperate. In six months, maybe things will
be clearer.
What
about the media and the general public?
The
press is our favorite partner, and has given our activities
extensive coverage. Of course, the extent to which homosexual
issues are tolerated varies from newspaper to newspaper,
and even from journalist to journalist. One time, a major
newspaper published one of our communiqués only after it
had removed our reference to “gay rights.” The same newspaper
refused to publish our communiqué related to the aforementioned
Hizballah incident, for political reasons, I think. Another
time, a female journalist from a minor Lebanese newspaper
asked us to abstain from talking about homosexuality if
we wanted to be covered by her newspaper. Of course, we
refused to comply. I learned afterwards that this journalist,
who had attended the entire penal code forum, had a hard
time with her editor, but in the end she succeeded in publishing
a story on the forum, with a brief reference to homosexual
rights. Access to TV networks is more difficult, though
we managed to get coverage of the forum from some channels.
Also, we were hosted by a morning program for six consecutive
days to talk about the forum. Concerning the public, I think
we have succeeded mightily in breaking the taboo without
being rejected, labeled or considered extremists. In 2002,
we had true difficulty in attracting well-positioned people,
but now Hurriyyat is ranked among the major human rights
organizations in Lebanon. In the beginning, we were bothered
by the fact that once the topic of homosexuality was mentioned
in meetings, it became the sole subject of debate. We have
now learned how to overcome this blockage, in order to keep
the principles or the concept of Hurriyyat Khassa present
in people’s minds. Finally, I think that the public in Lebanon
is more flexible on homosexual issues than is generally
perceived. It is enough to break the taboo in a non-confrontational
manner. One member of the audience at the forum discussions,
in the course of five minutes, renounced many times his
a priori ideas regarding homosexuality in response
to the audience’s reaction. To think the unthinkable—that
is what Hurriyyat invites people to do.
How
do Lebanon’s religious parties and authorities relate to
sexual minorities?
To
define homosexuality legally as an “unnatural act” aims
mainly at giving transcendental basis to its criminalization.
Yet homosexuality is generally only prosecuted in cases
in which it is otherwise morally difficult to mount a defense.
In general, there is a great deal of hypocrisy and denial
about homosexuality in Lebanon. In February-March 2002,
a widespread, baseless rumor about “Satan worshippers” linked
to homosexual practices was given credence by police raids
and never-completed legal proceedings, as well as official
statements. During that period, religious voices took advantage
of the occasion to reiterate their traditional position
against homosexuality. They urged parents to safeguard their
children’s morality against “satanic” bid‘a (new
practices which are contrary to religion) such as homosexuality.
Moreover, the “Committee for the Preservation of Moral Values,”
representing the main recognized sects in Lebanon, used
the word bid‘a to demonize homosexuality and even
civil marriage. This committee is currently preparing draft
essays on “moral values” and lobbying to integrate them
into school curricula. Apart from the aforementioned case,
Hizballah generally avoids social debates even though it
propagates its moral values among its members and supporters.
If
there is a gay subculture in Lebanon, is it limited to the
capital, Beirut?
In
the absence of statistics and real scientific studies, I
can only share my impressions with you. Maybe one can say
that this subculture is being formed and thus presents lots
of uncertainty and contradictions. There are some practices
which vary from one area to the other. Sure, Beirut is more
accustomed to various practices than other areas. Nevertheless,
same-sex practices are widespread and some cities are even
traditionally known for their particular practices. Most
of these practices remain at the stage of behavior, not
lifestyle. They are clandestine and thus marginalized. They
are more widespread among the poor and outside Beirut. As
for the manifestation of homosexuality as an identity, the
predominant model to follow at this stage is the Western
model. In both cases, the people involved are in a state
of rupture with their society, a fact that renders interaction
and communication more difficult.
Do
you mean that “the Western model” is inappropriate within
Lebanese culture?
Hurriyyat
speaks with an Arab voice, as we aim to legitimize homosexual
feelings and relations in the Lebanese context. We believe,
of course, that the homosexual choice responds to human
needs and that, therefore, it has a universal basis. However,
we believe that social recognition requires interaction
between the individual and the society. Such interaction
is more likely to occur if the society recognizes its history
related to homosexuality and the human needs of its citizens,
instead of denying them. Further, the possibility of interaction
presupposes that homosexuals themselves have reached a certain
stage of reconciliation between their sexual identity and
the surrounding culture. Producing literature and art in
Arabic related to homosexuality is an important step towards
reconciling homosexuals with their native language. Also,
the study of actual Arab history—laws, practices, poetry—is
the best way for society, and in particular homosexuals,
to reconcile with the Arab memory regarding homosexuality
and also to find out the rational rules for the present
time. For example, some notions in the Arab legal heritage
may constitute a basis for the right to privacy, such as
the well-known precept “man satar ‘ala muslim satar Allah
‘alayhi” (“whoever keeps confidential information related
to unlawful sexual acts, his/her reputation will be preserved
by God”). At any rate, Hurriyyat always focuses on the public
interest. We try to prove that the criminalization of homosexuality
in Arab history was related to the Islamic regime requirements
(rationalité axiologique, to use Weber’s classification),
and has never been justified by reasons inherent to homosexuality
(rationalité intrinsèque). So, yes, the emerging
Lebanese gay subculture has been influenced by the West
in many ways, through TV, films, the Internet, periodicals,
nightclubs and especially through contact with the Lebanese
diaspora following the civil war. If such influence seems
predominant in homosexual practices and behavior, it is
because it is the only public model for those having such
tendencies. In advocating for legitimacy on the basis of
Arabo-Islamic values and human needs, we hope to render
non-Western models possible, too.
How
does religious sectarianism affect gay identity politics
in Lebanon?
First,
it is well-known that all recognized religions in Lebanon
condemn homosexuality. One may expect, in theory, that this
fact would render homosexuals rebellious against the confessional
system. However, reality seems different—the homosexual’s
confessional identity is still stronger than his/her sexual
identity. The solution to this contradiction is to render
homosexuals more confident in the legitimacy of their sexual
identity or choices. A positive example of solidarity across
sectarian lines is the organization of the families of persons
who “disappeared” during the civil war. Those families,
coming from different sects, have successfully cooperated
since 1983, even during the war. Their love overcame their
communitarian identities. In Hurriyyat, as well as in HeLeM,
there is no room for confessional cleavages. Finally, it
is worth mentioning that the various confessions are unevenly
distributed across economic and geographic divisions. This
implies a certain difference as to the acceptability of
homosexuality in one confession or another.
Do
you mean that gay identity politics are mainly confined
to the (often Western-) educated middle and upper classes?
I think
that the imitation phenomenon in Lebanon—the communication
of new practices and manners—is important and things are
evolving very fast, in particular inside Beirut and its
suburbs. However, while those who identify themselves as
gay people do not belong to one particular social class,
those who assume their sexual identity socially are mostly
from the middle class. Class considerations are also present
in homosexual relationships, in the sense that homosexuals
of different social status are less likely to form relationships.
Is
Hurriyyat Khassa working on AIDS-related issues?
Hurriyyat
works on AIDS issues from a human rights perspective, that
is, we work to institute the necessary legal reforms to
prevent AIDS or discrimination against HIV-positive people.
The institutions working on AIDS always express their unhappiness
about the criminalization of homosexuality which, by virtue
of its targeting of homosexuals, somewhat hinders progress
on AIDS issues. To the best of my knowledge, HeLeM, our
sister organization, is the only organization which is making
the link between the gay community and organizations working
on AIDS. So far, however, HeLeM has not received any funds.
Does
Hurriyyat Khassa cooperate with LGBT rights groups in Europe
and in the US?
So
far, there has been no cooperation with those organizations.
Our current focus in Lebanon is on decriminalizing homosexuality,
while Western gay rights organizations overcame this obstacle
decades ago. Hurriyyat is very concerned with its independence
vis-à-vis all kinds of power, in particular the problem
of donor-driven agendas. That said, we are interested in
building relations based on mutual respect with international
or Western organizations, provided they are also independent
and share Hurriyyat’s main ideas about justice and human
dignity. However, I think that our focus, in the future,
should be to create a network for private liberties in the
Arab world.
