No
Buying Off the Past: Moroccan Indemnities and the Opposition
Susan
Slyomovics
(Susan
Slyomovics, a contributing editor of Middle
East Report, teaches anthropology at MIT.)
From
On affame bien les rats! (Abdelaziz Mouride)
Since
King Mohammed VI ascended the throne in 1999, Morocco has created
various bodies to pay cash awards to Moroccans "disappeared,"
imprisoned or tortured for their political beliefs under the reign
of his king father. But there have been no trials of the jailers
and torturers. Former prisoners continue to resist regime efforts
to "turn the page" on Morocco�s repressive past without
genuine truth and accountability.
International
precedents currently observed involving acknowledgment of state
crimes and abuses, reparations and the use of multinational courts
owe much to the unprecedented legal history of the Nuremberg war
crimes trials and German redress programs to victims of Nazi persecution
after World War II. The Federal Republic of Germany took responsibility
for meeting claims by Jews in a widely publicized speech to the
German parliament by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1951:
Unspeakable
crimes have been committed in the name of the German people calling
for moral and material indemnity, both with regard to the individual
harm done to Jews and to the Jewish property for which no legitimate
individual claimants still exist�. The Federal government is prepared,
jointly with representatives of Jewry and the State of Israel,
which has admitted so many stateless Jewish fugitives, to bring
about a solution of the material indemnity problem, thus easing
the way to the spiritual settlement of infinite suffering.
Policies
enacted were based on sincere government apologies and principles
of restitution interpreted as restoration of actual individual
assets, indemnification in the form of compensatory payments and
reparations defined, in this case, as collective payments from
one state to another: to the Jewish people and eventually to the
state of Israel after its establishment in 1948. German reparations
were called wiedergutmachung -- literally, making good
again. Ways to gauge reparations were based on the quality of
remorse expressed by the perpetrators or, in the case of Germany,
a government that admitted to harm committed in the name of Germany
and that sought to atone for past injustices. Germany is credited
with creating the largest sustained redress program in recorded
history, amounting to more than $60 billion in payments, a landmark
process that set in motion a global legal transformation in how
state abuses may be redressed. The absence of government atonement
and apology, in contrast, is assumed in legal discourse to signal
that a more common legal category is operating, one in which parties
agree to a settlement: one side pays without acknowledging or
apologizing for violating any laws and the other side, the aggrieved
party, receives a cash award.
Moroccan
Indemnities
The post-independence
civil and penal codes of Morocco remain largely French-inspired.
The complex heritage of the Moroccan legal system embraces an
uneasy mix of some, but not all, laws practiced in France at a
particular historical moment, along with decrees and military
emergency laws enacted by French colonial authorities to preserve
French hegemony over Morocco. Examples carried over intact and
"Moroccanized" after independence are codes governing
what was known as libert�s publiques both in France and
under the French Protectorate. In independent Morocco, these became
the laws governing the right to organize and to assemble, and
the right to a free press. Yet after independence, these French
laws were enforced as restrictively as possible and, frequently,
more punitively. The decree (dahir) of July 26, 1939, promulgated
under the French Protectorate, mandated prison terms for making,
distributing or selling tracts to disturb order, tranquility or
security. It continues to be invoked by the Moroccan government
to repress demonstrations and publications. When laws were enacted
declaring the persons of the king and the royal family sacred,
a new category of crimes and attendant punishments added more
names to the growing list of detainees and prisoners in post-colonial
Morocco. [1]
On August
17, 1999, a few weeks after ascending the throne, King Mohammed
VI ordered the Advisory Committee on Human Rights (ACHR) to activate
an independent Indemnity Commission, with a mandate to expire
at midnight December 31, 1999, for the purposes of indemnifying
Moroccans "who suffered moral or physical prejudice as a
result of enforced disappearance or arbitrary detention." [2] The commission began with indemnities (ta'wid),
the typical conclusion of the process for any truth commission.
Indemnity as conceived by ACHR acknowledges implicitly, rather
than explicitly, an official policy of illegal state practices.
If human rights violations are posed in material terms of indemnification,
then acknowledging a claim requesting indemnification becomes
the only way for a victim to be recognized.
Opposition
The Indemnity
Commission has been denounced from a variety of legal, moral and
emotional standpoints: indemnities cannot recompense torture,
there should be no impunity for the perpetrators, the process
is illegal and secret, and the administrators are complicit in
the government�s past abuses. Houria Esslami is the sister of
Mohamed Esslami, a 27 year-old doctor active in politics until
he disappeared on November 29, 1997. She cogently summarizes the
point of view held by many families searching for their disappeared
kin, only to be informed that no human rights organization has
been able to obtain information of their whereabouts. Active in
Moroccan organizations on behalf of families of the disappeared,
Houria opposes indemnities as conceived by the ACHR:
As
the family of a "disappeared," we are against the process
of indemnification for those competent to stand on behalf of the
dead or for the survivors, because indemnification should be the
last stage of this dossier. In the first place, it is necessary
to acknowledge all the disappeared, free those still living, speak
the truth about the reasons for their disappearance and incriminate
those responsible. It is only at that moment that one can speak
about indemnification, which should be equitable and should correspond
to the degree to which we have suffered.
[3]
For complex
personal and emotional reasons, a vocal number of former political
prisoners oppose filing any indemnity applications, although they
endorse familiar international recommendations and remedies. Fatna
Elbouih, a woman political prisoner (1977-1982), refuses to request
money:
Personally,
I don�t want indemnities because it comes from the state. I find
my indemnity elsewhere: in my activities and activism. Financial
indemnities cannot make up for what I lost. I advocate for real
truth and justice to be put in place for all. I personally am
not greatly interested in trials. I can forgive if I know this
will never happen again(la yatakarrar hadha).
[4]
Nor will
Abdelaziz Mouride, a Marxist-Leninist political detainee from
1974-1984, file an indemnity application. He makes clear his opposition
to the corrupt and historically complicit membership of the ACHR.
While incarcerated in Kenitra Central Prison, Mouride smuggled
out of prison a cartoon book that exposed the horrific conditions
produced by Morocco�s repressive police state. [5] In a subsequently redrawn edition of the events
of the notorious 1977 Casablanca trials, Mouride depicts five
judges on the bench fast asleep, snoring loudly (swarms of the
letter z dance around their heads) as verdicts condemning 178
Marxist-Leninist prisoners of conscience to decades in jail are
pronounced. [6]
The tribunal president during Mouride�s trial was Mohammed Afazaz,
whom Mouride�s cartoon book glosses as "today a member of
the Advisory Committee on Human Rights. A minor country judge
before the trial, he has known a murky ascent before becoming
an authority in matters of human rights."
[7]
Opposition
to the Indemnity Commission also comes from Moroccan human rights
lawyers who point to misuses of the legal concept of ta'wid.
Compensation and payment are key terms in contract law, part of
the legal vocabulary for economic disputes involving reimbursement
and arbitration of damages, all of which are regulated by Morocco�s
codes governing obligations and contracts, and which are procedures
that closely conform to French contract laws. As do Articles 77-106
in the Moroccan code concerning contracts, the Indemnity Commission
draws on the term ta'wid and the phrase, those who have
suffered "material and moral damage" (al-darar al-maddi
wa al-ma'nawi), to refer to victims. [8] But use of the same words does
not a shared vocabulary make between the Indemnity Commission
and Moroccan contractual codes; several breaches occur in the
application and arbitration of ta'wid by the ACHR. First,
during arbitration(tahkim) for indemnities as defined
in the Moroccan legal code, the opposing parties designate the
arbiter or arbiters. Under ACHR, members of the Indemnity Commission
are state-appointed; the state, therefore, occupies simultaneously
the position of both judge and interested party. Second, final
judgments in indemnity suits under the Moroccan legal code must
follow Moroccan civil code procedures as set out in Articles 306-327,
by which arbitration cases must be reviewed and controlled by
the president of the Tribunal of First Instance to ensure their
legality with respect to possibilities of recourse. Under ACHR,
there is neither judicial control nor oversight for any Indemnity
Commission ruling. Third, the infamous Article 12 of the ACHR
indemnity protocols requires that each application include a signed
statement that the victim accepts the indemnity amount assigned
by the commission and waives recourse to subsequent civil court
actions. Those who do file with ACHR automatically forfeit the
right to appeal, a right that should be upheld in Morocco following
international norms.
Indemnities
and Islamist Political Prisoners
The activities
of one Islamist group, known as Group 71 -- because 71 were tried
during closed tribunals beginning July 31, 1984 -- are instructively
considered in relation to victim responses to government indemnification.
Group 71 is the first group of Moroccan Islamists arrested and
tried for nonviolent crimes of opinion. Members were charged with
plotting against the regime, attacking the internal security of
the state, hanging banners, holding secret meetings in order to
constitute a group deemed illegal, inscribing graffiti hostile
to the regime on walls, distributing tracts in Morocco, introducing
into France tracts denouncing the monarchy and refusing to denounce
comrades deemed guilty by the state. In 1984, more than 80 trials
for political opinions were held with 1,600 people judged, the
arrests falling as heavily upon the Islamists as on the radical
left, notably Ilal-Amam.
[9]
On December
29, 1999, two days before the deadline date to file for indemnities,
Group 71 collectively decided to present their individual cases
and to disregard the commission format, in particular each refusing
to include the necessary letter accepting the indemnity commission
rulings without recourse to appeal. Instead, each narrated the
litany of arrest, torture, forcible disappearance and illegally
prolonged incommunicado detention, farcical trial, absurdly long
prison sentences, and physical and medical deprivations endured.
Taking the premise that truthful accounts of past criminal behavior
must be aired and the guilty punished, the Islamists of Group
71 are choosing to act as if the Moroccan authorities could and
would be held accountable. If the terms of debate determining
how Moroccan society moves away from dictatorship are framed by
indemnification plans, the Islamists are prepared to engage, even
bureaucratically by filing indemnification files, a government
determined to buy off and bury the past.
The Moroccan
combination of paying reparations to victims while absolving the
guilty redirects our focus to the case of post-war West Germany.
Adenauer, who launched the reparation program, began his new government
in 1949 by dismantling the Allied denazification programs for
Nazi-era crimes. Amnesty programs for those guilty of serious
crimes were created and restitution laws reintegrated hundreds
of thousands of Nazi party members into their former jobs and
professions, including many from the Gestapo and SS who would
then be called "those damaged by denazification."
[10] There are many advantages "to turning the page"
on state crimes, such as the necessity to retain large numbers
of trained civil servants, the impossibility of dismantling a
complicit army and police force, and the need to ensure a stable
monarchy and parliament as these institutions progress toward
economic and political reform. All of these reasons are advanced
by Morocco�s ruling elite. Despite more than 50 years of German
payments, it is not yet possible to gauge the extent of suffering
caused by what the historian Norbert Frei has called Germany�s
post-war self-pardoning and its effect on its victims, or on subsequent
generations. In Morocco, victims are forced to face -- indeed,
they encounter on a daily basis -- perpetrators of torture and
forcible disappearance as judges, governors, bureaucrats, lawyers,
military personnel and police officers.
Indemnities
and Islamic Law
The relationship
to Islamic (and implicitly pre-colonial Berber) practices is brought
to the fore by the commission�s own formulations. The Moroccan
government took pains to endow the Indemnity Commission with Islamic
moral origins, even though "enforced disappearance"
and "arbitrary detention" derive from the vocabulary
of international human rights.
The
issue of enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention is on
its way to a final solution�and after the Council [ACHR] complied
with the royal instructions�. The issue is about the task of the
board of arbitration regarding the award of compensation to those
entitled to it. As a result of the wise policy of the late King
Hassan II, the state was able to heal its wounds by resorting
to the Islamic rule "neither harm nor
injustice." [11]
Morocco introduced
a leading principle of the Maliki school of law -- la darar
wa la dirar (neither harm nor injustice). Sudanese legal scholar
Abdullahi An-Na'im points to the importance of local and Islamic
culture as potential sources inspiring legal norms: For example,
diyah (blood money) emphasizes the consequences of human rights
violations while its specific practices that may deny or diminish
reparative justice to women and minorities need not be invoked. [12i] Unlike the Indemnity Commission, the spirit,
if not the letter of diyah, accords a central role in the
victim�s full acquiescence to the outcome of blood money negotiations,
or in the case of death, the victim�s family determines acceptable
terms of repayment. Not just individuals, but more often the group,
must share responsibility for acts by its individual members.
Although any notion of collective responsibility is rejected by
shari'a, nonetheless local customary law acknowledges in
pecuniary ways that damage has been done to the social collectivity,
and that sanctions emerge from complex and very public negotiations
among perpetrator, victim and their respective families and tribes.
Indemnity
hearings and the distribution of funds are currently underway
in Morocco. Beginning in 1995, survivors of 18 years of disappearance
and incarceration in the notorious Tazmamart prison were accorded
a monthly pension of 5,000 dirhams by the government of King Hassan
II. In 2000, to mark the Moroccan visit of Mary Robinson, then
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, King Mohammed VI bestowed
additional one-time, lump sum payments of one million dirhams
or more.
On December
10, 2002 (International Human Rights Day), King Mohammed VI appointed
former minister of justice Omar Azziman as president and Driss
Benzekri as secretary-general of the ACHR. Benzekri, a political
prisoner (1974-1991) from the outlawed Marxist-Leninist group
Ilal-Amam, completed advanced university degrees in Morocco and
France in Amazigh/Berber linguistics and oral poetry and in human
rights law from Essex University. He was the first president of
the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Equity, a non-governmental organization
established in 1999 by victims of human rights abuses. In a televised
statement, Benzekri noted that the ACHR plans "to adopt mechanisms
in line with global standards of human rights that include civil,
political, economic and social rights."
[13] On November 6, 2003, the ACHR publicly issued a recommendation
(tawsiya) to create an "Instance d�equit� et reconciliation,"
[14] and in conjunction with the 1999 Indemnity Commission,
to reconsider indemnities and to investigate cases of disappearance
and the locations of mass graves. As this issue goes to press,
a year is envisioned to complete the task and "to turn the
page" on Morocco�s past. As in 1999, the new effort excludes
trials.
Diyah
may once have been a public method to end disputes without physical
violence, an effective instrument for the rights of social redress.
For the moment, neither diyah nor the Indemnity Commission�s
ta'wid provides appropriate redress for abuses committed
by the government. Redress to victims of human rights abuses remains
the purview of the ACHR, as does the possibility of establishing
a truth commission.
[1] Article 179, Moroccan Penal Code, calls for one
to five years of prison (and fines from 200 to 1,000 dirhams)
for offenses against the royal family.
[2] See Susan Slyomovics, "A Truth Commission
for Morocco," Middle East Report 218 (Spring 2001).
[3] F�d�ration Internationale des Ligues des Droits
de l'Homme, Rapport: Les disparitions forc�es au Maroc: R�pondre
aux exigencies de v�rit� et de justice 298 (November 2000),
pp.1-115.
[4] Fatna Elbouih, "Human Rights in Morocco,"
lecture delivered at MIT, Cambridge, Massacshusetts, March 13,
2001. Also see "This Time I Choose When to Leave: An Interview
with Fatna Elbouih," Middle East Report 218 (spring
2001).
[5] Rahhal (pseud.), Fi ahsha' baladi (In the
Bowels of My Country) (Paris, 1982); updated edition is Abdelaziz
Mouride, On affame bien les rats [They Starve Rats, Don't
They?] (Paris-Casablanca: Tarik, 2000).
[6] For an account of the 1977 Casablanca trial, see
Comit�s de Lutte contre la R�pression, Le Maroc des proc�s
(Paris, 1977).
[8] Fran�ois-Paul Blanc and Rabha Zeidguy, Dahir
formant Code des obligations et contrats: �dition synoptique franco-arabe
(Casablanca: Sochepress, 1983), pp. 25-37.
[9] Jean-Claude Santucci, "Chronique marocaine,''
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (1985).
[10] Norbert Frei, Adenauer's Germany and the
Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. xi-xv, 303-312.
[11] Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of Communication,
"Achievement of the Human Rights Advisory Committee in Brief,"
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/state_st/human_rights.htm.
[12] Abdullahi An-Na'im, "The Right to Reparation
for Human Rights Violations and Islamic Culture(s)," in Netherlands
Institute of Human Rights, Seminar on the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Amsterdam: SIM Special,
1992), pp. 174-181.
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