Seeking
a "Social Contract for Saudi Arabia
Toby
Jones
(Toby
Jones is a doctoral candidate in history at Stanford University.)
| 
Bird market in
mostly Shi’i town of al-Qatif. (Moulouk Y. Ba-Isa/AP
Photo) |
For
most of its history, the royal family of Saudi Arabia has maintained
public order by exercising absolute, at times brutal, control
over the people of the country. The House of Saud has tolerated
neither resistance nor the questioning of its authority. But in
the mayhem of 2003, with war to the north, terrorist car bombings
in the capital of Riyadh and running gun battles in Mecca and
Medina, something strange is happening in the oil monarchy. In
the spring and summer, several bold groups of Saudi Arabian citizens
pressed the royal family to rescue the country from the forces
crippling it and open up to political reform. This time, Saudi
rulers appear to be listening to, and even encouraging, dialogue.
Has the age of reform dawned at long last in Saudi Arabia?
There
are reasons for optimism. Crown Prince Abdallah's highly publicized
embrace of the various reform groups suggests that, if nothing
else, talking about reform has become a legitimate element of
public life. Editorial pages of Saudi Arabian newspapers openly
call for greater freedoms and debate possible ways to ameliorate
long-standing problems. The new reformers, by aligning themselves
with the regime, have shrewdly maneuvered the royal family into
a stance from which they cannot easily back down. With the requisite
endurance, the reformers may ultimately accomplish their task,
but for now, the reasons for skepticism are abundant and powerful.
There are significant questions about the strength of the social
base supporting the cause of the moderates. Reactionary forces
are on the rise, and power struggles among the royal family continue
to stymie forward motion.
Looming
Disaster
| 
Fireman takes
a nap near site of Riyadh car bombing, May 13, 2003. (Bilal
Qabalan/AFP) |
It
is well-known that the economic, social and political systems
in the kingdom demand urgent overhaul. Saudi Arabian author Turki
al-Hamad recently remarked that "ten, 20 years ago, we had
the luxury of time. We could choose the kind of reform pace we
wanted.... Now, we either reform or collapse."[1] Since the bottom fell out of the oil boom in
the mid-1980s, the strength of the Saudi economy has flagged considerably.
Subsequent shocks to the economy, especially the heavy cost of
subsidizing the 1991 Gulf war, wreaked havoc on an unstable system
almost wholly dependent on the whims of the international oil
market. Rapidly compounding social pressures promise additional
dangers if not remedied soon. Although accurate data is rare,
it is clear that government expenditures outstrip revenues, continuing
a trend toward greater indebtedness begun in the early 1990s.
Most disturbingly, over 40 percent of the budget continues to
be allocated to defense rather than human development or other
more pressing matters.
In
1981, US and Saudi Arabian per capita income levels were equivalent
at roughly $18,000 per year. In the 20 years since, while the
US level has grown to $36,000, the average Saudi Arabian household
income plummeted, now hovering around $7,500. Social services,
including quality health care and reasonably priced housing, have
declined and the Saudi Arabian infrastructure is in a steady state
of decay. The county's population continues to grow at an alarming
pace annually, according to the US Embassy, with the fertility
rate at seven children per female. Predictions suggest that Riyadh
alone, today a city of around 5 million, will reach the 11 million
mark by 2020. The overwhelming majority (figures range between
60-70 percent) of the Saudi Arabian population, which totals around
20 million, is under 25 and unemployed.[2] Considering the country's almost total reliance
on foreign labor, jobs will likely continue to remain in rare
supply. With the state no longer able to subsidize the nation's
welfare, the future looks bleak.
Augmenting
anxieties generated by economic futility and the specter of total
social disarray is the authoritarian regime itself, long at the
vanguard of the world's oppressive governments. Religious minorities
are marginalized. The Shi'a, who live mostly in the oil-rich eastern
province of al-Hasa and make up between 10-20 percent of the population,
have been ruthlessly oppressed. The monarchy's record on women's
rights and most other measures of human rights is worse than abysmal,
as documented by Human Rights Watch, the State Department and
others. Foreign laborers toil in virtual slavery, subordinate
to vague labor laws that allow their unlimited exploitation. Arrest
without formal charge is frequent, the torture of criminal and
political prisoners is common, and due process is mythical. Forced
confessions fill the police records, while capital and corporal
punishments are handed out with frightening regularity. The top-heavy
regime is corrupt and cruel, and maintains domestic order through
fear and the threat of violence.[3]
Demands
for reform of the dysfunctional Saudi system are not without precedent.
In fact, the limited success of the contemporary reform movement
owes much to an earlier generation of political pioneers. An Islamist
social movement, organized throughout the 1980s as a result of
the expansion of religious institutions and the return of the
mujahideen from Afghanistan, erupted in anger in the aftermath
of the 1991 Gulf war. While exasperation with the regime festered
unspoken in the past, the war and the country's reliance on US
soldiers galvanized dissenters who shattered the silence. In addition,
the Islamist opposition movement had finally tired of government
corruption and betrayal of the austere Islamic principles the
Al Saud purported to uphold. Throughout the 1990s, the regime
cracked down on the dissidents, leading some to proclaim their
defeat. As Gwenn Okruhlik has argued, however, while the Islamist
opposition failed to topple the regime, such a yardstick for success
is not wholly appropriate. The Islamists fundamentally altered
the terms of political discourse in the kingdom, forcing the royal
family to take them seriously. Yet even in the new era of discussion
and debate about the nation and the proper relationship between
the state and citizen, the brutal regime endured.[4] What appeared to be significant political compromises,
like the creation of the consultative council and the 1992 Basic
Law, actually enabled the Al Saud to centralize power more completely
and erode already limited political access.[5]
"Better
That It Happen from Above"
In
mid-January 2003, Crown Prince Abdallah, de facto ruler of the
kingdom since his brother King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995,
issued a call for political reform across the Middle East. When
asked about Abdallah's initiative, Mohammed al-Mohaissen, the
secretary for one reform group, replied that "I believe he
is sincere, but for his thoughts to be credible, they must first
be applied in Saudi Arabia." He continued sarcastically that
"I also believe that he has reflected many of our ideas and
so perhaps news of our discussions has already reached him."[6]
It was al-Mohaissen's group, 104 strong, that presented Abdallah
with the first of the year's petitions, called "The Vision"
(al-Ru'ya), later that same month. The letter demanded
sweeping changes. It recommended broad reforms including public
election of the consultative council (Majlis al-Shura), social
justice, civil rights, ending corruption, an independent and reformed
judiciary, the creation of human rights institutions and economic
diversity, as well as freedom of speech, assembly and association.
Emphasizing the Islamic roots of citizenship, the document underscored
that scripture mandates fairness on the part of governments and
that they were bound to consult with the community in "affairs."[7] There were, however, no women signatories
and the demand for women's rights was addressed in vague terms.
The
end of April witnessed the second petition, as 450 Shi'i men and
women signed an ambitious entreaty for reform. As with their predecessors,
the Shi'a emphasized Islamic and national unity as well as explicit
support for the royal family. The document, titled "Partners
in One Nation," expressed solidarity with the January group
in calling for structural change as well as "justice, security,
equality and stability." More importantly, though, they petitioned
for relief from the forces that continue to operate against them
in the country. Urging an end to discrimination and the "fanatical
sectarian tendencies stimulating hatred," the document called
for equal representation of Shi'is in government positions such
as the Majlis al-Shura (of the 120, there are two Shi'i members
at present), the cabinet, diplomatic posts and in military and
security fields. The petition implored the regime to stop "unlawful"
arrests, interrogation, the deprivation of travel, detention at
borders and "the personal frisking associated with insult."
They also demanded educational reform, a national program promoting
tolerance, human rights, intellectual and religious freedom, laws
allowing for the prosecution of hate crimes as well as a public
announcement "by leaders of this country to respect Shi'a
rights in the Kingdom and equality with other citizens."[8]
Finally, the petitioners requested greater freedom for worship
and religious institutions, the right to publish religious books
and the creation of an official government organization to oversee
their religious affairs, as well as the institutionalization of
religious courts with "suitable legal executive power."
Whether
Abdallah had Saudi Arabia in mind or not when he called for regional
reform, he has been accommodating to Saudi Arabian activists,
meeting each group for extended discussion. The crown prince's
willingness to welcome them may have had less to do with the actual
content of their reform agenda than it does with their tone and
timing. While efforts in the past have challenged the royal family,
the 2003 generation has aligned itself with the regime. Hajib
al-Khunayzi, who signed the January letter and attended the first
meeting with Abdallah, remarked in February that "whether
we like it or not, change will come -- from above or below. It's
better that it happen from above."[9] Emphasizing Islamic and national unity, they
have appeal as progressive-moderate Islamic reformers who would
prefer the current regime to a more reactionary alternative. A
decade ago, reformers demanded accountability from the Al Saud.
In 2003, the talk is of the "social contract" and mutual
interests.[10]
Intense
Unease
What
appears to be the melding of mutual interests is more likely a
shared understanding of the precarious positions of both the reformers
and Abdallah at the moment. The September 11 attacks and the revelation
that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabian has generated intense
international scrutiny of the regime, particularly from the United
States. The subsequent war on terrorism has had two visible effects
on politics in Saudi Arabia. First, a deep fear that external
forces threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the country has
taken root, particularly as the US expands its military efforts
globally. Compounding the fear, a cottage industry in the American
media and certain "intellectual" circles has dedicated
itself to Saudi-bashing. While criticism of the royals is clearly
justified, the vituperative tone of much of the maligning has
worked to engender paranoia among ordinary Saudis that the Americans
are coming. The Iraq war exacerbated the intense unease. Turki
al-Hamad captured much of the pre-war sentiment: "Iraq is
just a starting point. Saudi Arabia could be the next target,
since America considers it the cradle of terrorism."[11]
The
war amplified the anxiety, and even fostered unjustified distrust
between Saudi Arabian reformers. In the drive to war, an article
in the Wall Street Journal -- subsequently translated in
Arabic and widely distributed -- suggested that the Shi'a in al-Hasa
would be amenable to separating from the kingdom.[12]
After the article circulated, rumors swirled that "liberating"
the eastern province had in fact become official US policy and
that residents in the predominantly Shi'i areas sought to re-establish
Greater Bahrain, the ancient name for the eastern part of the
peninsula, what is now southern Iraq, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf
island nation.[13]
Shi'a
community leaders scrambled to fend off suggestions that they
intend to join forces with the newly "liberated" Iraqi
Shi'a and that they are partial to other meddling external influences.
Jaafar al-Shayeb, one of the petition's co-authors, declared that
the group's "demands were made toÉclose the door to any outside
party wanting to exert pressure on the kingdom and threaten its
unity."[14]
In fact, it is clear that the Shi'a document in particular is
neither a knee-jerk reaction to the Iraq war nor an attempt to
generate pressure by soliciting outside support. To the contrary,
the petition states that "at this stage, our Arab and Islamic
nation faces the most dangerous challenges. There is a massive
global hostile campaign intending to give a false image about
Islam and Muslims. Additionally, the Zionist crimes were unleashed
in the Palestinian occupied territories, at the time when the
American and British forces started their intensive attack against
Iraq, with no consideration for the Security Council, the United
Nations and worldwide opinion, and they are raising threats to
other Arab and Islamic countries."[15] Additional materials suggest that such sentiments
are more than mere political grandstanding. Summaries of weekly
meetings held for the last three years in Qatif, the largest Shi'i
city in the eastern province, and obtained for this article indicate
that community leaders gathered regularly to discuss local politics,
social issues and their vision of how best to become more, not
less, integrated into Saudi society.[16]
Second,
the horror and magnitude of September 11 forced Abdallah and reform-minded
Saudis to come to terms with the reactionary powers in their midst
and their possible mobilization due to the war on terrorism. Mohammed
al-Mohaissen admitted in an interview with an American journalist
that "[September 11] raised a lot of questions," including
"What was behind it? Who was responsible? The government
realized it must listen to inside voices and find a margin of
freedom for these questions to be discussed."[17] He editorialized before the Iraq war that "current
US military plans have only destabilized societies and strengthened
the hand of reactionary forces in the region." Al-Mohaissen's
fear that the US effort to remake the Arab world would engender
enduring difficulty for domestic activists is powerful. He claimed
that Washington's "attempts to appropriate the goals and
language of our grassroots efforts has set us back considerably
by risking the perception that ours is a movement being imposed
from the outside."[18] His worries about such forces proved prescient
when on May 12, terrorists carried out a deadly assault on American
and Saudi interests in Riyadh.
For
the Shi'a, similar forces operating in the kingdom may have played
a direct role in the timing of their missive. Al-Ahram Weekly,
published in Cairo, reported that their petition "came just
after authorities announced an investigation into a number of
Shiite mosques in the Eastern Province set ablaze in apparent
arson attacks."[19] While it is difficult to verify
the al-Ahram account, it has been widely reported that
several places of worship in the east were attacked days after
the Qatif-based group submitted their petition to Abdallah. Other
instances of sectarian strife have been reported, including physical
violence between Shi'i and Sunni youth as well as the desecration
of a Shi'i cemetery in Annak -- a village south of Qatif near
the Persian Gulf.
The
real power of these reactionary forces is largely unknown. As
the social and economic data mentioned earlier makes clear, there
are material forces leading to despair -- fodder for radical Islamists.
Conversely, the social base supporting reform is also unknown.
The middle class is vanishing, creating a large group of poorer
Saudi Arabians who continue to harbor hopeful expectations with
few real prospects. An alternative clergy, much more radical in
its message and feared by moderates, capitalizes on the resulting
anxiety.[20] Several Saudi Arabians told the author that
the extremists outnumber the more progressive-minded by a wide
margin. The certainty with which individual citizens will attest
to this "fact," even without being able to cite precise
data, makes it a powerful truth whatever the reality. Even after
the May bombings, which did not discriminate among religious or
national groups, we know very little. The government has taken
to speaking about terrorism more openly and claims to be fighting
against the "evildoers."[21] However, there is little consistency
in their position.[22]
The government splashes its claimed victories -- which all happen
to occur when presumed militants crash through police roadblocks
-- across national newspapers, but its war on terrorism raises
more questions than it answers about the extent of the radical
Islamist threat.
Islamic
Unity and the Boundaries of Reform
Fundamental
to the new reform initiative is the principle of Islamic unity.
Theoretically, it is hoped that space will be opened for Saudi
Arabia's diverse population to participate. In the early summer,
the crown prince hosted a gathering of religious leaders from
around the kingdom in Riyadh to promote pluralism. Al-Majalla,
a weekly based in Jidda, called the National Forum for Dialogue
"the first of its kind in Saudi history." The group
included "salafi Hanbalis, Twelver Shi'a (from Qatif,
al-Hasa and Medina), Isma'ili Shi'a (from Najran) as well as representatives
from the Maliki and Shafi'i Sunni schools. To a limited extent,
Sufis were represented."[23] Dialogue focused on a familiar set of progressive themes, especially
defining national unity and the centrality of Islamic law and
the clerics to the process. Other topics included expanding efforts
to oppose forces threatening the "dissolution" of the
nation, promoting diversity of thought, the rights and responsibilities
of women in society, freedom of expression and contemporary religious
rulings (fatawa) -- their connection to social reality
and their effects on national unity and internal cohesion. The
coming together of historically oppressed religious leaders was
hailed by various participants. Abd al-Aziz al-Khadr, an Islamic
journalist and writer, remarked that the meeting represented "a
huge step" in moving past long-standing divisions. Qays bin
Muhammad al-Sheikh Mubarak, professor of jurisprudence at King
Faisal University in al-Hasa, commented that it symbolized a "cornerstone"
in building a national identity.[24]
But
promoting a shared vision for Islamic unity, while also including
room for a plurality of ideas, is a daunting task. Historically,
the official religious authorities in Saudi Arabia have been given
tremendous power in shaping the kingdom's theological orientation
and infrastructure. As is well-known, the "official"
religion of the kingdom is a puritanical variant of Islam deriving
its theology from the fifteenth-century thinker Ibn Taymiyya and
the eighteenth-century preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Historically,
Wahhabis have not welcomed the principle of plurality. As late
as 1991, high-ranking official religious leaders railed against
the Shi'a, for example. That year, Sheikh Abdallah bin Jibrin,
a noted religious scholar, called for their extermination. Although
it has not been reported in the press, in the weeks after the
Shi'a reform group met with Crown Prince Abdallah, a Sunni cleric
in the east reiterated this call, leading predictably to heightened
tension.
The
crisis over Islamic principles transcends sectarian conflict.
The question of who has ultimate authority to define, or even
discuss religion and religious institutions, has played out in
the press, demonstrating the impotence of dialogue alone. On May
27, the Minister of Information unceremoniously fired Jamal Khashoggi
from his post as editor of the "liberal" Saudi newspaper
al-Watan for being critical of powerful religious interests.
Khashoggi had previously written on other progressive reform efforts,
but stood out for his critical handling of the Saudi religious
police (mutawwa'in), officially known as the Commission
for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. In the May
22 edition of al-Watan, he published a controversial piece
critical of Ibn Taymiyya, blasting those responsible for the May
12 bombings and for their corrupted justifications of jihad. In
the editorial, which cost him his job, the former editor wrote
in strikingly similar terms to those discussed just a few weeks
later at the National Forum for Dialogue. Regarding the importance
of protecting the nation, he wrote "the homeland, which we
fear may become a second Algeria, is a million times more precious
and important to us than Ibn Taymiyya."[25]
Later
in the summer, a similar incident occurred. On July 1, Saudi Arabian
columnist Hussein Shobokshi penned an article in which he fantasized
about the liberalization of the kingdom, challenging the stance
of conservatives on women, human rights and sectarian differences.
The public response to the article was mixed. While some found
it courageous, Shoboshki also received death threats. One e-mail
warned him to "know your limits or you will be punished by
God and by his followers on earth." Shobokshi said that the
Crown Prince wrote him remarking that "he liked the article,
but that I shouldn't make so many people angry."[26]
Abdallah's comment hardly reflects a firm stance on the issue
of reform, indicating that he too is unable or unwilling to confront
the reactionary forces operating in the kingdom. The vulnerability
of those challenging the status quo was reconfirmed weeks later
when Shobokshi was quietly fired over the affair. Episodes such
as these raise serious concerns about intra-royal politics and
the familiar gambit of playing rival social and political groups
against one another to forestall challenges to power.
Security
Is Freedom
Whatever
his true intentions, Crown Prince Abdallah does not yet have the
authority to implement the reform agenda. There are other sources
of support for the project in the royal family, but they are limited.
In an article in the London-based, Saudi-funded newspaper al-Sharq
al-Awsat, Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi ambassador to Great
Britain, stated that "reforming the kingdom is not a choice,
it is a necessity." He embellished a bit when he claimed
that "the Saudi leadership has always been at the vanguard
in implementing reforms," and suggested that "we have
become more open and keen on reform after the attacks of September
11 while the US has become more closed."[27]
Even so, his position is on the public record. While some of the
Al Saud do appear to be encouraging progressive change in public,
there are also clear warning signs that meaningful reform will
be sacrificed on the altar of the family's internal power struggle.
One
of Abdallah's chief rivals for power, Prince Nayif, who serves
as Minister of the Interior, head of the intelligence services
and chief of police as well as overseer of the mutawwa'in,
is most active in stalling serious reform efforts. When asked
about the January reform letter, Nayif remarked impatiently, "I
have said it clearly -- no to change, yes to development."
According to Nayif, "change means changing something that
already exists. Whatever exists in the Kingdom is already well-established;
however, there is scope for development -- development that does
not clash with the principles of the nation." He crushed
hopes for the formation of political parties, one of the main
demands of the reformers. "This [system of political parties]
does not exist now. But, as everyone knows, what exists in the
country is something almost like it."[28]
As
head of the various non-military police services, Nayif is principally
concerned with domestic security, a position that grants him tremendous
power. Remarking specifically on the reformers and the issue of
their requests, Nayif argued that since threats to the country's
safety, security and stability have yet to be overcome, "the
current circumstances are not conducive to raising or speaking
about such matters." When probed about the future prospects
for change, he commented that "reforms are going on whether
people ask for them or not. But now we should focus on the current
critical situation around us." Speaking about the threat
of terrorism, he concluded, "every country today is concerned
about coming out of this critical situation with minimum losses.
They don't think about anything else but this painful situation."[29]
The Riyadh bombings, several months later, substantiate Nayif's
comments that there are forces threatening the security and stability
of the kingdom.
It
would be a stretch, however, to conclude that Nayif was seriously
concerned with the extremists in the Saudis' midst. Rather, Nayif
has consistently manipulated his "worries" about security
to maintain a huge intelligence service and project his control
as widely as possible. Before the May attacks, Nayif regularly
remarked that security was tantamount to freedom, although he
never identified specific threats. In fact, it is clear from comments
in the fall of 2002 that Nayif refused to admit that a specific
domestic threat existed. In an interview given to al-Sharq
al-Awsat in late November 2002, Nayif outlined his views about
the national situation. When asked about al-Qaeda sleeper cells,
he proffered that while there were indeed those in Saudi Arabia
who harbored "violent thoughts," they posed no serious
threat because they benignly sought to present "advice to
officialsÉand some demands." Furthermore, "of course
you find discussion by these groups on Internet magazines,"
but they are characterized by "exaggerations and absolute
nonsense." He implied that the seriousness of the threat
is non-existent "as "the positions of these groups are
not consistent with reality" and "those who give voice
to [their positions] are not concerned with accountability because
they do not leave their backsides."[30] Nayif appeared unconcerned that
his comments contradicted his standard refrain that Saudi Arabian
security is constantly under threat. Meanwhile, reforms that might
ameliorate the crises affording the reactionaries their social
base are halted, and more than 30 people died in violent attacks
that the Saudi security forces were either too ill-prepared or
unwilling to handle.
Considering
his public proclamations on security, it would seem that the May
12 bombings would undermine Nayif's credibility and potentially
erode his power. After all, Saudi security forces failed to arrest
a single suspect in the week before the attacks, when the police
discovered their hideout and a huge cache of weapons in the same
part of Riyadh in which the blasts occurred. All the suspects
on that occasion fled into the night, while the police refused
to pursue. Instead, the inverse is true. Saudi Arabians on the
street now speak of the urgent need for security and that change
should not come at the expense of stability. In spite of his penchant
for assuming contradictory positions simultaneously, Nayif has
shaped the current national discourse on which is more urgent
-- reform or security. Even Abdallah has fallen into line. In
early August the Crown Prince announced on Saudi television the
establishment of the Center for National Dialogue in Riyadh, one
of the steps called by participants in the National Forum for
Dialogue. According to the Arab News, the center's opening
represented "a further step toward fostering a national dialogue
between people who hold different views."[31]
Yet Abdallah's vague remarks diminished the significance of pluralism,
let alone reform, focusing instead on the need for national unity
in the face of the threat to security. "The responsible expression
of opinion," he commented, "will have an impact on the
fight against extremism and provide an atmosphere where considered
views and new ideas that reject terrorism and extremist thought
can emerge." That the militants can best be combated through
structural and political change -- the message of the reformers
-- is being ignored.
It
is difficult to say what will happen if the powers that be continue
to drag their heels on the reform agenda. For now, the reformers
are not speaking publicly about the consequences of inaction.
Jaafar al-Shayeb is no doubt close to the mark, however, when
he says "I think that the time is right forÉseriously treating
the [reform] issue with absolute devotion to unifying the nation
and its security, rather than leaving it [so that] it becomes
critical and danger arises and transforms into a social dilemma
we cannot control."[32]
