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Arabs,
Race and the Post-September 11 National Security State
Salah D. Hassan

Six
of eight immigrants detained post-September 11 in Evansville,
Indiana. (Denny Simmons/Evansville Courier and Press) |
In
the face of a post-September 11 wave of racially motivated attacks
against people from the Middle East and South Asia, the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division announced in a September 13,
2001 press release that "any threats of violence or discrimination
against Arab or Muslim Americans or Americans of South Asian descent
are not just wrong and un-American, but also are unlawful and will
be treated as such." To demonstrate further the administration's
sensitivity to attacks on Muslims, George W. Bush visited the Islamic
Center of Washington, DC on September 17. Shortly thereafter a resolution
was passed by Congress "condemning bigotry and violence against
Arab-Americans, American Muslims and Americans from South Asia in
the wake of terrorist attacks in New York and Washington."
Some Arab-American advocacy groups have applauded the Bush administration's
rhetorical opposition to the disturbing backlash against Arabs and
Muslims. The director of the Arab American Institute, James Zogby,
stated that "the president saved lives by speaking out against
anti-Arab and anti-Muslim violence." Zogby goes on to claim:
"There is no question the collective effort of the national
leadership stopped hate crimes in their tracks, changed the national
discourse and brought out our better angels. I will never forget
what [Bush] did."(1)
Despite the
enthusiasm of Zogby and other Arab and Muslim Americans for the
administration's response, the "national security" measures
undertaken during the last 12 months by the Justice Department have
targeted almost exclusively people from the Middle East and South
Asia, and led to the incarceration, deportation and interrogation
of numerous individuals who had nothing to do with September 11.
In other words, the imposition of the rule of law on behalf of Arabs
and Muslims coincided with an aggressive Justice Department attack
on people from the Middle East and South Asia. Even if the administration
deserves some credit for opposing individual acts of racial violence
against Middle Easterners and South Asians, its present treatment
of Arab and South Asian immigrants amounts to a legal assault based
largely on an unstated policy of racial profiling.
Racial profiling,
according to David Harris, author of Profiles in Injustice,
uses "race or ethnic appearance as a broad predictor of who
is involved in a crime or terrorism." As a de facto
policy, racial profiling dismisses the legal principles of "innocent
until proven guilty" and "preponderance of evidence,"
and instead relies on "probable cause," "reasonable
suspicion" and, perhaps most importantly, "compelling
interest" to justify arbitrary interrogations and detentions.
In effect, racial profiling constitutes the criminalization of entire
groups within the US. Racial profiling is the domestic counterpart
of Bush's new foreign policy based on preemptive strikes: profiling
and preemption work together to define the human targets of the
"war on terror." Objectionable on legal and political
grounds, racial profiling of Arabs and others from the Middle East
is also a particularly imprecise law enforcement mechanism given
the tendency in the US to confuse and collapse Arabs and Muslims
into one category, or to misidentify South Asians, Latinos, Africans
and others as Arab Muslims. In the case of Arabs, racial profiling
is premised on equating an "Arab-looking" person with
terrorism. This equation conditions the October 2001 USA PATRIOT
Act, which grants US law enforcement and intelligence authorities
unprecedented surveillance and investigative powers.
A New
Exclusion Act
Since September
11, many Arab and Muslim immigrants have faced dire prospects of
detention, secret trial, deportation and what is now beginning to
look more and more like a new exclusion act aimed at impeding the
immigration of people from the Middle East. The Justice Department
announced on August 12 its intention to implement the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) on September 11, 2002. The
system involves the fingerprinting of "high-risk" foreign
visitors. In addition, the program will require targeted foreign
nationals to register their residence with authorities and to confirm
their exit. According to a Justice Department statement, foreigners
"will be selected according to intelligence criteria reflecting
patterns of terrorist organizations' activities." But the system
will begin by tracking "all nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Sudan and Syria," though no nationals from these countries
were involved in the September 11 hijackings. In addition, the system
will tag for fingerprinting any "non-immigrant aliens whom
the State Department determines to present an elevated national
security risk, based on criteria reflecting current intelligence"
as well as aliens "identified by INS inspectors at the port
of entry, using similar criteria." The ultimate design of the
system is to create an enormous database of foreign visitors that
can be used to track and locate "terrorist suspects."
Rather than relying on "intelligence criteria," NSEERS
will generate intelligence to facilitate the detention and deportation
of certain visitors and immigrants.
The National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System is the most recent component
of the police action launched by the Justice Department and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) against Middle Easterners,
which began with a campaign of secret detentions of immigrants,
mostly Arabs and South Asians. By November 5, 2001, the Justice
Department had, according to its own count, detained 1,182 persons,
but detentions continued after November 5. An INS statement issued
in mid-June claimed that 751 persons were detained on immigration
charges, and have been deported. An additional 74 remain in custody
for alleged immigration violations. There have been 129 federally
charged detainees, of which 73 were still in custody in mid-June.
An untold number of people defined as material witnesses are still
detained. Attorney General John Ashcroft has refused to release
the total number of detainees, the names of the detainees or the
location of their detentions.
Detainees subsequently
released have complained of solitary confinement, restrictive ankle
and wrist restraints and lack of physical activity. The INS arrested
and subsequently deported many immigrants because they had apparently
failed to submit change of address forms in the allotted period
of time. But the Washington Post reported on August 3 that
more than 2 million documents filed by foreigners, including 200,000
change of address notices, are sitting in a warehouse awaiting processing.
Many immigrant advocates believe that some detainees caught in the
post-September 11 dragnet had in fact submitted their forms on time
and were removed from the US illegally.
The Center
for National Security Studies, the American Civil Liberties Union
and 21 other organizations, including the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee and the Arab-American Institute, have challenged the legality
of Attorney General John Ashcroft's secret detentions and are seeking
a court order for the release of all information on the detainees
connected to September 11 events. On August 2, 2002, District Court
Judge Gladys Kessler ordered the Justice Department to make public
the names of the detainees and their lawyers, but on August 15,
the same judge granted a stay while the government appeals the decision.
A good number
of the detainees being held on immigration violations have been
awaiting deportation -- including two of the known Arab detainees,
Rabih Haddad, a Lebanese citizen living in Ann Arbor, Michigan,
and Mazen al-Najjar, a Palestinian who formerly resided in Tampa,
Florida. Both worked with Islamic organizations and both were detained
without charge in the sweep after September 11. Both have been subject
to secret deportation trials. Though a Federal appeals court has
ordered that the courts open the deportation hearings to the public,
notably with regard to Haddad's case, the Justice Department continues
to insist on the need for secrecy.(2)
Al-Najjar's
case reveals the continuity between pre- and post-September 11 treatment
of Arab Muslims in the US. He was first detained in 1997 and held
without trial on the basis of secret evidence until December 2000,
when he was released following a court order. He was arrested again,
according to a Justice Department press release, on the grounds
that "he violated his visa and was ineligible for any form
of relief from deportation." The government claimed that al-Najjar
"had established ties to terrorist organizations and held leadership
positions in the Tampa-based Islamic Concern Project (ICP) and the
World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE)." But the judge who
ordered al-Najjar's release in 2000 found that "WISE was a
reputable and scholarly research center and the ICP was highly regarded."
The judge also asserted "that there are not�bonafide reasons
to conclude that [al-Najjar] is a threat to national security."
Since al-Najjar is a stateless Palestinian, no country was willing
to accept him, leaving him to languish in a cell while his family
seeks to obtain for him a travel document and visa. Bahrain finally
accepted al-Najjar, then turned him away, leaving a US Customs plane
to dump al-Najjar in Beirut without the approval of Lebanese officials.
While al-Najjar is no longer in jail and his deportation order was
based solely on a minor visa violation, government authorities are
still labeling him a terrorist.
Ashcroft's
initial dragnet was followed by plans to deport some 6,000 Middle
Easterners who have violated the terms of their visas. It has become
increasingly evident that the Justice Department and the INS intend
to use September 11 as a pretext to crack down on immigrants in
general and specifically to reduce the number of Arabs and Muslims
residing in the US. These policies are supported by the conservative
Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), which published a report in
May 2002 titled "The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists
Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001." While
the report focuses mostly on Arab immigrants, it recommends a reduction
in overall immigration. The Bush administration has seized on September
11 to reinforce US borders and scapegoat immigrants in a period
of unprecedented growth of the immigrant population.
Arabs,
Race and the Law
Arabs and Muslims
who are citizens have been less directly affected by the anti-terrorism
measures, but they too have been subject to blanket suspicion and
racial profiling and have reason to be concerned that these practices
could intensify. Bush's controversial appointee to the US Civil
Rights Commission, Peter Kirsanow, stated in public that "if
there's another attack by Arabs on US soil, 'not many people will
be crying in their beer if there are more detentions, more stops,
more profiling.'"(3)
Ashcroft has
ominously suggested that it might be necessary to establish camps
for US citizens designated as "enemy combatants," an idea
that found expression in the 1998 film The Siege. In spite
of the apparent racial blindness of the term "enemy combatant,"
it would appear, judging from the contrasting treatments of John
Walker Lindh and Yasser Hamdi, that a perceived racial difference
is a significant criterion in defining "enemy combatant."
As noted by legal scholar Jonathan Turley in the Los Angeles
Times, "Hamdi has been held without charge, even though
the facts of his case are virtually identical to those of the case
of John Walker Lindh. Both Hamdi and Lindh were captured in Afghanistan
as foot soldiers in the Taliban units. Yet Lindh was given a lawyer
and a trial, while Hamdi rots in a floating Navy brig in Norfolk."
Enemy combatant and terrorist operate along the same rhetorical
register and are virtually synonymous -- the main difference being
that the former is also applied to non-white US citizens (like Hamdi,
but also Jos� Padilla), while the latter is primarily reserved for
foreign Middle Easterners.
Although Arabs
and other people from the Middle East are classified racially as
white according to the US Census and most affirmative action forms,
since the 1960s, the US government has unofficially constituted
them as a distinct racial group by associating Arabs with terrorism
and threats to national security. Unlike other racial constructs,
such as blackness or Asian-ness, which are defined officially in
opposition to whiteness, the contemporary racialization of Arabs
appears to be linked to US foreign policy in the Middle East and
its translation into the domestic context. US support of Israel
and its occupation of Arab lands casts a shadow upon Arab-Americans,
who are treated as perpetual foreigners and denied the rights of
other citizens and immigrants.
The secret
evidence trials of the 1980s and 1990s illustrated perfectly how
a distinct system of justice was used prior to September 11 to deal
with Arabs.(4) Secret evidence trials prior
to September 11, most infamously that of the Los Angeles Eight,
which continues to this day, have concerned Arabs or individuals
associated with Arabs accused of links to terrorism. Linguistic,
religious and "ethnic" differences play a part in the
racialization of Arabs, but the hatred, suspicion and unequal treatment
of Arabs by the justice system is more significantly tied to the
perception that "they" are foreign enemies of the US.
On this basis, they have been denied equal rights before the law.
Ironically, the official classification of Arabs as white emerged
from a series of court decisions in the first half of the twentieth
century, in which immigrants from "Syria" and "Arabia"
sought citizenship rights. The so-called prerequisite court cases
reveal both the emptiness of racial categories and the uneasiness
caused by an Arab presence in the US.
The
Arab Prerequisite Cases
In December
1913, Faras Shahid, a 59 year-old immigrant "born at Zahle,
in Asia Minor, Syria" who had resided in the US for 11 years,
went before a court in South Carolina to establish his right to
naturalization. Presiding Judge Smith denied Shahid's application
because, according to the court, the applicant did not meet the
racial prerequisites for citizenship established in the 1790 Naturalization
Act. This act limited citizenship to "free white persons."
Judge Smith argued in his decision that the words "free white
persons" "mean persons as then understood to be of European
habitancy or descent."(5)
Several months
later, in a February 1914 hearing for George Dow, another "Syrian"
immigrant residing in the US, Judge Smith reiterated his decision
that "Syrians" are not entitled to citizenship because
they do not meet the prerequisite of whiteness. Again, in an April
1914 rehearing brought before the same district court by Dow's lawyer
and the Syrian American Association, Judge Smith restated with greater
elaboration his argument that "Syrians are not white."
Judge Smith went to substantial length in his Dow decisions to refute
definitions of whiteness based on physical appearance, as well as
linguistic and ethnographic racial classifications. Rather he asserted
that "[t]he test becomes mainly one of geography" and
that in the case of Dow "the applicant was excluded because
he was an Asiatic and not an European."(6)
Judge Smith's
attempts to limit the definition of "white persons" and
reinforce the exclusionary character of US citizenship law was completely
antithetical to the decisions of three other Federal courts that
in 1909 and 1910 had granted the right to naturalization to "Syrians"
on the grounds that they fall within "the classification of
the white or Caucasian race." In the important 1909 case of
George Najour, which came before a Georgia District Court, Judge
Newman wrote in his decision that "I consider the Syrians as
belonging to what we recognize, and what the world recognizes, as
the white race."(7) While Dow took
his case to the Fourth Circuit Court in 1915 and succeeded in establishing
the legal precedent that "Syrians" meet the racial prerequisite
for naturalization, the logic of Judge Newman's decision in the
Najour case was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1923. The split
in the courts persisted even as the cases made their way up the
judicial ladder, revealing both the ambiguous position of "Syrians"
within the US racial system and also the legal construction of racial
categories.
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Protesters
march across the Brooklyn Bridge, April 6, 2002. (J. Stephen
Moses/AP Photo) |
The Nationality
Act of 1940 updated the statute on naturalization, but did little
to overcome the problems of racial categories, as the statute retained
the prerequisite of whiteness. Congress still bestowed upon the
courts the power to determine an individual's race and his or her
right to US citizenship. A set of cases in the 1940s concerning
applications for naturalization submitted by immigrants from the
Arabian Peninsula illustrate the continuing confusion in the court's
treatment of Arabs. Ahmed Hassan presented in 1942 his case for
naturalization to the Eastern District Court in Michigan. Judge
Tuttle describes Hassan in his decision as "an Arab, being
a native of Yemen, located in the southwestern part of the Arabian
peninsula. Petitioner was before the court and his skin was undisputedly
dark brown in color." Citing several decisions that followed
Judge Smith's argument in the Dow case, Judge Tuttle claimed that
"Arabs as a class are not white and therefore not eligible
for citizenship." The judge also noted that "[a]part from
the dark skin of the Arabs, it is well known that they are a part
of the Mohammedan world and that a wide gulf separates their culture
from that of the predominantly Christian peoples of Europe."(8)
Religious differences
were not relevant in the earlier cases of Shahid and Dow, as both
were Christians. In fact, Dow attempted to use religious similarities
to challenge the exclusionary logic of the court, and asserted in
his petition that according to Judge Smith's definition of whiteness,
not even Jesus would be eligible for naturalization in the US. Despite
their knowledge of the historical linkages between the eastern Mediterranean
and Europe, Judge Smith and subsequently Judge Tuttle dismissed
the suggestion that Europeans shared anything in common with "Syrians,"
"Arabs" and others classified as non-white. Conversely,
in a 1944 decision concerning the petition of Mohamed Mohriez, "an
Arab born in Sanhy, Badan, Arabia," who was admitted to the
US as a permanent resident in 1921, Massachusetts District Judge
Wyzanski wrote that "the Arab people stand as one of the chief
channels by which the traditions of white Europeans, especially
the ancient Greek traditions, have been carried into the present."(9)
Judge Wyzanski's decision to grant Mohriez's petition for citizenship
was supported by the INS, which had published an article in October
1943 entitled "The Eligibility of Arabs for Naturalization."
Undoing
Racial Categories
In the years
from the 1940s to the present, the official position of the US Census
Bureau has been that Arab-Americans were to be treated like Italian-Americans,
Greek-Americans and some other European immigrant communities. The
manual of the 1960 census instructed enumerators to classify "Southern
European and Near Eastern nationalities" as white. In contrast,
"Asian Indians were to be classified as 'other,' and Hindu
written in."(10) The 1980 census,
however, listed Asian Indian as a separate category along with 14
other racial designations. That same year, the Census Bureau included
a specific question for persons of "Spanish/Hispanic origin
or descent," which included the categories Mexican, Mexican-American,
Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban and other Spanish/Hispanic. These shifts
in racial classifications have resulted in part from political pressure
exerted by Latinos and South Asians, but the changes also correspond
to increasing efforts of the US government to gather more specific
data on "non-white" immigrants to the US.
Despite their
official classification as white, Arabs have routinely been subject
to forms of racism experienced by blacks, Asians and Latinos. This
contradiction underscores the impossible position of the Arab minority,
as it seeks to obtain equal political and legal rights in the US.
Positioned awkwardly within the category of whiteness, but subject
to racial profiling and racist cultural stereotyping, Arabs are
denied the rights of other recognized minorities and excluded from
the racial privileges of the white majority. In the 1990s, some
Arabs in the US undertook an initiative that sought to pressure
the Census Bureau into recognizing their position as a minority.
In a sense, this initiative aimed to reverse the legal struggle
of Arabs during the first half of the twentieth century without
sacrificing gains in the area of citizenship rights. Efforts to
reclassify Arabs outside the "white" category respond
in a belated manner to the increased recognition of minority groups
in the post-civil rights era. Helen Samhan, executive director of
the Arab American Institute, maintains that "it is important
to research the compelling reasons for supporting the official minority
status and the drawbacks for the constituency [Arab-Americans],
for other minorities and for the society."(11)
The proposal
to create a new minority category is grounded in the assumption
that the position of Arabs within the political system will be enhanced
if they are so classified. It may be, however, that Arabs and others
from the Middle East will simply secure an official position within
the racial hierarchy that corresponds more accurately with their
second-class status. In the present climate, one of the significant
risks of elaborating a Middle East minority category is the possible
convergence of ethnic classification and racial profiling. Moreover,
as a number of critics of the census have noted, official classifications
are one of the principal mechanisms that the state uses to manage
minorities.
The contradiction
that arises from the classification of Arabs as "white,"
on one hand, and the racialist and racist treatment of Arabs by
various state agencies, on the other, has assumed increased significance
since the events of September 11, 2001 and the beginning of
the "war on terrorism." According to unofficial statistics,
the Arab population now approaches 3 million, but the report of
the 2000 census claims that there are only 1.25 million people of
Arab ancestry presently residing in the US. Whether 1.25 million
or 3 million, the relatively small size of the Arab-American population
continues to constitute a major challenge to US racial thinking.
There is now an urgent and growing need to question the conceptual
scheme through which the US government understands its Arab minority
population and to resist all instruments of "racial" categorization
that facilitate policies of racial profiling.
Endnotes
1 "Arab-American
in Chief," The National Review, March 25, 2002.
2 New
York Times, August 27, 2002.
3 Detroit
Free Press, July 20, 2002.
4 Jeanne
Butterfield, "Do Immigrants Have First Amendment Rights?"
Middle East Report 212 (Fall 1999).
5 Ex
parte Shahid 205 F.812 [E.D.S.C. 1913].
6 Ex
parte Dow 211 F.486 [E.D.S.C. 1914] and In re Dow 213 F. 355
[E.D.S.C. 1914].
7 In
re Najour 174 F.735 [N.D. GA 1909].
8 In
re Ahmed Hassan 48 F.Supp. 941 [E.D.Mich. 1942].
9 Ex
parte Mohriez 54 F.Supp. 941 [D. Mass. 1944].
10 Also,
"Puerto Ricans, Mexicans or other persons of Latin descent
would be classified as 'white' unless they were definitely Negro,
Indian or some other race." 200 Years of US Census Taking:
Population and Housing Questions (Washington, DC: Bureau of
the Census, 1989), p. 78.
11 Helen
Samhan, "Not Quite White," accessible online at www.aaiusa.org/arabamericans/helen3.html
on [1998].
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