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Shaky De Facto Kurdistan
David Aquila
Lawrence
(David Aquila
Lawrence is a freelance journalist based in Maine. He has covered
Latin America and the Middle East for the Christian Science Monitor,
National Public Radio and the Los Angeles Times.)
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Rebuilding
Halabja, March 2000. (David Aquila Lawrence)
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Surrounded
by four states that do not wish it well, officially embargoed, still
divided by internal conflicts, Iraqi Kurdistan hasn't had it this
good for years. Paradoxically, Kurds in northern Iraq are hoping
everything stays exactly the way it is.
"If the
government comes back we lose everything," says 35-year old
farmer Chasim Abdullah Azi. Azi leans his wooden-stock Kalashnikov
in the corner of his hut, taking off his shoes for tea. He needs
the gun to protect the sheep, he says. "My kids are small so
they don't know."
What the children
don't know is that this mud brick village of 48 families, like the
rest of Iraqi Kurdistan, are officially still ruled by Saddam Hussein's
regime. Here in Dal da Ghan, the elementary school begins each day
with the national anthem of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
The children study Kurdish textbooks printed in Erbil, and they're
too young to remember when their fathers were soldiers in the Kurdish
resistance.
During the
Iraqi Anfal campaign about 4000 villages like this one were forcibly
depopulated, burned to the ground and dynamited by government troops.
In some cases soldiers burned down the trees, and relocated the
inhabitants to camps away from the borders with Iran and Turkey.
You can still see the ruins of village after village along the highways.
Dal da Ghan itself was destroyed in 1987.
The reconstruction
of Dal da Ghan is part of a virtual UN welfare state in northern
Iraq. Over the last few years the UN Habitat program scouted out
villagers who were willing to return. The program spent about US
$24,000 to provide the village with materiel to build houses, schools,
roads and water facilities. Though the recent drought appears to
have broken, Azi says, "Without the food ration, we would be
starving."
On the UN
Dole
By far the
most important factor in Kurdish prosperity is the much-maligned
UN Security Council resolution 986, known as "Oil-for-Food."
The studies that show devastation in the Government of Iraq's (GOI)
area show that indices of human welfare are improving slightly in
the north. The US State Department and both major Kurdish parties
claim that this prosperity proves that 986, when administered by
the UN as it is in the north, is adequate. The health problems in
the GOI areas, they say, prove that Saddam Hussein is impounding
food and medicine to manipulate world opinion. UN officials offer
a different explanation.
George Somerwill,
spokesman for the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq
(UNOCHI), breaks down the numbers to explain the disparity. The
three Kurdish provinces contain 13 percent of Iraq's population;
therefore they receive 13 percent of the supplies that enter under
Oil-for-Food, right off the top. Then war reparations at 30 percent
and UN operational costs at 3 percent are deducted. The GOI areas--home
to 87 percent of the population--end up living off only about 54
percent of the food and medicine. Somerwill says that the government
has not been obstructing food deliveries, though there is little
doubt that Hussein diverts all of his black market money for personal
security. ("What the hell did they expect him to do?"
asked one UN worker.)
Since 1991,
international NGOs have been contributing to the welfare of the
Kurds, without the permission of the Iraqi government. They are
reluctant to be identified by name, having already once fled an
Iraqi government offensive in 1996. The NGO contribution aims to
complement 986--one aid worker pegged it at around US $20 million
per year. NGOs also have targeted areas like literacy and building
community organizations that 986 does not address. A group of major
NGOs working in the north recently signed on to a letter protesting
the sanctions, and also the culture of dependency being created
by the UN program.
Black Market
Share
The oil traded
for food is not the only oil leaving Iraq. The embargo has turned
the Ibrahim al-Khalil crossing on the Turkish border into the most
lucrative smuggling route in the region. The route offers a direct
line to the huge economy of Turkey, and is tacitly blessed by the
US and UK, who don't mention it in their regular briefings on the
Iraqi regime's sanctions-busting. The US knows that black-market
trade placates Turkey, which lost Iraq as a trading partner when
it joined the Gulf war coalition. Washington needs Turkey's Incirlik
airbase to continue patrolling the no-flight zones.
Black market
revenues are hard to estimate and it is unclear if profits trickle
down to most Kurds. New villas and even a giant supermarket spring
up in Dohuk, while tens of thousands still live in shanty towns
and camps. The oil revenues are also the main focus of disagreements
between the two Kurdish political parties.
Everyone agrees
that the KDP, led by Masoud Barzani, is making a killing off the
Ibrahim al-Khalil crossing. That revenue has been a perennial excuse
for hostilities between the KDP and its rival, the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani. Talabani currently claims
that the KDP is making over a million dollars a day on transit fees
from the oil going out and the consumer goods coming in. Both parties
keep in constant contact with their neighboring states, and the
US and Baghdad switch alignments when the moment suits them.
The latest
round of shooting began in late 1993, as small political and land
disputes rapidly escalated. Both sides claim that the other side
resorted to military action to head off defeat in parliament. The
resulting war caused thousands of casualties. Talabani was heavily
backed by Iran, and the KDP alleged that the PUK was moving through
Iran to attack behind their lines. Backed into a corner, Barzani
reached out to the Iraqi regime in 1996. "There was unfortunately
a union of contradiction between us and the Iraqis," says the
KDP's heir apparent, Nichervan Barzani.
The shooting
war continued until 1998 when an agreement in Washington mandated
normalization between the PUK and KDP, and preparations for elections.
To please Turkey, the two groups agreed to deny safe haven to the
PKK. They also agreed neither would engage nor invite the Iraqi
army. "I suppose the invite was for the KDP, the engage was
for the PUK," quips Talabani.
There are signs
of a thaw beyond the ceasefire. Prisoner exchanges took place in
April. Attacks in the press have also decreased, and it is hard
to get the two parties' leaders to impugn each other. "I don't
want to talk about the past because right now we are getting closer,"
says Talabani. "We're having high-level meetings once or twice
a week."
But huge hurdles
remain. The revenue sharing question still causes bitterness, and
PUK officials still complain that the KDP is cheating them. Barzani
retorts that large sums of money were delivered to the PUK last
fall. Soon after, he says, Talabani declared himself president of
Kurdistan in an interview with foreign journalists, and began setting
up a separate legal system in the PUK area. "Literally, he
has settled the outcome of the election beforehand," says Barzani.
Water Parks
and Refugee Camps
There is a
festive mood in PUK-controlled Sulaymaniyya. University students
mill about the campus studying for exams. Shoppers fill the main
boulevards. A water park, complete with toy motor boats, refreshment
stands and a well-kept zoo, is packed with people.
Sulaymaniyya
shows many signs of the pluralism which the Kurds say they represent.
Serious political actors, such as the Communist party and the Islamic
party which currently controls the town of Halabja, criticize the
PUK openly. While in the KDP territory every portrait of Hussein
has been replaced by one of Masoud Barzani; there are few portraits
here at all. NGO observers were impressed by the turnout and transparency
of municipal elections held in February, though the PUK won heavily
as predicted. Talabani realizes the credibility these elections
gained him. He also knows that Barzani's brief alliance with Hussein
cost him politically.
Just a few
miles outside Sulaymaniyya live thousands of the greatest obstacles
to normalization between the KDP and PUK. In makeshift tents, with
open pits for waste disposal, displaced Kurdish families, or fractions
of families, survive on UN rations. This particular camp is called
New Kirkuk, because people thrown out of Kirkuk by the Iraqi army
arrive by the dozens almost every day. "I prefer to live here,
because there is freedom," says one refugee, Sabria Mahmuda,
38, who was detained for a month in an Iraqi jail before her deportation
from Kirkuk, "but someday I'd like to return."
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Kurdish
refugee camp in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf
war. (Jasper Young/Panos Pictures)
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About 900,000
internal refugees--as much as a third of the region's population--are
scattered across Iraqi Kurdistan. Some of them have been displaced
several times in the last twenty years by violence between the Kurds
here and in Turkey. Some are unable to return home because the soil
is still strewn with landmines. About 200 people each month are
killed or maimed by mines, according to the UN de-miners. Some have
family members who are soldiers for one side or the other and are
stuck on the wrong side of the ceasefire line.
The refugees
streaming in from Kirkuk are a grim reminder to the Kurds that the
Iraqi army is still on the job (though soldiers are so poorly paid
they sometimes sell their guns to the Kurdish border guards). While
some have predicted the decline of the Kirkuk oil field, it still
produces around 40 percent of Iraq's 986 oil. The Iraqi government
appears to be continuing its campaign to make Kirkuk into an Arab
city.
Shaky Foundations
A few miles
in the other direction stands the only oil refinery in Kurdistan,
possibly the biggest symbol of autonomy. Kurdistan also now has
its own currency, its own telecommunications system, and Kurdistan
even switched to daylight savings time, making it one hour ahead
of Baghdad. The Kurdish troops at the border controls wear brand-new
uniforms. The Kurds are showing so much independence that, on a
recent diplomatic visit to Turkey, Nichervan Barzani was told to
stop acting like a head of state.
"We understand
their concerns," says Barzani, "We reassured them that
our policy has not changed. We have no intention of establishing
a Kurdish state." But the Turkish request underscores the sensitivities
of the region. Turkey and Iran are wary of an independent Kurdish
state stirring up their restless Kurdish groups. The Iraqi Kurds
know if they upset their neighbors they risk losing the Western
good will that keeps them protected. Both parties repeat a mantra:
they want autonomy within a democratic Iraq.
"The democracy
we're enjoying now is with the support of the US," says Kosrat
Rasul, the PUK Prime Minister. "Otherwise Saddam would come
back."
The Kurds know
dependence on the US from past bitter experience. Talabani poses
the question: what if someone puts a bullet in Hussein's head tomorrow?
What if the US finds a new Sunni strongman to support, just as they
once supported Hussein?
"It cannot
be like the time of the Cold War," says Talabani, "with
the US supporting dictatorships. You cannot have free markets without
democracy." "In this age of globalization no issue can
be regarded as internal. They're all international," Barzani
concurs. Here the KDP and PUK converge in somewhat wishful thinking:
the West cannot forget them when a new regime, or simply a new Sunni
Arab general, takes over in Baghdad. But both parties know the US
may do just that. Such sober assessments leave the Kurds in the
awkward position of wishing for the status quo to continue--including
the embargo, the no-flight zone and yes, Saddam Hussein's rule.
"We have
not received one dollar from the US. Not one bullet. It is very
wrong to think that without the US we will be finished. We will
still be here. Maybe not here but in that mountain," says Talabani,
pointing to the snowy peaks along the Iranian border. But for all
the talk of a new world order, the Kurds point to a chilling analogy.
"Look
at what happened to Chechnya," says one KDP official, shaking
his head.
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