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Myths
and Money: Years of Hariri and Lebanon's Preparation for a New Middle
East
Volker Perthes
Hariri's
first four years may be remembered not for his personal electoral
victory and his image as a leader of scale, but for the shift in
the lines of political conflict. Political debate during the election
campaign and after has been concerned primarily with social and
political issues--citizens' rights, public freedoms, respect for
the constitution, economic reconstruction, social policies and even
relations with Syria.
The price
of prosperity has already been paid," read an ad that Lebanon's Investment
Development Authority ran in the summer of 1996, "now is the time
to harvest." The ad also mentioned, euphemistically, that the price
had been "a period of unrest." The message was meant to convince international
investors that Lebanon has reemerged as a stable location for big
finance and capital. At the same time, it reflected the feeling of
many Lebanese that the civil war (1975-1990) had been due to external,
regional, rather than internal, domestic circumstances, and that Lebanon
therefore ought to be compensated for all the suffering.
As is sometimes forgotten, Lebanon is the only state on whose soil
the Arab-Israeli conflict is still fought militarily. By early 1996,
it seemed that a Syria-Israel agreement on the Golan was within
reach and that the conflict over the Israeli occupation of Lebanon's
southern border strip was about to be resolved. With the "Lebanese
track" tied to the Syrian one, Lebanon had no active part in the
negotiations with Israel. The Lebanese government, however, has
been preparing for an eventual peace treaty more than the Syrian
leadership. Quite symbolically, during the "Operation Grapes of
Wrath"--Israel's 16-day war on Lebanon in April 1996--construction
work on the extension of Beirut international airport continued
uninterrupted even as the nearby motorway was being bombed.
The airport,
the coastal highway, the new motorway to the Syrian border, the
rehabilitation of the telecommunications network and, most importantly,
the reconstruction (or restructuring) of Beirut's city center are
all part of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's program of infrastructural
development intended to make the country a regional center of finance
and services in a post-peace Middle Eastern division of labor. With
its tradition as a service economy, its economic and cultural openness,
entrepreneurial spirit and relatively well-educated, cosmopolitan
workforce, Lebanon's leaders think that the country is much better
equipped than many other states of the region to face and benefit
from new forms of economic competition in the Middle East. Beirut
has been eager to conclude negotiations with the European Union
over a so-called partnership agreement. In contrast to Syria or
other regional states, Lebanon uses import tariffs as a source of
state income rather than as a means to protect local industries.
Neither the government nor Lebanese industry is therefore particularly
wary of free trade with Europe or others, provided that lost tariffs
can be replaced by other forms of state revenue.[1]
Undoubtedly,
Israel would be a strong competitor to Lebanon in a post-peace regional
environment. But, Lebanon would be better able to compete with Israel
than other Arab states. Little wonder therefore that many in Lebanon
viewed Israel's "Grapes of Wrath" as an attempt to obstruct Lebanon's
reconstruction process. In fact, in addition to human and material
losses, "Grapes of Wrath" dealt a blow to reemerging international
business confidence in Lebanon. Little wonder, too, that Lebanon's
political elite was particularly concerned about Netanyahu's election
victory and the virtual freeze of the peace process between Israel
and Syria.
The Socio-Economic
Groundwork
Whether Lebanon
is indeed prepared or preparing itself for the future is an issue
of domestic debate. Some intellectual critics claim that Hariri has
no vision at all; that he is simply parroting the jargon of neo-liberal
ideology, trying to run the government and the country like a company,
and furthering both his own material interests and that of his allies
and cronies.[2] Corruption, never an alien phenomenon in Lebanon's
past, has been increasing with respect to the sums of money involved.
Kickbacks from public spending are counted in millions rather than
thousands. To mention but one example, senior officials in charge
of the reconstruction program openly acknowledge that the contract
for the southern part of the coastal motorway, won by the construction
firm of Randa Berri, the entrepreneurial wife of Parliament Speaker
Nabih Berri, has been overpriced by a three-digit million dollar sum.
Although
not particularly visionary, Hariri's program is nonetheless a project
for Lebanon's future. The "Hariri Project" aims at making Lebanon
a center for regional business and finance, as well as a tax paradise.
Priority is given to the economic infrastructure that foreign and
expatriate capital will, in the optimistic version, make use of
once regional peace arrives. Banking on peace is risky, because
peace might not occur before interest has to be paid on a reconstruction
loan. To fund its projects, the government has been borrowing heavily,
ignoring IMF and local experts' warnings regarding the growth of
the country's international and domestic debt. Debt service stands
at more than 40 percent of the 1997 budget; as a result, budgetary
policies are extremely tight on social expenditures and public sector
wages. Also, through its own borrowing on the domestic market, the
state is crowding out private investors. Certainly, it is undeniable
that the country has been brought back to work since Hariri was
first appointed prime minister in 1992. Beirut today is the largest
building site in the Middle East. Inflation is low and the Lebanese
pound has stabilized. Economic growth has been estimated at nine
and 6.5 percent in 1994 and 1995 respectively, and at four percent
in 1996, the decline not only due to austerity and reduced private
investment but to the direct and indirect effects of Israel's April
war on the country.[3]
Aside from
the financial risks it involves, the Hariri project is under criticism
for its social coldness. Government policies seem to favor the wealthier
parts of society--demonstrated by the reduction of income and corporate
taxes to a flat ten percent--and seem to care little for the less
well-to-do. More than one-quarter of the population is estimated
to live below the poverty line, mainly as a result of war and displacement.[4]
Tensions are high between the trade unions and the Hariri government.
By rejecting union demands for cost of living wage and salary increases,
Hariri is "socializing" parts of the reconstruction costs. When
unions called for a general strike twice in 1996 the government
responded by flexing its muscles rather than seeking an agreement,
at one point even imposing a curfew to enforce an overall ban on
demonstrations.
Trade union
and social demands have become the common denominator of a broad,
but in no way united, opposition alliance. This alliance was established
after the 1996 legislative elections by political forces ranging
from Christian hard-liners close to exiled General Michel `Aoun
on the one hand, to pro-Syrian leftists and Hizb Allah, on the other.
Except for notorious opponents-in-government such as Walid Jumblatt,
Hariri's economic and social policies face little opposition from
within the political establishment or from Syria. Damascus constantly
interferes with Lebanese sovereignty, particularly where questions
of external and internal security are concerned. Economic policies,
however, are left to Lebanon's own decision-makers. The Syrian leadership,
tending to view Lebanon not as competitor but rather as complement
to its own economy--some would even speak of Lebanon as Syria's
Hong Kong--is interested in the success of Lebanon's reconstruction
process and in the job opportunities this process offers for a substantial
part of Syria's unemployed labor force. Lebanese cabinet ministers
in charge of economic portfolios are Hariri's own men--a handful
of whom were actually employed in his business empire before he
recruited them into government. Lebanon's parliamentary elections
of 1996, which despite a certain measure of fraud and manipulation
were no doubt real elections, have installed a chamber whose largest
"faction," in terms of class, rather than political orientation,
is a group of contractors and multimillionaire businessmen. Their
number has increased considerably at the expense of middle-class
professionals and intellectuals who used to be the backbone of Lebanon's
parliament. Traditional leaders and notables have more-or-less maintained
their relative weight.[5]
Failed Myths
To attract and
maintain the confidence not only of local and international capital,
but of its citizens, Lebanon needs to achieve substantial political
consensus and national integration. In the immediate aftermath of
the civil war, as Lebanon's Second Republic was formally established
on the basis of the 1989 Ta'if agreement, the main approach of Lebanon's
ruling elite was to produce an image of integration that would facilitate
acceptance of the new order. This new order entailed the redistribution
of legal political power at the expense of the Maronite part of the
political class as well as Syria's de facto hegemony over the country.
One myth simply held that there had been no civil war in Lebanon but,
to quote President Elias Hrawi, "only a war of others on our territory."[6]
As much as this myth might prepare the ground for a superficial reconciliation
of people who had been at war with each other--placing the blame for
most of the "events" on the Palestinians--it is not sufficient to
serve as the ideological basis for national integration, or nation-building.
What came closest to a formula of reconciliation was an idealized
version of the Ta'if Agreement, the document of national understanding
produced at the conference of Lebanese deputies in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia,
in October 1989, which both acknowledged the fact of civil war and
claimed no winners or losers.[7] This seemed to be helpful in reassuring
the Christian population that such constitutional changes as stipulated
by the agreement--changes that would correct the pro-Christian and
pro-Maronite bias of Lebanon's constitution and political system--would
nevertheless not make them second-class citizens. However, the no-winner-no-loser
formula also laid the ground for later complaints that Ta'if was not
being implemented fairly.[8] Many Christians harbor resentment towards
the new republic, often referred to as al-ihbat al-Masihi (Christian
frustration). The problem, of course, is not with the formal distribution
of power, as Christian representatives like President Hrawi occasionally
try to suggest when calling for constitutional changes that would
return some prerogatives to the (Maronite) president of the republic.
Rather, Christian uneasiness with postwar Lebanon results from the
fact (which no myth can argue away) that, whatever their formal representation,
the leadership of the country is today in the hands of Muslim politicians.
In terms of a confessionalist group logic, there is no doubt about
who the winners and losers are. While a generation of Maronite leaders--Amin
Gemayyel, Michel 'Aoun and Samir Ja'ja'--has been defeated or ousted,
either in the last stages of the war or thereafter, a new Christian
leadership has yet to emerge. Authoritarian
Integration
Hariri, who was
brought in as prime minister in 1992, two years after the end of the
civil war, has followed a practical approach to consolidating postwar
Lebanon. This approach can be characterized as functional authoritarianism.
It combines all the functional aspects of the "Hariri project"--physical
reconstruction and the creation of a friendly business environment--with
professional management of Lebanese issues on the international scene
and a strong element of authoritarianism beyond the simple restoration
of state functions. Hariri's government made a good impression on
international diplomats when, during and after Israel's "Operation
Grapes of Wrath," Hariri toured Western capitals, apparently dealing
with other statesmen on an equal basis.[9] Also in 1996, two visits
of French President Chirac to Beirut, a White House meeting between
Hariri and President Clinton and the successful conclusion of the
"Friends-of-Lebanon" meeting in Washington, from which Hariri returned
with a 3-billion-dollar-plus pledge of grants and soft loans, all
lent credibility to the claim that Lebanon had reemerged as an international
actor in its own right.
Domestically, the first four years of Hariri's premiership have
brought home to Lebanese citizens the fact that the government is
no longer an empty shell as it had been during most of the civil
war years. It is, rather, a tough regime, whose main pillars, aside
from Hariri are Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, Army Chief Emile Lahoud
and, by virtue of his position rather than personality, President
Elias Hrawi. This regime does not allow opposition to the current
distribution of power nor to Syria's involvement in Lebanon. In
fact, the general amnesty for all but a few of the crimes and atrocities
of the civil war has been withdrawn for those who refused to cooperate
with the regime. Samir Ja'ja', leader of the largest Christian civil
war militia, the Forces Libanaises, who blatantly challenged the
regime in 1992, has been jailed and on trial for various postwar
and wartime-murders since 1994.[10] His predecessor, Eli Hubeiqa--notorious
for his role in the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres--allied himself
with Syria as early as 1985 and has succeeded in becoming one of
the "permanent" government ministers of the new republic.
The authoritarian
tendencies of the present regime are apparent. The constitution
was manipulated to allow an extension of President Hrawi's term,
the electoral law of 1996 was tailored to ensure political "stability"
and the military has been put in charge of maintaining public order.
Public demonstrations have been banned since 1994 and numerous people
suspected of connections to opposition groups have been arrested
following a brutal attack on Syrian workers in a Beirut suburb in
December 1996. All of these actions have been understood as attempts
to intimidate potential and real political opposition.
The regime
also seems to be wary of media pluralism. There is some agreement
that the state should seek to regulate the audiovisual media landscape
characterized since the war by the proliferation of more than 100
radio stations and some 50 television networks. There are, however,
substantial fears that Hariri and the Syrians will use regulation
to do away with much of Lebanon's traditional freedom of the media.
In 1994, the parliament overruled a government decree stipulating
that news and political broadcasts would be restricted to state
televison and radio. Immediately after the 1996 election, the government
passed another decree seen by many as an onslaught on pluralism
and as an attempt by the prime minister and his political partners
to protect their own business interests, in this case their share
of the audiovisual advertising business. The decree stipulated that
only a limited number of private radio and television stations would
be licensed, and unlicensed stations would have to cease operations.
Moreover, only four private television networks and three private
radio stations were allowed to send news and political programs:
Hariri's own TV al-Mustaqbal and Radio Orient; Murr TV owned by
the brother of the minister of the interior; a new network still
in the process of being set up and owned by Nabih Berri and his
friends[11] and the LBC television and Free-Lebanon radio networks.
The latter two were formerly owned by the outlawed Forces Libanaises
and are now under the control of a group of investors considered
close to some Christian leaders from northern Lebanon and some of
the enterprising sons of Syrian officials. An exception was made
at Syrian insistence for Hizb Allah which would still be allowed
to transmit news related to anti-Israeli resistance operations.
As public protests mounted, the government showed some lenience,
indicating that additional networks could be licensed. At almost
the same time, however, the government decreed that all news and
political programs transmitted by satellite would be subject to
censors. In particular, news that might offend friendly Arab governments
would be banned.
Liberals,
Christian hard-liners, Islamists, trade unionists and outspoken
leftists have all been critical, to varying degrees, of Hariri's
authoritarian tendencies, as well as of particular aspects of his
reconstruction program. Apparently, such criticism has not overly
disturbed the prime minister. On the contrary, in his election campaign
Hariri took the offensive, using a discourse that portrayed himself
not only as the guarantor of reconstruction, but also as the man
who had brought authority back to Lebanon. The elections, according
to his discourse, were a confrontation between "moderation and extremism"
(al-i'tidal wal-tatarruf). "Moderation" meant to "accept
the logic of the state." "Extremism" referred particularly to Hizb
Allah, but also implicitly to all other opposition forces rejecting
Hariri's form of state-building.[12] In Beirut, where Hariri ran
for a seat, he and his list won 14 out of the 19 seats. Those results
cannot be attributed to manipulation or fraud. Rather, voters seem
to have accepted, and voted for, Hariri's project, giving the prime
minister a popular mandate for his political and economic plans.
Balancing
Exercises
Still, politics
in Lebanon, six years and a full legislative period after the end
of the civil war, are like a juggler's exercise. There are three main
overlapping conflicts. First, there is the cleavage between the current
regime and those old and new political elites who have so far refused
to support the regime's postwar order, because the share of political
power they have been offered is unacceptably limited.[13] Weakened
since the end of the civil war, these groups could regain considerable
public support if the regime fails to deliver on its promises of reconstruction
and economic recovery. The second conflict is between the winners
and losers of the reconstruction process. The regime has to consider
the threat of an antagonistic coalition comprising the political losers
of the postwar order, the trade unions (which in principle support
that order), and other opposition forces, such as Hizb Allah, that
are both critical of the regime's domestic policies and of its interests
in reaching a settlement with Israel. The third line of conflict runs
between an authoritarian-minded leadership and its liberal opponents.
Hariri knows, however, that the country's intellectuals and other
elements of civil society now critical of his project will eventually
try to influence his policies rather than risk his fall. Moreover,
a liberal opposition is unlikely to find any support or encouragement
from other regional states.
To prevent mass protest against its economic and social policies
and to preclude opposition forces from exploiting discontent, Hariri
uses the army to guard public security and enforce the general ban
on demonstrations. Conflicts between the unions and the government
are thus kept under control. In return, the army has been privileged
and strengthened; becoming assertive in its demands for salaries
and promotions. Within the security forces a new corporate spirit
has emerged. More than a few military leaders see the army as the
only reliable pillar of the state, that it alone can guarantee civil
peace after an eventual withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces
from the country and that it would be best to promote one of their
ranks to the very top. Army chief Emile Lahoud, in fact, is a strong
candidate to succeed President Hrawi--acceptable to the Syrians,
the West and a large number of disgruntled Christians who see him
as one of the few Maronite figures within the system that could
be a counterweight to Hariri.
To counter
criticism of the regime's insensitivity to increasing inequalities
and to its authoritarian tendencies, those close to it point to
the functional requirements of the reconstruction program. The country
has to be fit for regional competition; only a business-friendly
environment will eventually guarantee work and employment for the
largest possible number. Therefore, some economic imbalances will
have to be accepted. Thus, the argument continues, to strengthen
its sovereignty, the Lebanese regime must prove to the Syrian leadership,
the Israelis and the West, that the country is under control. The
regime itself can deal with any political force that might seek
to challenge either the Syrian regime or regional rearrangements
that might result from an Arab-Israeli settlement.[14] Syria's redeployment
of some of its troops from Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon in
the aftermath of the first rounds of Lebanon's 1996 elections signalled
the Syrian leadership's confidence in the Lebanese government's
ability to guarantee internal security, political stability and
the reelection of some of Syria's main allies and friends.
Hariri's first
four years may be remembered not for his personal electoral victory
and his image as a leader of scale, but for the shift in the lines
of political conflict. In contrast to the immediate post-civil war
period, political debate during the election campaign and after
has been primarily concerned with social and political issues--citizens'
rights, public freedoms, respect for the constitution, economic
reconstruction, social policies and even relations with Syria. Given
that the 1992 elections still largely represented a continuation
of the war by nonmilitary means--mainly fought along the civil-war
lines of division15--the significance of this development for the
emergence of a viable polity can hardly be underestimated.
Volker
Perthes is Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for
International Relations, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen,
Germany. Endnotes
1 Such partnership
agreements, as part of the EU's so-called Mediterranean initiative
launched with the Barcelona Conference of November 1995, basically
stipulate the establishment of a free trade zone between the EU and
its individual partners by 2010, financial aid from the EU, and an
institutionalized political dialogue. As an example of demonstrative
Lebanese self-confidence regarding the prospects of globalization
and even competition with Israel, see the interview with the president
of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, Jacques Sarraf, al-Nahar,
May 20, 1996.
2 See, among others, Joseph Samaha, Qada'an, la Qadar fi-Ihlaq
al-Jumhuriya al-Thaniya (By Decision, Not by Fate: On the Morals
of the Second Republic), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid) 1996.
3 Economic
data and estimates are based on Banque Audi's Quarterly Economic
Report, various issues.
4 See Antoine
Haddad, "The Poor in Lebanon," The Lebanon Report (Summer
1996), pp. 36-42.
5 See Volker
Perthes, "Die Parlamentswahlen im Libanon: Akzeptanz des Faktischen,"
Orient 38/1 (1997).
6 Quoted from
al-Hayat, October 11, 1993. Some other myths and legends
that have been invented to patch over the differences of the war
(such as the myth that the militias did not represent anyone but
themselves) are dealt with by Samaha, Qada'an, la Qadar,
op. cit., pp. 27-38.
7 For details
of the proceedings and outcome of the conference, see Theoder Hanf,
Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of
a Nation(London: I.B. Tauris and Centre for Lebanese Studies,
1993).
8 One of the
authors extensively riding this argument (Ta'if being good but unfairly
implemented) is Albert Mansur. See his Al-Inqilab 'ala Ta'if
(The Coup Against Ta'if), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1993).
9 See Paul
Salem, "In the Wake of 'Grapes of Wrath': Meeting the Challenge,"
in Rosemary Hollis and Nadim Shehadi, eds., Lebanon on Hold:
Implications for Middle East Peace (London: The Royal Institute
for International Affairs, 1996), pp. 75-78.
10 Ja'ja'
has been sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1990 assassination
of Dany Chamoun, leader of the National Liberal Party and a rival
for the leadership of the Maronite community. He has been acquitted
of having blown up a church in 1994, but he is still accused of
being involved in the civil war-time assassination of a Christian
lawyer and of then Prime Minister Rashid Karame.
11 Berri has
officially denied that he is involved in the establishment of the
network. See al-Hayat, September 18-19, 1996.
12 See Perthes,
"Die Parlamentswahlen im Libanon," op. cit.
13 In the
first place, these are Maronite Christian elites, including the
remnants of the Forces Libanaises, the Chamounists (National Liberal
Party), and some independent leaders who supported the Ta'if agreement
in expectation of a better share in the postwar order than they
actually obtained. Some leaders from other communities share similar
attitudes; a prominent example is former speaker of parliament Hussein
al-Husseini.
14 We can
certainly expect that Lebanon will be called upon not only to disarm
Hizb Allah, but also to contain it politically, along with and after
an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied southern border strip. Apart
from that, one of the most important issues for Lebanon in the peace
process is the issue of Palestinian refugees. As it is unlikely
that more than a tiny minority of Lebanon's Palestinian population
would be able to "return" to the Palestinian Territories (the majority
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon come from towns and villages
now inside Israel, not in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), most of
them are likely to remain in Lebanon. This implies that Lebanon
will remain the most fertile ground for radical Palestinian opposition
factions that may try to carry on the struggle with Israel even
after a "final-status" agreement. It is likely that Lebanon will
have to grant permanent residence and civil rights close to citizenship
to most of its Palestinian inhabitants, a possibility not very much
to the liking of a substantial part of the Lebanese population.
15 See Volker
Perthes, "Problems with Peace: Post-War Politics and Parliamentary
Elections in Lebanon," Orient 33/3 (September 1992), pp.
409-432.
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