In contrast to most Palestinian exiles, who from the outset rejected the DOP because it relegated them to the furthest margins of the Israeli-Palestinian equation, reassessment of this agreement within the occupied territories has been a slower and more complex process. The majority of Palestinians accepted the PLO's argument that in the post-Gulf War and Cold War context the accords could neither be refused nor improved, and that despite its shortcomings it created a new dynamic that would ultimately result in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Repeated PLO proclamations that the transitional phase would be characterized above all by tangible improvements in personal security and economic prosperity were eagerly embraced by a population driven to utter desperation by Israeli repression and a stagnant intifada.[3]

The warm welcome accorded Yasir Arafat and his entourage of soldiers and bureaucrats when they entered Gaza in July 1994 revealed the high hopes Palestinians continued to attach to the DOP even though little had been achieved in the intervening months to inspire popular confidence. Largely isolated from prior direct contact with the PLO apparatus, residents of the occupied territories generally retained an idealized notion of its character and capabilities. Those with a more nuanced view assumed that the PA would be more responsive to popular opinion than the PLO had been, and additionally felt a moral obligation to give the historic leadership an opportunity to succeed. Only a small minority insisted that Arafat and his lieutenants signed onto the DOP to revive their own flagging fortunes, and would be reduced to junior partners in the administration of Israeli rule.

The rude awakening experienced by many Palestinians during the first year of autonomy did not fundamentally alter the popular consensus in favor of the DOP. Autonomy was considered the lesser of two evils when compared to direct Israeli occupation. PA misconduct was rationalized as the product of inexperience and individual malfeasance; and the deteriorating economic situation was attributed to Israeli restrictions and the donor community's inertia. The PA's inability to confront a very palpable Israeli hegemony, however, set against its very public cooperation with Israel's security forces (most notably the "joint patrols"), damaged its reputation.

In the villages, most of which fall within "Area B" (altogether approximately 27 percent of the West Bank), the PA has only civil and police powers, while Israel remains responsible for "internal security" the meaning of which it is free to define. According to the terms of Oslo II, Israel can--and routinely does--continue with land confiscations, mass arrests, house demolitions, defoliation, prolonged curfews, arbitrary violence, and any other measure it sees fit to impose on the pretext of security.

Nearly 70 percent of the West Bank is classified as Area C. Comprising the Jewish settlements (including the center of Hebron), water-rich areas, border regions, main roads and most lands outside Palestinian municipal and village boundaries (but also several Palestinian villages), Area C is a contiguous whole that both surrounds Areas A and B in their entirety and parcels them into isolated enclaves. Pursuant to Oslo II, Area C is not subject to restrictions regarding the further expansion of Jewish settlement. In accordance with the Interim Agreement, jurisdiction over the settlements has been transferred from the civil administration of the military government within the occupied territories to the state apparatus within Israel, consolidating their position as integral, undifferentiated components of Israeli territory and public administration. Area C also includes numerous "bypass roads" constructed during the past several years, at an enormous cost in terms of Palestinian land, in order to erase the boundaries between Israel and the settlements, and to provide easy access between settlements "bypassing" Palestinian enclaves. In mid-September, 1996, a new, $40 million road including the largest Israeli tunnel was opened in the West Bank to integrate the Gush Etzion settlement bloc near Bethlehem with metropolitan Jerusalem. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert asserted that this road would make Gush Etzion "a permanent part of Israel."[5]

In the Gaza Strip, a contiguous if oddly-shaped 60 percent is Area A with most of the remainder classified as Area C. Entirely surrounded on three sides by electrified razor-wire and a heavily-patrolled coastline on the fourth, the entry and exit of goods and persons is strictly controlled by a series of permanent Israeli and Palestinian checkpoints. In principle, the only persons who may pass are senior PLO and PA officials, a select number of Palestinian businessmen and drivers with prior clearance, and a maximum of 50,000 men who are married, with children, over the age of 30 with clean security records and with permits to work in Israel.[6] In practice, Israel on several occasions has prevented Yasir Arafat from leaving Gaza, banned several senior PA officials from doing so (including Social Affairs Minister Intisar al-Wazir--Um Jihad--for attempting to smuggle several students to Birzeit University in the West Bank), and routinely prevented most or all workers from reaching their jobs for prolonged periods. With respect to goods, Israeli products as a rule have unrestricted entry to the Gaza Strip, while imports from other countries often experience bureaucratic warfare and associated storage costs. Israel's policy on Palestinian exports similarly seeks to ensure continued dependence upon Israel and prevent the emergence of a recognizably Palestinian economy.[7]

According to senior Israeli military and intelligence officers, no suicide bomber has ever applied for a permit to enter Israel. Likewise, no Palestinian with a valid work permit has been convicted of a "terrorist" offense. Such officers see closure as a misguided and ultimately counterproductive political response to an essentially military challenge. Other observers have argued that closure is (or at least has become) a political strategy rather than security tactic whose economic consequences (up to 70 percent unemployment in the Gaza Strip, widespread poverty throughout the occupied territories, and a rapidly growing PA budget deficit which has paralyzed its ability to deliver services)[8] make violence more, rather than less, likely.

Although no longer physically present, Israeli administration remains very much in evidence within the PA areas as well. Birth certificates, identity cards, driver licenses, applications of various sorts, even Palestinian passports, must all be registered with and approved by the military government in order to attain official status. The difference here is that Palestinians outside Jerusalem now conduct such procedures through the PA rather than directly, leading to considerable delays and frustration.

Although "internal closure" has thus far been imposed as an extraordinary rather than permanent measure the separation of East Jerusalem and its annexed environs (comprising roughly 20 percent of the West Bank) from the rest of the West Bank has been fully institutionalized; as a "final status" issue Jerusalem is in fact excluded from the terms of the Interim Agreement. Without an Israeli permit, which as a rule is virtually impossible to obtain, Palestinians may neither enter the Jerusalem area nor pass through it. Permanent military checkpoints on most primary and secondary roads leading out of the West Bank, constant patrols within Jerusalem, and stiff fines and prison sentences for violators, have ensured that few Palestinians today venture into their political, economic, cultural and institutional capital to which they enjoyed virtually unrestricted access prior to Oslo.

The PA's approach to government and state-building, its relationship with Israel, and the role of the opposition have all contributed to the spreading pessimism. Best characterized as an elected autocracy, the PA's ra'is possesses a seemingly limitless capacity for micro-managing the public and private sectors, and consequently an equally impressive ability to co-opt, marginalize or outmaneuver his critics with comparatively little violence. Arafat brooks no opposition to his own person or position as uncontested leader, and has moved decisively to crush such dissent by whatever means necessary. Most of the violence, meted out by his security forces, however, has been aimed at improving the PA's standing with Israel and the West rather than directly bolstering his rule.

While the PLO's traditional pluralism continues to survive in attenuated form, democracy is permitted only to the extent that it respects autocracy. Concerning freedom of expression, for example, PA security forces in August, confiscated and banned books by Palestinian intellectual Edward W. Said that unequivocally denounce both Oslo and Arafat.[9]

The Palestinian media, meanwhile, promotes the personality cult of the leader as faithfully as any of its Arab counterparts. Palestinian television (headquartered in Arafat's office) daily broadcasts several songs of praise and additional eulogies. The media's responsibilities were emphasized when Mahir al-'Alami, night editor of al-Quds newspaper, was arrested by the PA's Preventative Security for relegating to an inside page a statement by Greek Orthodox Archbishop Theodorus likening Arafat to the first Muslim conqueror of Jerusalem, Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab.

The judiciary has fared little better. As Graham Usher points out, the plethora of Palestinian security services (most recently augmented by Jihaz amn al-jami'at, the Universities Security Agency) are neither regulated by legislation nor subject to regular legal review.[10] In mid-August, however, the Palestinian Supreme Court agreed to hear a case brought against the PA by ten Birzeit University students who have been detained without charge or trial since the February-March suicide bombings. When the court ordered their immediate release, its President, Amin 'Abd al-Salam, was immediately forced into retirement and his ruling ignored. In other cases suspects have been arrested, charged, tried, convicted and sentenced within hours by State Security Courts.

Hopes that the Palestinian Council would act as an effective counterweight to the executive branch on the whole have failed to materialize. Its powers of legislation are restricted by the corpus of Israeli military orders which cannot be repealed or contradicted without permission from the Israeli military government. Additionally, Arafat has co-opted several of its most prominent independents, including 'Abd al-Jawad Salih, Hanan Ashrawi and 'Imad al-Faluji, into his cabinet.[11] Even if devoid of results, substantial debate and criticism, however, is possible within the Palestinian Council, which is becoming more resistive in reaction to the growing frustration of its members and popular cynicism (in a recent public opinion survey, 46.7 percent stated that the Council "represents the people well but with no effect").[12]

Although the Palestinian Council remains a significant forum, the more likely source of effective opposition is the Palestinian street. Under-mobilized and provided with no meaningful role in national reconstruction, ordinary people find the process of state-building all too easily obscured by the realities of easy money being amassed by monopolists and others popularly derided as "mafia." While Palestinians do not belittle the significance of being able to walk the streets more safely than before and enjoy a day at the beach, "this is not what we fought and died for" has become a national refrain. According to a recent poll, 68.5 percent of those describing themselves "not well-to-do" are pessimistic about their future. By contrast, 54.9 percent of the "well-to-do" are optimistic.[13]

Throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the feeling of abandonment is palpable. The Islamist opposition, held responsible for provoking the closure and contributing to Netanyahu's rise, and the radical left, whose basically unchanged political slogans seem irrelevant, offer no viable alternatives to the PA. Asked which Palestinian movement they trust most, 34 percent chose Fatah, 6.5 percent Hamas, 2.8 percent the PFLP, and 29.4 percent "do not trust anyone."[14] The mainstream Fatah movement, increasingly marginalized with Arafat's transformation from the leader of a national movement to head of government (and the attendant decline of factional politics), must itself be considered a potential force for political reform.

Few who have followed developments in the "peace process" thus far, particularly since the imposition of "separation," can realistically claim that it will result in Palestinian self-determination. What is emerging, rather, is a series of "arabistans," ruled by a native authority, but subject to overall Israeli control. So long as Israeli rule continues to accommodate Palestinian authority, therefore, the future of the DOP will come to rest upon the ability of Israel and the PA to jointly control an increasingly disillusioned, and restive, Palestinian population.

Endnotes