The
Song Does Not Remain the Same
Ramin Sadighi
and Sohrab Mahdavi
March 12, 2009
(Ramin
Sadighi is the director of Hermes Records, an independent music
label with over 50 titles, one of which, Endless Vision,
by Hossein Alizdeh and Djivan Gasparyan, was nominated for
a Grammy in 2007. Sohrab Mahdavi is co-founder and editor of
TehranAvenue.com.)

Iranian
singer Mohammad Reza Shajarian is greeted by his fans
as he arrives for a concert in Tehran, September 7, 2007.
(document IRAN/Mohammad Kheirkhah) |
Starting in
the late 1990s, and especially following two stories by CNN's
chief international correspondent, the British-Iranian Christiane
Amanpour, Westerners were treated to a slew of articles and broadcast
reports aiming to “lift the veil” on Iran. Amanpour’s second
story revolved around “youth and the party scene.” She visited
the house of another hyphenated Iranian to show a group reveling
in youthful abandon, toasting each other with alcoholic drinks
to the tune of playful music, and so consuming two illegal items
of consequence in the Islamic Republic. With youth, it seemed,
came merriment and rebelliousness.
Iran -- at
the time, one of the youngest nations in the world -- soon became
a top destination for the Western press corps, eager to peek
inside a country that had long been closed to outsiders or at
least been seen that way. This was a time when Iranians had just
elected a new president with genuine ambitions of reform.
But it was
not only President Mohammad Khatami who was heralding a new era
of “dialogue of civilizations.” The Internet, too, had changed
the face of journalism. No longer was it necessary for a journalist
to trot across the globe to get the full story. She could do
the legwork at home, online, and then hop in and out of Iran
to show she had been there. Such efficiency was essential to
the Rupert Murdochs of the world who yearned for the sensational,
the immediate and the risqué.
The interest
in a glimpse at what was underneath the “veil” in Iran was thus
deliciously (in)appropriate for the emerging global mass media.
Meanwhile, Khatami announced that, during his tenure, culture
would take priority over economics. Artists and writers made
up a crucial constituency sweeping him into office -- two others
being youth and women -- and starting in 1997 the atmosphere
of the country underwent a radical change.
Within the
music scene, TehranAvenue.com organized an online Underground
Music Competition (2002), where 21 bands mostly interested in
rock, jazz and blues submitted their works. At the same time,
Hermes Records released the rock album Barad (2003) as
part of its roster, which was otherwise alternative-classical.
Young musicians interested in rock organized small concerts,
especially at the University of Art in Tehran, and a few more
rock albums came out.[1] The
Underground Music Competition became an overnight sensation.
With a half-million successful downloads, the competition startled
many into believing something was afoot under the stern gaze
of hardline clerics who had deemed music suspicious and possibly
corrupting. Barad sold well at record stores and small-venue
concerts left no room to stand.
As director
of Hermes Records and founder of TehranAvenue.com, we were buffeted
from all sides by the stream of Western press reports that celebrated
the phenomenon for its political as well as its aesthetic meaning.[2] Time and again we saw Westerners’ nostalgia
for the 1960s projected onto Iran. In the West, after all, rock
music was synonymous with the liberating counter-culture of youth,
the desire for freedom from stuffy formalities and an electric
connection to the zeitgeist. The headline writers of the Washington
Post, to cite one example, exultantly evoked Chuck Barry:
“Roll Over, Khomeini!” The Western reporters were careful to
note that, though censorship has loosened over the years, there
were still severe restrictions on the work of would-be concert
and recording artists in Iran. To this day, artists must submit
their work to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, where
it is vetted for adherence to “Islamic standards” and “public
sensibilities.”
In fact, there
has been a radical transformation of the Iranian music scene
since the fall of the Shah -- but the salient changes are not
rooted in foreign forms like rock and rap. Rather, the changes
flow from a revitalization of the classical Persian tradition
that began around the same time as the revolutionary ferment
itself. Musical groups collectively known as the Chavosh (Herald)
movement altered the way that players of classical Persian music
viewed the world and related to their audiences. Like Western
rockers, these performers were “modern” -- in the sense that
they chose as lyrics the lines of contemporary poets and they
played in a style projecting impatience and idealism. And these
were also “underground” bands -- in the sense that their music
stayed clear of the mainstream, defied the demands of the market,
sought momentum in the energy of listeners and stayed true to
the spirit of the times.
Revolution
and War

Iranian
singer Googoosh cries while performing during her first
public appearance in 21 years on July 29, 2000 in Toronto.
(Zoran Bozicevic/AFP/Getty Images) |
In the late
1960s and early 1970s, Iran’s musical scene was dominated by
Western and local pop. Western pop had come to Iran mainly through
the oil industry, in the clubs and cabarets that studded the
cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan in the oil-rich Khuzestan province
and catered to foreign oil workers. The National Iranian Oil
Company regularly invited Western musicians to tour the region,
notably Duke Ellington, who played to large crowds in Abadan
and Isfahan in 1963. Armenian Iranians who were in touch with
relatives or friends in the Armenian Republic further facilitated
the entrance of pop into the mainstream of Iranian music. The
propagation of Western music naturally affected Iranian musicians,
some of whom, like Vigen, Martik, Farhad and Fereydoun Foruqi,
tried to assimilate to what they considered to be the latest
rage, while others strove to thwart what they found to be a cultural
infraction. The latter group, what later became the Center for
the Preservation and Propagation of Iranian Music, found an important
niche of their own.
So it was
actually the classically trained Iranian musician who sowed the
seeds of resistance to Western-inspired pop that sprouted in
the days of revolution. Composer-instrumentalist Hossein Alizadeh
dubbed his music razmi (militant) in contradistinction
to the bazmi (banquet) style heard at the fêtes of
the elite. The same was true of the well-known Mohammad Reza
Lotfi and Mohammad Reza Shajarian. They never challenged the
political system directly, participating in state-organized events
like the landmark Shiraz Art Festival in 1977, but they practiced
a brand of music of which orthodox musicians disapproved. They
argued that classical Iranian music was less a means of entertainment
than a vehicle by which the musician could speak the truth about
the issues of the day. At the Shiraz Art Festival, Shajarian
sang the constitutional revolution tasnif (art song),
“All night sleep doesn’t come to my eyes / Oh, you who are asleep
/ In the desert those who are thirsty die / While water is being
carried to ostentatious palaces.” Music, by the lights of the
classically trained, was to be political in orientation and iconoclastic
in structure.
The new revolutionary
order that came to power in 1979 was out to purge the cultural
atmosphere of “corrupting” elements, and ironically some of the
musicians who had previously been part of the Center for the
Preservation and Propagation of Iranian Music set policies for
what was permissible in music. The post-revolutionary regime,
in turn, citing religious injunctions against men hearing the
voice of a solo female singer, forbade public appearances or
records by solo women singers and further tightened the noose
on alternative, socially oriented works.
By far the
most important factor in shaping the musical environment was
the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), an all-consuming, genuinely national
effort. Even those who opposed the new revolutionary order were
determined to defend the country from the outside threat, and
hence it is not surprising that the dominant musical form was
the military march, designed to encourage Iranians to stand tall
and resist occupation by the Iraqi army. Still, giants of Iranian
music, like Hossein Alizadeh and the Chavosh singer Mohammad
Reza Lotfi, went to the front to perform their own music for
the troops. As the war ground on, many young talents died, among
them technicians, poets and musicians who might have continued
the Chavosh movement or changed the direction of musical production.
Instead, the normal development of this movement was arrested.
Together with the international isolation of Islamic Republic
(answered in kind by the regime), revolution and war put Iranian
music into a state of hibernation.
Reconstruction
In 1989, shortly
after war’s end, Khomeini was asked for his opinion as a jurist
on music. He who had spoken of music being a “drug” at the outset
of the revolution now saw “no objections to the purchase and
sale of instruments serving a licit purpose,” in an interview
published in Keyhan. Music was permissible as long as
it did not manipulate the emotions or carry a hint of sensuality,
meaning that women were to remain excluded from the musical sphere.[3]
But the icon
of the Islamic Revolution had given the green light to a group
of religious musicians, including Qur’an reciters and dirge performers
whose music is built on classical Persian foundations, to migrate
to pop. State-run radio and TV was their springboard. One such
singer is Mohammad Esfahani, a Qur’an reciter with staunch religious
beliefs. After Khomeini issued his opinion, Esfahani produced
an album in which he sang the stanzas of classical poets like
Hafez and Sa‘di. On a later album, he covered songs of Delkash,
a renowned alto whose deep voice and contemporary poetic lyrics
appealed to all social strata. Esfahani’s tribute to a woman
was an event in itself. Well connected in the clerical establishment,
he is among the few musicians in Iran today who can afford to
appear on stage with a big band. Women wearing the full chador can
be seen at an Esfahani concert, demonstrating that pop music
has penetrated the more pious circles. The extent of this penetration
has so alarmed the regime that Khomeini’s successor as Supreme
Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, felt he had
to intervene. In a 2007 meeting with dirge singers, he criticized
the unrestrained use of pop melodies, notably one by Mahasti,
an exiled female pop singer.
In the post-war
reconstruction period, government cultural programs focused on
the young. President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s administration
sought to polish Iran’s image abroad, always important to Iranian
youth, by revitalizing cinema. At home, the state thought that
relaxing the strictures on music would keep the young content
and give them an incentive to help with reconstruction. But to
avoid backlash from the pious masses, officials of the Ministry
of Culture and Islamic Guidance had to present the music they
wanted to promote -- with radio broadcasts or permission to release
records or hold privately funded concerts -- as morally sanctioned.
Sometimes they even changed the meaning of words, for example,
assigning the name “anthem” to a run-of-the-mill pop tune simply
because it was suggestive of the marches played during the war.
The ministry tried to limit musical expression to religious,
mystical or mainstream political themes. In this endeavor, they
faced criticism from hardline clerical elements, but this opposition
was never able to stop their undertaking, as the political needs
of the country called for such a change in direction. Among high-ranking
clerics, too, there were those, like Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei, who
looked approvingly upon music.
The state
set aside a budget for the promotion and dissemination of approved
music. The annual Fajr Music Festival, convened every year concurrent
with the celebrations of the victory of Islamic Revolution, brought
musicians from abroad, like Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan and Bismillah
Khan. But the unstable economy was not conducive to long-term
investment by those in the music business. As such, producers
sought out projects that could bring short-term returns. The
easiest sell was music exploiting nostalgia for pre-revolutionary
pop, and so the voices of many singers who broke into the scene
during the early 1990s closely resembled those of exiled or departed
counterparts. This commercial trend continued until 1998, when
a cadre of pop musicians, notably Shadmehr Aghili, whose album Dahati smashed
sales records, came out with albums that did not try to imitate
pre-revolutionary singers or adhere to the officially sanctioned
themes of religious devotion, God’s love and epic history. This
type of music was similar to the Iranian pop produced in exile,
but had its own identity.
The cautious
opening of musical production in the reconstruction era reduced
state pressure on musicians and listeners alike. The revolutionary
militia that patrolled the streets and set up roadblocks during
the war could no longer stop someone for carrying a musical instrument
or for playing music on the car radio. It was during this time,
also, that the maverick mayor of Tehran, Gholamhossein Karbaschi,
established cultural centers (fahangsara) around the city.
In these centers, residents could sign up for painting, music
and photography classes, in addition to the customary Qur’an
and sewing classes, usually for free. One such center, the Bahman
Cultural Center, was built upon the site of a slaughterhouse
in southernmost Tehran, in an impoverished neighborhood known
as Koshtargah. Overnight, municipal authorities, in conjunction
with law enforcement, took control of the abattoir, evacuated
a large swath of land surrounding it and bulldozed the area.
Scant weeks later, prefabricated structures appeared and Bahman
opened its doors, not only offering diverse cultural activities
but also bridging socio-economic divides in the city. Before
Bahman, there were only a few major venues that offered music
to Tehran residents. The 800-seat Vahdat Hall and the Niavaran
Cultural Center in the tony northern part of the capital hosted
classical Western and Persian concerts. People had to wait in
line far in advance. Bahman was so successful that it supplanted
these venues, attracting well-to-do Tehranis to the south of
the city, an area they would otherwise avoid. The new center
also showcased the joys of music for the children of the poor,
who are more likely than affluent classes to be religiously conservative
and hence consider music sacrilegious in deference to the original fatwas of
Ayatollah Khomeini. Reza Sadeghi, a war veteran (and Qur’an reciter)
whose outward appearance is reminiscent of the militiamen who
formerly stopped cars suspected of playing pop music, is one
pop singer who hails from south Tehran and retains a large following
to this day. Authorities initially declined his first album a
permit for release, but when bootleg copies seeped out, they
reluctantly gave it the green light.
The Screws
Loosen…
The Ministry
of Culture and Islamic Guidance, as well as orthodox practitioners,
had long considered the sound of classical Persian music to be
sacrosanct. New musical genres began to appear as part of a further
cultural opening during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005),
particularly the first term. Groups like Avizheh, Rumi and Raz-e
Shab invented a genre called talfiqi or fusion, employing
Western rock instruments like electric and bass guitar, keyboard
and drums next to the traditional dulcimer called the santur and
the violin-like kamancheh. Together, these fusion bands
were able to introduce the sonorities of rock to the official
music scene of Iran, though Rumi did continued to rely on the
lyrics of classical Persian music, as its name suggests. Fusion
sold well in the late 1990s.
Around the
same time, a straightforward rock band called O-Hum burst onto
the underground scene, setting the classic poems of Rumi and
Hafez to rollicking guitar riffs reminiscent of the 1970s band
Kansas. O-Hum overestimated the extent of the delicate freedoms
attained bit by bit during the years of war and reconstruction,
and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance denied the band
permission to distribute their debut album. Thinking that they
were playing the music the world was listening to, O-Hum stood
their ground. They failed to gain access to the legal market,
but as a result they kick-started a trend in music production
and distribution -- indeed, in the relationship between musicians
and audiences -- whereby officially disapproved music is posted
online. Their website (www.o-hum.com) was launched in January
2001, featuring all the songs on their first album, Nahal-e
Heyrat (Saplings of Wonder, a Hafez phrase), and word buzzed
around the Internet. O-Hum became disillusioned with the breadth
of their reach, nonetheless, and the band members went abroad
to record their second album.
But the Internet
music sharing initiated by O-Hum had pushed the envelope, and
state censors felt compelled to loosen the screws still further.
Slowly, lyrics and sounds that resonated with experiences of
ordinary life -- lost since revolution and war smothered Chavosh
in its crib -- began to reappear. In TehranAvenue.com’s inaugural
competition, for example, the top vote getter was the band Fara,
for their song “Pasheh” (Mosquito). The track is out of tune,
yet listeners warmed to the amusing account of a musician speaking
to a mosquito in his room, pleading that it stop biting him.
Such lyrics were previously thought of as trite or lowly. Of
late, bands like Kiosk, whose members moved from Iran to the
US and Canada in the mid-2000s, mix sharp political commentary
with an urban feel. The lyrics of Mohsen Namjoo took the politics
in Iranian pop to a new level, “Look how they have fed Diazepam
to the masses / See how they have made hypocrisy fashionable
/ Look how they break plexi instead of glass / Look how we are
paying for oil, electricity / See how we see dollar signs everywhere,”
he sang in “Gozar,” which was never published legally. Still,
the majority of pop lyrics are selected from the centuries of
classical Persian verse.
The resplendent
reserve of Persian poetry is akin to a verdant pasture where
musicians can graze. Perhaps this is why, while there is no shortage
of contemporary poets in Iran, there are so few songwriters.
Before the 1979, a small number of lyricists, associated with
Chavosh, had begun to set their own words to music, and they
continued to do so through the tumultuous early years of the
revolution before state repression and self-censorship exacted
their toll. The consequences run deep. Unlike Iranian cinema,
for example, Iranian music has yet to deal with the effects of
the calamitous war with Iraq -- the longest such conflict in
the twentieth century -- on Iranian society.
…and Tighten
It is a cliché
-- but one that concentrates the minds of those in power -- that
a country’s young people are its future.[4] The
1979 Keyhan article decrying the narcotic power of music
was titled “Radio and Television Must Strengthen the Young.”
Obsession with youth explains the vagaries of the Islamic Republic’s
cultural policies over 30 years, as well as the persistent interest
of Western press in Tehran’s underground music scene. These articles
belong to the larger journalistic genre touting the presumed
emancipatory clout of the 25 percent of the Iranian population
between the ages of 15 and 24. Under Khatami, when a younger
generation of Iranians listened to promises of a transformation
in social values, Western journalists poured in to record the
tearing down of yet another wall. It seemed that, yet again,
a scowling, repressive state might be overrun by democracy from
below, even if the “below” in question consisted mainly of upper
middle-class urbanites imitating the globalized Western youth
culture. The pieces continue to appear in the era of Ahmadinejad.[5] The
flower children are not taking over in Tehran tomorrow, concedes
Mark LeVine, one writer on the music scene, but he nevertheless
goes on to see heavy metal and hip-hop “as an important part
of the soundtrack” to Iran’s political struggles, completely
blind to the fact that these genres are mostly listened to by
certain privileged social strata of the country.[6]
In seeing
what they want to see in the Tehran music scene, Western observers
have blown the influence of the underground out of proportion.
Coupled with the space that Internet has opened, these reports
sow dissatisfaction among young musicians with the constraints
under which they live without making them fight for the rights
to produce and play what they like. They choose, instead, to
live in cyberspace, where they will remain, in the words of the
Western press, a counterculture, without bothering to look for
solutions elsewhere. The same illusion grips the censors in the
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, who are suddenly confronted
with a picture of Iranian music as subversive. The paranoia of
the Ahmadinejad administration is exacerbated. The Chavosh movement
engaged with the dominant culture of its day to effectuate an
overhaul of Iranian classical music. The same is hard to imagine
within the sphere of Western-inspired rock music in Iran. For
music to bring sweeping change in Iran, as did rock music in
the West, both the musical and the political registers have to
be different. The song, in other words, does not remain the same.
Endnotes
[1] Notably Exir (2005)
by a heavy metal band, Kahtmayan, released with Ava Khorshid
Records.
[2] See,
for instance, Washington Post, August 23, 2001; Christian
Science Monitor, October 1, 2003; and New York Times,
February 15, 2006.
[3] Ameneh
Youssefzadeh, “The Situation of Music in Iran Since the Revolution:
The Role of Official Organizations,” British Journal of Ethnomusicology 9/2
(2000), p. 39.
[4] See
Ted Swedenburg, “Imagined Youths,” Middle East Report 245
(Winter 2007).
[5] See,
for instance, Colin Meyn, “Rocking Lolita in Tehran,” In These
Times, December 18, 2007 and Simon Broughton, “Something
Inside So Strong,” Guardian, January 16, 2009.
[6] Mark
LeVine, Heavy Metal Islam (New York: Random House, 2008),
p. 207.

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